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Komsomol Central Committee Report to 21st Congress

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in Russian 30 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Report by Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary V. Mironenko: "Komsomol Central Committee Report to 21st Komsomol Congress"]

[Text] The report of the Komsomol Central Committee to the 21st Komsomol Congress, which was approved by the 10th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum, is being published today. An opportunity is offered to familiarize oneself in advance with information on the Central Committee's activity in carrying out the resolutions of the 20th Komsomol Congress. The Plenum authorized Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary V. Mironenko to deliver the political report at the Congress:

I.

The 21st Komsomol Congress is an extraordinary one, in spite of the fact that there was no such definition in the resolution on convening it. It is made extraordinary by the entire course of events in the Komsomol's development during the three years which have passed since the 20th Congress, with the worsening political situation in society and the increasing economic instability and social tensions.

The Contradictions of Renewal

Both in April 1985 and in April 1987, at the 20th Komsomol Congress, we assumed that the essence of perestroika lay merely in correcting certain distortions in socialist society. However, life has shown that society does not need partial changes, but a radical alteration of its basis—from the economic foundation to the political superstructure.

Under conditions of switching the economy onto new tracks, the development of democracy and glasnost are laying down the true prerequisites for the country's departure on the path toward a democratic, humane socialism. The administrative-command system is being dismantled; a search is in progress for a way to renew the Soviet federation; and new political, ideological and moral priorities are being set. The authority of the Soviets and various forms of property are being asserted; the cooperative movement is picking up speed, and the land is acquiring owner-operators.

A noteworthy political phenomenon of the past three years is the polarization of social forces. Clearly revealed are not only conservative elements, but also destructive forces whose goal is to take advantage of the present difficulties, both to satisfy their own political ambitions, and to introduce alien ideas and currents into the public consciousness.

Social instability, the crisis of the social system, and the downfall of stereotypes are acutely and especially dramatically reflected among the young people.

For the majority of young workers, the economic reform has not yet provided positive results. Their standard of living is falling.

Young people are still discriminated against in the sphere of labor and consumption. The average wages of young workers and employees amounts to 120-140 rubles in all. Nearly 2.5 million young families are on the list for housing, and have no prospects of getting it in the near future. The level of material support for the majority of students is significantly below the survival minimum.

Among the 7,000,000 unemployed workers in the country, more than half consists of young men and women. Consumerism, social apathy, and various kinds of negative phenomena are on the rise among young people. Every year nearly a million crimes and misdemeanors are committed, in which over three million young men and women take part. About 130,000 narcotics addicts have been registered in the country—the majority of which are young people.

It is becoming common for significant portion of the young people to reject everything from the past; they have no faith in the possibilities of the official structures, including the Komsomol, nor in achieving perestroika in society.

The destruction of the myth of "a happy childhood and youth under socialism," has had and continues to have a significant influence on young people, who no longer want to accept everything on faith. According to data from sociologists, less than 40 percent of young people connect the country's future with socialism in its traditional sense. The majority speak out not for socialism or capitalism, but for some kind of new social system, the contours of which have not yet been revealed in the mass consciousness.

The Times Demand Action

During the reporting period the Komsomol Central Committee's efforts were directed toward:

- participation in the economic, political and social changes in the country;
- formation of new democratic mechanisms and the structure of a political and national consensus (above all, at the young people's level);
- defending the rights and interests of young people in various spheres of socio-economic, political and cultural life; and,
- drawing up the basis for a contemporary youth policy, and setting up committees and administrations in the system of legislative and executive organs of power to coordinate this policy on a national scale.

The principal positions of the Komsomol on the fundamental questions of a contemporary policy are laid down in the mandate of the USSR People's Deputies elected

from the Komsomol; in the Program Declaration adopted by the 9th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum; in a number of resolutions of the Central Committee Buro; and in the speeches of members of the central elected organs on the pages of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and other publications.

The Komsomol Central Committee has spoken out:

- for full authority for the Soviets;
- for various forms of property, which would exclude the possibility of man exploiting man, or the state exploiting man;
- for developing regional cost accounting and local self-administration;
- for overcoming inflation and an investment policy that cares about the people;
- for priority development of the social sphere and reduction of military spending; and,
- for adopting as fast as possible laws on social organizations, on the press, and on freedom of conscience; and other state acts which affirm genuine popular rule and pluralism.

II.

Komsomol organizations will make their mark in the front lines of the struggle for fundamental socio-economic changes; they will become actively involved in genuine social relations, appealing to the needs and interests of specific young people: these are the basic directions for restructuring the young people's league, as defined by the 20th Komsomol Congress.

On the Economic Activity of the Komsomol

Carrying out the decisions of the Congress, the 11th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum defined measures for renovating the economic activity of Komsomol organizations. It is seen as one of the means for resolving critical social problems of young people, involving the Komsomol in developing the economy, preparing young men and women for life and work in conditions of formation of a qualitatively-new system of socialist management.

The normative-legal basis of the Komsomol's activity are the government decrees:

- “On Expanding the Foreign Economic Activities of the Komsomol; and
- “On Assistance in the Economic Activity of the Komsomol.”

The New Economic Structure

Komsomol committees operate more than 4,000 economic formations, with total production volume of

goods and services of over two billion rubles. For coordinating their actions and rendering practical assistance, a young-people's commercial bank, the foreign-economic association “YuNEKS,” and a coordinating and methodological center have been set up in the Komsomol system.

“Razvitiye” [Development], a share-holding society, has been organized for production of modern toys for children. A inter-regional commercial association, “Molodezhnaya moda,” [Youth Fashions] (Leningrad, Saratov) produces young-people's clothing. Personal computers have begun to appear in the trade system, manufactured by youth enterprises of Cheboksary and Smolensk.

The Komsomol and Cooperation

The Komsomol Central Committee has supported the cooperative movement in the country. Today there are more than 17,000 youth, student and pupil cooperatives, uniting nearly a million young men and women. A concept for developing pupil cooperation was jointly developed with USSR Gosobrazovaniye [State Committee for Public Education], and a Pupil Cooperative Association has been set up.

Student Detachments

During the three-year period, student detachments [studotryad] have carried out more than two billion rubles worth of work.

The basic directions of the changes are—rejection of a rigid bureaucracy, specialized forms for attracting college and elementary school student-youth to labor, and restoration of the principle of voluntarism. A statute has been drawn up on Nationwide Student Detachment, and outmoded and morally obsolete normative acts have been abolished. The functions of the Central Staff of the SO [Siberian Department], Komsomol Central Committee have been changed—it has been turned into a coordinating and methodological organ.

Housing for Young People

Over 35,000 young families have received well-appointed apartments in MZhK's [Young People's Housing Complex]. At the present time, nearly 700 MZhK have been built or are under construction, at a total cost of 1.2 billion rubles. The Komsomol Central Committee in cooperation with Gosagroprom [State Agroindustrial Committee] of the RSFSR Non-Chernozem Zone have drawn up and are implementing a program for the 1989-1995 period for construction of rural youth housing-production complexes on 69 economically-weak farms. Planning is under way for construction of 120 rural MZhK's.

The All Union MZhK Center at the Komsomol Central Committee has been in operation since 1987. Its main

mission is to render practical assistance to organizational committees and regional cost-accounting centers. An Association of Collectives of Experimental MZhK has been created.

Although the MZhK movement has not made any major changes in providing housing to young people, it has aroused in tens of thousands of young people faith in their ability to resolve their daily problems by their own efforts, relying on the support of Komsomol organizations.

The Scientific-Technical Creativity of Young People

An organizational-economic mechanism has been formed for the NTTM [Scientific-Technical Creativity of Young People] social-state system. The creation of 600 NTTM centers has provided impetus to developing young people's creative initiatives. The total volume of work carried out in the years 1987-1989 amounted to 700 million rubles, as 600,000 young people worked voluntarily on the staff of creative collectives in their free time. Services of the NTTM system are enjoyed by industrial enterprises, scientific research institutes and design bureaus, cooperatives, and foreign firms.

NTTM coordination centers are in operation in republics, krais and oblasts, and a system is being organized for training and re-training organizers of technical creativity for young people. The Komsomol Central Committee and All-Union Coordination Council have begun to publish a magazine, NTTM-UMELETS [NTTM-Skilled Craftsmen].

More than 100 million rubles have come in to the funds of regional NTTM councils, earned by young innovators. Funds are directed toward financing amateur technical creativity, computer clubs, and for holding exhibits.

The Komsomol Central Committee has supported a number of initiatives in the area of intellectual creative activity, and has been the organizer of setting up programs to search for talented young people. Its first structural elements were "Soyuz," an all-union scientific-academic young people's aerospace society; "Yunost," a center for computer creativity; the "Intellect XXI veka" [21st Century Intellect] fund; and "Deti kak tvortsy XXI veka" [Children as the Creators of the 21st Century], a Soviet-American project for school pupils.

The Komsomol and the Renaissance of the Village

The USSR Council of Ministers' Resolution, "On Additional Privileges for Resettlement and Measures for Further Improvement of the Practice of Social Conscription of Young People for Agriculture," which was adopted upon the initiative of the Komsomol Central Committee, has promoted the creation of a principally new economic and legal mechanism for protecting the rights and interests of young people arriving in the rural area.

The need to breath life into the emptied villages was born through the actions of the Komsomol Central

Committee and the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, "I Choose to Live in the Countryside." More than 30,000 people have found jobs on kolkhozes and sovkhozes. An automated system, "Poisk," [Search] has been set up to find jobs for young people in rural areas.

The Komsomol Central Committee and USSR Central Union of Consumer Societies organized for 1989-1990 a Nationwide contest for the best farmstead of young farmers. The Komsomol Central Committee was co-founder of the Agroekologiya Association, which is occupied with production of ecologically-pure agricultural production. The Association of Young People's Cost-Accounting Enterprises, cooperatives of the RSFSR Non-Chernozem Zone, "Young Russia," is coordinating the activities of enterprise-shareholders in restoring the Russian heartland, realizing various youth programs, and development of native industries. NECHERNOZ-EMIE [The Non-Chernozem Zone], a socio-political popular-scientific magazine for young people began publication in 1990.

The introduction of leasing and development of relationships of land ownership demanded of the Komsomol principally new approaches and decisions, and active participation in the activities of the Leasers' Society, the Association of Peasant Farms, and the Cooperatives of Russia.

Sponsorship of Shock Workers: a New Quality

The Komsomol Central Committee has rejected a formal, gross-output approach, in which the main indicator was the number of young people sent off to crash construction projects. The system for organization of social conscription of young people has been placed on a voluntary, legal-contractual basis. The new Statute on All-Union Komsomol Shock Construction Projects has been adopted, and their number has been reduced from 65 to three. Only the West Siberian Territorial-Production Complex, the RSFSR Non-Chernozem Zone and BAM retain the status of All-Union. The activities of Komsomol Central Committee staffs have been switched to cost-accounting, and they have been turned into economic production associations.

The Komsomol Central Committee is helping to realize the initiatives of a number of Komsomol committees and People's Deputies of the USSR on developing young people's territorial contracts in the eastern regions of the country, and on creation of a Center for Assimilation and Development of the Far East and the BAM zone.

For a State Policy on Young People

The socio-economic vulnerability of the young people has made it necessary to draw up a comprehensive state policy on young people. The USSR Supreme Soviet was given a report, "On the Situation of Young People in Society." A draft law, "On the Basic Principles of a State Policy on Young People," was drawn up, discussed at the

7th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum and in Komsomol organizations, and was submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Youth Affairs, organized on the initiative of the Komsomol Central Committee, was a step in the direction of establishing the organizational basis for a state youth policy, as was the structure in the organs of executive power (USSR Council of Ministers, Goskomtrud and others).

The establishment of legal bases for a youth policy was backed up by active participation in the solution of specific social and economic questions. With the direct participation of the Komsomol Central Committee, the procedure for social insurance was changed; measures were introduced for the material support of young families and single mothers; enterprises and organizations have been granted the necessary rights to render assistance to young people; and a youth fund was set up. The Central Trade Union Council and Goskomtrud SSR, upon the suggestion of the Komsomol Central Committee, approved recommendations for participation of Komsomol committees in drawing up and implementing collective agreements, which will permit more fully considering the interests of young people.

III

The policy of the 20th Komsomol Congress toward democratization, scrapping bureaucratic centralism and restoration of the lost ties with young people has produced its first results. However, the changes taking place in the league are lagging behind the rate of social development, and do not always coincide with the wishes of Komsomol members.

Priority to First Things

The orientation on primary links and their needs, departure from issuing directives in administration, and transferring the right of independent choice of forms and methods of operation, have since the Congress created the necessary conditions for renewing the Komsomol.

The 3rd Central Committee Plenum approved the conduct of direct, contested elections for Komsomol committee and bureau secretaries. The shameful practice of discussions with recommended candidatures prior to their election has been discontinued. Primary organizations have received the right to independently decide questions of accepting people into the youth league, or extending the period in which one can be a member. Office work and registration of Komsomol members have been greatly simplified.

Komsomol dissatisfaction with the work of electoral organs has prompted the Komsomol Central Committee to conduct an experiment on a new procedure for their formation in seven republic and 45 kray and oblast organizations. The experiment supported the creation of

conditions for holding elections in a democratic atmosphere, and election to Komsomol membership of genuinely businesslike and enterprising Komsomol members, who are not indifferent to the fate of the league.

In a number of regions of the country, new approaches have been worked out to create primary organizations, and to conduct registration of Komsomol members.

Komsomol organizations today are independent in determining the priorities of their actions and the form of their realization. At the very same time, positive changes in the primary organizations are proceeding very slowly.

On the Make-Up of the Komsomol

Under conditions of re-ination of views on the Soviet federation and the headlong growth of centrifugal tendencies, in the Komsomol as well, the Komsomol Central Committee at its latest plenums has been approaching a new conception of the make-up and principles for building the league, and analysis of the situation in it.

The Lithuanian Komsomol's 22nd Congress declared the transformation of the Leninist Communist Youth League [LKSM] into an independent organization—the Communist Youth League of Lithuania. Komsomol members who disagreed with this decision united in an organization that is part of the All Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol]. The situation which emerged was the subject of detailed analysis at two Komsomol Central Committee Plenums.

A congress of the Leninist Communist Youth League of Estonia proclaimed the independence of the organization, and declared a transition period up to 1 March 1990; upon expiration of the period, the activity of the Estonian LKSM, based upon the current Komsomol Regulations, would be considered terminated. New youth organizations were formed: The Estonian Youth Association, and the Estonian Youth Fund. In addition, the republic conference decided to continue the activity of the Estonian LKSM on the basis of the new Regulations and Program. In this situation, acknowledging the renewed Estonian LKSM as a constituent part of the Komsomol, the Komsomol Central Committee Bureau deemed it necessary to agree with the proposals for rendering assistance in setting up other youth organizations in the republic as well.

The proposal of a number of Komsomol organizations of the Russian Federation to form an RSFSR Komsomol was twice discussed at Komsomol Central Committee Plenums. A congress of RSFSR Komsomol organizations held in February 1990 summed up the discussions which took place during the reporting and election campaign.

The congress adopted a resolution on voluntary association of Komsomol organizations located on the territory of Russia, as the RSFSR Leninist Communist

Youth League. The term of office of the delegates has been extended in order to continue the work of the congress in June 1990, organize the elected organs of the RSFSR Komsomol and adopt program and normative-regulatory documents at the final sessions.

Komsomol Cadres

The Komsomol Central Committee has conducted a line toward developing democratic norms in working with cadres. In the course of the past reporting and election campaign alone, every fourth secretary of Komsomol gorkoms and raykoms were chosen in this matter; and election of secretaries from among several candidates took place in every other kray and oblast conference.

In three years practically all Komsomol cadres have been replaced, and in certain organizations two or three times.

Of the Komsomol members polled, 57 percent noted that democratization helped elect the most worthy and prestigious people to leading Komsomol organs.*

The Komsomol Central Committee Buro has examined the question, "Of the Reduction and Principles of Forming the Staff Structures of Local Komsomol Organs," and has supported the proposal of the union republic Komsomol central committees and Komsomol kraykoms and obkoms, on reducing their staff by 25.4 percent.

The 4th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum approved the basic directions of work on training and re-training cadres. The Higher Komsomol School [VKSh] and the VKSh Scientific Research Center were reorganized, and a project was drawn up to reorganize the "Olimpiyets" Youth Center. Institutes for improving the skills of the cadres and the aktiv were set up in Kiev and Tashkent, and a number of regional academic-scientific centers were set up on the facilities of previously-operating republic and zonal Komsomol schools. The number of local academic institutions has grown from 46 to 87. They have been granted the right to independently determine the basic content of the academic process.

The Central Elected Organ under the New Conditions

The capability for renewal and a constant influx of new strength established in the Regulations has had a positive effect on the activity of the Central Committee. Since the 20th Komsomol Congress there has been a 15.8 percent turnover in the make-up of the Central Committee.

The 11th Central Committee Plenum approved the clause, "On Formations from the Membership and Candidate Membership of the Komsomol Central Committee." Central Committee commissions were formed according to the sector in which they work. In connection with the necessity to more clearly define the authority of Central Committee members, the Status of a

Central Committee Member and the Statute on Permanent Commissions, and the Work Regulations of the Komsomol Central Committee were drawn up and adopted at the 7th Plenum.

Standing committees have assumed responsibility for preparing resolutions on such questions as the planning and financing of Central Committee work, defining the priority directions of activity and the structure of the staff; thereby, the division of functions between elective and executive bodies was brought about.

Democratization has opened the "veil of secrecy" over the Central Committee's activity. Detailed articles on plenum materials published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and thorough reporting on television and radio have provided members of the league to assess the urgency of the problems under discussion, the correlation of the resolutions and the processes taking place in society, and the activity and positions of their representatives.

Finances: Democratization and Glasnost

The principal financial and economic activity of the Central Committee during the reporting period was establishing optimal conditions for carrying out the Komsomol's established missions. A regulation was adopted on Komsomol monetary assets. The transition from centralized distribution of funds to democratic "upward" methods of budget formation was implemented. Today Komsomol organizations themselves are planning their own expenditures; and they are defining their own staffs, and forms for acquiring and realizing assets.

For the first time in the league's history the Komsomol Central Committee's budget was formed by the Central Committee Finance and Budget Commission; the budget was approved at the plenum and published in KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA.

In 1988-89 the Komsomol Central Committee transferred funds for philanthropic purposes and for improving young people's socio-economic situation amounting to 61.7 million rubles, to include 50 million rubles to improve pension support for invalids and needy young people, and 7 million for the alleviating the consequences of the earthquakes in Armenia and Tajikistan.

In late 1989 the process of redistribution of monetary assets among primary organizations was begun. For example, Komsomol members at AvtoVAZ [Volga Automotive Plant] employed 70 percent of their own membership dues for their own purposes. Conflicts have sprung up between primary organizations and the higher authorities. The situation was aggravated in connection with the reduction in the total amount of income because of the decline in Komsomol membership, and the resolution taken at the 7th Komsomol Central Committee Plenum on increasing the salary of Komsomol officials.

A critical financial situation has come to pass. The Komsomol Organization Deductions for the Komsomol Central Committee Budget (in millions of rubles) as opposed to Subsidies from the Komsomol Central Committee Budget (in millions of rubles) were as follows: in 1987, 32.1 vs. 57.8; in 1988, 7.5 vs. 62.3; in 1989, 9.5 vs. 76.0; in 1990 0 vs. 172.2.

Under these conditions, additional funds from Komsomol insurance reserves (23 million rubles in 1989 and 93 million rubles in 1990) were allocated to finance the activities of Komsomol organizations.

The question of use of monetary resources is increasingly turning from an economic into a political question. A situation is taking shape in the league, characterized by the fact that with respect to the primary organizations, Komsomol gorkoms, raykoms and obkoms are changing from the status of "masters" into the status of organs created by the primary organs themselves.

The Party and the Komsomol: For New Relationships

Swift changes in society, the entry of new forces and movements into the political arena, the re-examination of the role of the CPSU in the nation's life, and the processes taking place within the party itself, have forced the Komsomol Central Committee to seek new approaches to the relationship between the party and the Komsomol. Upon the insistence of Komsomol officials who were delegates to the 19th All-Union Party Conference clauses were included in its resolutions on the necessity for working out a comprehensive state policy with respect to the young people, to restore Leninist principles of party supervision of the Komsomol, observance and respect of the organizational independence of the Komsomol, and Komsomol participation in working out party policy.

The democratization of social life has left its imprint on the relationships between party and Komsomol committees.

The results of a sociological survey on the influence of party supervision of the activity of Komsomol Organizations show that among Komsomol members and youth, in 1988 30 per cent felt a positive influence, 25 per cent reported a mild influence, 17 per cent said no influence, 9 per cent felt it hindered perestroika in the Komsomol, and 18 per cent remained undecided. In 1989, among the same group, 12 per cent felt a positive influence, 26 per cent reported a mild influence, 19 per cent said no influence, 17 per cent felt it hindered perestroika in the Komsomol, and 25 per cent remained undecided. The results among Komsomol Officials show that in 1988 28 per cent felt a positive influence, 33 per cent reported a mild influence, 20 per cent said no influence, 17 per cent felt it hindered perestroika in the Komsomol, and 4 per cent remained undecided. In 1989 among Komsomol officials, 20 per cent felt a positive influence, 30 per cent reported a mild influence, 17 per cent said no influence, 22 per cent felt it hindered perestroika, and 11 per cent remained undecided.

We are following the party committees who are striving to operate in an innovative manner and to structure their activities in cooperation with the Komsomol. Joint plenums of the CP Central Committees and the Komsomol Central Committees of Tajikistan; the Astrakhan, and Leningrad CPSU Obkoms and the Komsomol; and many reporting and election conferences, above all in Volgograd and Petrozavodsk, have shown that the Komsomol aktiv too has its own opinion on many controversial political questions, including the processes taking place in the CPSU.

Nevertheless, the party's manner of working with the Komsomol in most organizations remains as yet unchanged.

Indecisiveness at the Komsomol Central Committee in re-thinking the Komsomol's relationship with party and state authorities, and the lack of a clear-cut position toward proponents of radical and conservative courses toward perestroika in the party have led to a loss of faith on the part of the politically-active part of the youth.

IV.

The decisive break with dogmatism in the theory and practice of socialist construction, the new political realities, and glasnost and pluralism in society have faced the Komsomol Central Committee with the necessity of fundamentally restructuring its ideological work, and accentuating in-depth analytic activity; and the search, study, generalization and support of new experience.

Emancipation from Ideological Dogma

After the 20th Congress, a working group on problems of self-employed associations and a special scientific subdivision were set up at the Komsomol Central Committee's Higher Komsomol School Scientific Research Center. A data bank on youth associations is being organized. The work experience of Komsomol committees of Belorussia, Kuybyshev, Novosibirsk and Sverdlovsk Oblasts and the cities of Moscow and Kiev is being summarized; the program aims of civic initiative movements in Latvia, Lithuania and Uzbekistan are being thoroughly analyzed. The information and analysis materials derived are being swiftly dispatched to Komsomol committees.

An All-Union Meeting of Political Clubs was held in October 1988 under the theme, "The First RKSM [Russian Komsomol]: 70 Years Later." It served as an example of effective dialog, and cooperation with young people's political associations on an equal basis.

An All-Union Information Coordinating Council of Intermovement, and an All-Union Association of Young Historians were created; as well as associations for international youth initiatives and young social scientists occupied with questions of interethnic relations.

Ties were established with representatives of the burgeoning workers' movement. In February 1990 a

"round-table" discussion was held under the theme, "The Komsomol and the Workers' Movement," with participation of the leaders of strike committees, political scientists and Komsomol officials.

Significant efforts have been directed toward coordination of scientific research on youth problems, and organizing the work of the Interagency Council for coordination of this research and its thematic sections. A number of all-union schools for young social scientists, scientific conferences and seminars were proposed.

This approach permitted a new look at the historical experience of the Komsomol as well. The celebration of the 70th Anniversary of the organization in 1988 was not merely an ostentatious ritual, but an occasion for turning to the controversial history of the league, and to examine the previously-closed pages in the context of the development of the country and society.

The Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat has adopted a program for in-depth study of the problems of Komsomol history. Work has begun on "Essays on Komsomol History," on re-publishing the minutes of the 1st through the 10th Congresses and the All-Union Komsomol Conferences. The first results of perestroika in historic scholarship on the Komsomol were summed up in March 1989 at the All-Union Conference conducted under the theme, "Seventy Years of the Komsomol: History, Experience, Problems."

And yet, thus far these are only the first steps in taking advantage of the capabilities of social science for in-depth elaboration of the problems of young people and the Komsomol.

In Consideration of the National Factor

In rejecting the endless incantations on the unbreakable friendship of the nations of the USSR, the Komsomol was re-examining the forms and methods of inter-ethnic work. Its basic efforts were directed at stabilization of the situation in the young people's environment, and prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts.

A permanent conference of Komsomol committee first secretaries from union and autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts and okrugs has been formed for the purposes of coordinating efforts and drawing the attention of Komsomol committees to restructuring the international education of young people, and preparing proposals for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum.

A laboratory on inter-ethnic problems has been organized at the Higher Komsomol School's Scientific Research Center at the Komsomol Central Committee. A series of joint conferences with the Komsomol Central Committee Higher Komsomol School and a section of the Council on Coordination of Scientific Research Problems of Young People has been set up, as well as "round tables," scientific-practical conferences, and a scientific-political praktikum, "The Komsomol and the

Peoples of the North" (in the city of Khanty-Mansiysk). International friendship days have been held in Ulyanovsk, and an international friendship week in Karaganda. The First Youth Festival of the Peoples of the North was held in Yakutsk.

The Komsomol Press—An Active Force for Perestroika

After the 20th Congress, the youth press emerged at a qualitatively new level, and was changed both in its spirit and substance, becoming an influential force in the youth environment. It has been a catalyst of radical transformations in society and in the Komsomol as well. Without the aggressive position of the youth mass information media, the path which the Komsomol has traveled for three years would have stretched out for a considerably longer period.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has done a great deal to arouse public interest in the problems of perestroika in the Komsomol. It has found suitable forms of expression of interest to the readers. But the newspaper has not always managed to reflect diversity of opinion and has at times manifested superficiality and haste in its assessment of complex and multifaceted processes, which demanded in-depth and weighty consideration.

The new trends in the activities of the youth press were at the center of attention of the Komsomol Central Committee. The Central Committee Buro and Secretariat have examined the questions, "On KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's Illumination of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies," "On the Role of the Magazine SMENA, and the Weekly, SOBESEDNIK, in Propaganda and in Organization to Carry out the Resolutions of the 20th Komsomol Congress," and others. These were the main topics at seminars of editors of young people's publications in Minsk, Moscow and Riga; at the All-Union Conference of Journalists, and at the Youth Press Festival in Tbilisi.

Approaches to working with youth publications has changed in favor of mutual cooperation and support. Bureaucratic methods of management of newspapers and magazines is seen less and less often in practice. Editors and editorial boards of many publications are now being confirmed on a competitive basis, openly, at plenums and conferences. Regulations have been drawn up defining the democratic principles of the relationships of the editors and Komsomol committees. On the initiative of the Komsomol Central Committee, new democratic forms have arisen for interaction with the managers of publications—the Council of Editors of Local Youth Newspapers, and the Komsomol Central Committee's Council of Chief Magazine Editors.

The Komsomol press has continued to grow in popularity. KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA has become the top weekly newspaper in the country, with a circulation of over 20,000,000 copies. The single-issue circulation of newspapers and magazines has grown from 80 million in

1987 to 85 million copies this year. More than 20 new publications have been established, including three central publications.

On the initiative and with the material support of the Komsomol Central Committee, a serialized topical TASS youth bulletin, and a commercial musical information magazine, *METALL KHAMMER*, have begun to appear.

The activity of *MOLODAYA GVARDIYA*, the Komsomol Central Committee publishing and printing association, has been fundamentally restructured. Nearly a thousand book titles have been published, with a circulation of over 110 million copies.

At the same time, over the last 20 years book production has not grown because of the shortage of paper and its poor quality. Because of a lack of cash, the decision on creating new youth magazines has not been implemented. And the technical re-equipment of the printing facilities is being carried out slowly.

The Main Editors for Youth Television Programming of Central Television has produced new programs: "Youth Editors Invite You," "Youth Bulletin," and "Auktsion" [Auction]. Broadcasts of the contest program, "The Club for the Merry and Quick-Witted," have been renewed. According to surveys of TV viewers, the program *VZGLYAD* [Viewpoint], enjoys the greatest popularity of all programs from Central Television. In 1990, the amount of broadcasting by the Main Editors for Young People's Radio Programs was significantly increased. Presently radio station *YUNOST* [Youth] is heard 38 hours per week, which is a third more than last year.

The Komsomol and the Defense of Society

New approaches have been developed in Komsomol work on bringing up the young people in the spirit of civic responsibility, patriotism and readiness and ability to defend the Fatherland. The Komsomol Central Committee has supported Komsomol members and young people in movements to perpetuate the memory of the Defenders of the Motherland and Soldier-Internationalists, to search for war veterans who have not yet received their medals from the Great Patriotic War, and to rehabilitate those repressed in the years of the personality cult. An important feature of the degree to which the young people have grasped common human values was the military history movement, which was made official in the Federation of Military History Clubs at the Komsomol Central Committee.

The content of patriotic-defense work has been renovated. Many questions have been resolved, regarding the organizational, financial and material-technical support of this work, to include cost-free transfer by the USSR Defense Ministry of military hardware and equipment to the young people's clubs and associations.

Upon the suggestions of Komsomol organizations at elementary schools, vocational-technical schools and

technikums, an All-Union Voluntary Youth Army Movement has been organized from among various un-coordinated formations. Creation is underway of patriotic-defense associations of young border guards, paratroops, and a young people's Navy League. The Komsomol Central Committee has approved a program for building specialized sailboats for young seaman's clubs.

Young soldiers in the Reserve and young Afghanistan Veterans played a special role in restructuring the Komsomol's popular defense work. Reserve soldier councils and clubs for preparing young people for various kinds of military service are in operation. An all-union association of reserve soldiers' councils, internationalist-soldiers, and patriotic defense organizations has been created. Upon the initiative of the Komsomol Central Committee and the associations, nearly 20 resolutions of the party, the government, and the Komsomol have been adopted and realized on principal questions of socio-legal defense preparation, and medical rehabilitation of internationalist soldiers and family members of servicemen who perished in Afghanistan.

The perestroika process has become more active in Komsomol organizations of the Army and Navy, Border Forces and Interior Troops. For the first time, a special-purpose organization of the Komsomol of the USSR Armed Forces, with its elected administrative organs—Councils of Komsomol Organizations—have been organized by democratic means. They consist of more than two thousand elected representatives of territorial Komsomol organizations. Organizational and financial conditions have been set up to affirm the independence of the primary military organizations.

During the past reporting and election period, military Komsomol organizations were granted the right to independently elect their own delegates to the Komsomol Congress, and the corresponding quotas were defined for them at the central elective bodies. Soviets of Komsomol organizations are taking measures to protect their rights and to establish conditions for realizing the interests of the young soldiers.

Young People, Culture and Sports

For Komsomol committees, the sphere of culture has become a kind of laboratory for new forms of realizing the many-faceted youth initiatives. Here, youth centers are becoming a reliable mechanism. It is namely they who have assumed the task of introducing young men and women to the spiritual life of society; however, they have been subjected to attacks on the part of various bureaucrats, and accused of commercialization of their activities. Being well-acquainted with the reasons for these attacks, the Komsomol Central Committee is speaking out decisively against monopolies by any agency, regardless of the noble ends they profess.

On the basis of documents drawn up at the Komsomol Central Committee, many amateur associations and special-interest clubs have been formally organized as

young people's cultural centers, theaters, studios, creative workshops, charitable and educational associations.

On the initiative of the Komsomol Central Committee, nationwide meetings have been held for young writers, cinematographers, and leaders of theatrical studios, and an All-Union Young Composers' Festival was held. A festival was held for creative youth of socialist countries, under the joint auspices of the USSR Ministry of Culture, and an All-Union Exhibit of Young Artists, dedicated to the 70th Anniversary of the Komsomol, was held under joint auspices of the USSR Artists' Union.

With the support of the Komsomol Central Committee, an all-union conference of young cinematographers, an association of theatrical studios, and associations of musicians, architects and writers were established; as well as an All-Union Motion Picture and Television Center for Children and Young People, the Society of Friends of Motion Pictures, the theatrical studio, "School of Musical Arts," and the All-Union Council of Clubs for Lovers of the Fantastic.

Movements supported by the Komsomol have developed, clubs for songwriters and political songs, and associations of an ecological-cultural orientation. Joint work has been stepped up with the All-Russian Society for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments, and the All-Union Musical Society.

Komsomol work in the sphere of physical culture and sport has been given new content. Accents in the activity of the central committee are moving toward the creation of mechanisms for realizing youth initiatives.

Youth centers and associations created by Komsomol committees have taken up the organization of sports matches and restorative work among the population. The "Yuni-Sport" Association has been established at the Komsomol Central Committee. The support of new sports attraction, national kinds of sport, production of sporting goods, bright popular holidays, advertising—these are just a few of its tasks.

In spite of their financial difficulties, Komsomol committees are striving to preserve clubs for children and teens, including Zolotaya Shayba [Golden Puck], Kozhanyy Myach [Leather Ball], and others. The newly-created Sambist [Unarmed Combat] and Snaypery Basketbola [Basketball Snipers] clubs are being developed.

Youth Tourism

Seventeen million young men and women have traveled the routes of "Sputnik," the service volume of which amounts to 1,100,000,000 rubles. Nearly 1.5 million people have taken part in international tourist exchanges. Sputnik's activities have become more oriented toward the professional and cognitive interests of the young people. The volume of family tourism has increased five-fold.

Since January 1989, the youth tourism system has been operating under new management conditions. The right to independently make international tourist contacts has been granted to local Youth Tourism Buros. This has made it possible to increase the number of trips abroad by young Soviet tourists to more than 100,000 per year.

Significant sums were directed toward strengthening the material base of tourism. New hotels have been put into operation in Lvov, Bukhara, and Voroshilovgrad. A concept for developing active forms of tourism has been worked out. "Spart" cost-accounting firms and the "Prikl'yucheniye" [Adventure] Club have begun operating. More than 160,000 people have enjoyed their services.

V.

The concepts of humanization of training and democratic reform of the entire educational system in the USSR, and support for teacher cooperation and creative innovators were decisive in the activities of the Komsomol Central Committee in the area of school-construction, and developing higher and secondary specialized education.

The Komsomol and the Elementary School

Problems of Komsomol interaction with schools under conditions of perestroika were examined at a joint plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee and the Central Soviet of the VPO [All-Union Pioneer Organization] imeni Lenin in May 1988, and were reflected in a number of joint resolutions and actions of the Komsomol Central Committee and the USSR State Committee on Public Education.

The Komsomol Central Committee Secretariat has summarized suggestions from Komsomol organizations on draft concepts for restructuring general secondary, vocational and continuing education, and regulations on schools and vocational-technical schools for the All-Union Congress of Public Education Workers (December 1988).

An All-Union Scientific Research Center for Seeking, Developing and Supporting Youth Talent, seven regional children's computer camps, and a public fund for young railroaders were established; and final work is being completed on organization of nationwide clubs for intellectual creative games, and for young seamen.

On the initiative of the Komsomol Central Committee, the minimum age was reduced for student authorization to work in their non-study free time, and the elements of a system of social security have been introduced for them—paid vacations, medical treatment, the right to join professional societies, and the right to count the time they have actually worked against their total work experience. These measures have allowed more than 1.2 million pupils to find work.

The proposals of the Komsomol Central Committee on fundamental improvements to training and education of orphans and children not in the care of their parents were fully and completely considered in the corresponding resolutions of the USSR Council of Ministers of July 1987. Vacationing at All-Union Pioneer Camps were 16,000 orphans and children not in the care of their parents.

Five million rubles have been allocated for financing the programs of Dobroye Serdtse [Kind Heart], the Soviet children's fund; Nadezhda [Hope], Zhizn rebenka [Life for a Child] and Souchastiye v sudbe rebenka [Partnership in the Fate of a Child]. One million rubles were allocated for construction of an experimental training and education complexes for orphans at the Electrical Equipment Manufacturing Plant imeni Lepse in Kirov.

In accordance with instructions from the 20th Komsomol Congress, an experiment is being conducted jointly with the USSR Academy of Pedagogical Sciences on restructuring Komsomol work with juveniles at their place of residence.

The Komsomol has been supporting the creative work of young teachers. In seven Komsomol Central Committee laboratories, headed by leading innovative teachers, the professional skills of over 2,000 young teachers were improved.

Part of the Komsomol-pupils are striving for self-definition within the Komsomol, and to set up student Komsomol organizations within the framework of the rayon, city or republic, with their own administrative organs. In practically every city and rayon, Komsomol-pupil staffs have been set up, and over 100 elementary school gorkoms and raykoms have been set up. In a number of places young people's and juvenile's associations are being set up.

The Student Body and the Komsomol

The Komsomol Central Committee has supported student demands for radical changes in the teaching of the social sciences and in restructuring the activities of the military departments; and has spoken out against assigning students and pupils to agricultural work for no good reason.

On the initiative of the Komsomol Central Committee and with the support of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR People's Deputies, the most acute problems were resolved: offering student deferments to conscription into the Soviet Army; early release to the Reserves for military servicemen who are students; the voluntary nature of military training for VUZ students; restoration of air-travel privileges; and voluntary student participation in agricultural work. Student collectives have received the right to elect their own representatives to academic councils.

The Komsomol Central Committee, together with the USSR State Committee for Public Education and the

AUCCTU, have initiated the development of a social-state program, "The Student Family;" the establishment of a social assistance fund, "The All-Union Student Fund," for especially needy students and pupils; and have raised the minimum amount of student stipends.

The Komsomol Central Committee has rendered material-technical, methodological and organizational assistance in organizing student associations for medical, law and journalism students; and the All-Union Council of Student Organizations for Mining, Geological, Petroleum and Metallurgical VUZ's and Departments.

The Komsomol Central Committee, USSR State Committee for Public Education, and the AUCCTU have founded the All-Union Student Forum, which has become an important political event in the life of society and young people. In dialogues between students and the country's highest political leadership, the forum has expressed support for the policy of perestroika, assisted in focusing attention on the need to resolve urgent problems in higher and secondary specialized schools; and laid the basis for further progress, to unite the student body, and to motivate students to active participation in the interests of perestroika and the reform of society and the Komsomol.

VI.

On the All Union Pioneer Organization imeni V.I. Lenin

The 20th Congress, the nationwide Pioneer discussion and the 9th All-Union Pioneer Rally which followed, require that the Komsomol Central Committee examine anew the All-Union Pioneer Organization imeni V.I. Lenin [VPO].

Considering the many years of atrophy of the leading Pioneer organs, for which the Komsomol must share the blame, the Komsomol Central Committee has, first of all, organized work on drafting a concept for reforming the VPO; and, secondly, has given the Pioneer collectives themselves the right to independent action and decisions.

This has permitted the Pioneer organization to emancipate itself to a large extent. Some interesting shoots have sprung up in its life.

The joint plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee and the VPO imeni Lenin Central Soviet in May 1988, the All-Union Assembly of Activists in Pioneer Perestroika in "Artek," and a series of other major events; and finally, the All-Union Conference of Pioneer Workers in March 1990, have placed the organization in a qualitatively new condition, which meets the needs of the broad civic and moral development of the personality of a Pioneer.

The 10th All-Union Pioneer Rally will be held in September 1990. Discussion of a draft Regulation for the organization is under way.

A scientific research project on "Children, Juveniles and the Pioneer Organization in Conditions of Perestroyka," is being completed, and an association of researchers has been set up to study the problems of the children's movement. A new package of programs is being implemented, which provide for extensive participation of Pioneer collectives in various social and state efforts.

The course has been set for a volunteer, social, independent and self-governing, multi-national Pioneer organization, oriented toward the ideals of human and democratic socialism.

VII.

International Activity of the Komsomol Central Committee

Radical changes in world politics have demanded of the Komsomol Central Committee fundamental reform of the nature of its international activity.

The Komsomol Central Committee has given a central place to cooperation with the youth organizations of the socialist countries. But the changes which have taken place in the Eastern European countries require that the Komsomol Central Committee re-think the form and content of youth cooperation with these countries. Renewal of Komsomol ties with the youth organizations of the Korean People's Republic was a noteworthy event as well.

Cooperation was further developed with communist and revolutionary-democratic youth organizations, and with national-liberation movements.

In carrying out the policy of the 20th Congress for developing contacts with youth organization of various political orientations on the basis of the principles of new political thinking, the Komsomol has managed to significantly strengthen its ties with socialist and social-democratic youth leagues, with young liberals and radicals, Christian democrats, conservatives, influential pro-government organizations, and associations of young political figures from a number of countries.

Measures of the international youth campaign, "Nekst stop—Sovet" [Next Stop—Soviet Union], has become a non-traditional form of cooperation within the framework of developing the ideas of "people's diplomacy," with access to the broad strata of Soviet youth.

The 13th Worldwide Youth and Student Festival [VFDM], held in the summer of 1989 in Pyongyang, was an important event. The Komsomol Central Committee has actively engaged in the process of reform and democratization of VFDM and MSS [International Student Union] activities.

Proceeding from the real requirements for development, the Komsomol has begun reorientation of its international activity toward the practical needs of the league. The accent has been shifted to developing ties along such directions as education, culture, professional training,

research on youth problems, participation in economic and scientific-technical projects; and probationary work for young scientists, specialists, and production engineers in the leading industrially-developed countries.

The creation of the Komsomol Central Committee's International Commission and its activity are important elements in the democratization of international work. A significant portion of the international ties have been passed to Komsomol central committees, and to kray and oblast Komsomol committees.

Restructuring Komsomol Relationships with the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations

The Komsomol's rejection of a monopoly on government interests in all Soviet young people gave impetus to beginning equal dialogue and cooperation with all forces in the youth movement, not only abroad but within our country as well.

At the December 1989 general assembly of the USSR KMO [Committee on Youth Organizations], a new youth structure was set up, to which nationwide and republic associations, as well as other youth organizations, subscribe. While not rejecting all the positive things that were achieved in the plane of cooperation in the international sphere, the Committee is presently establishing a platform for joint action of various organizations in the country, including some that are still being organized, and for defending the positions of young people before the organs of state power and Soviet society.

With the rights of a member organization, the Komsomol has an opportunity to activate contacts and cooperation with youth organizations of various orientations.

VIII.

Restructuring the Komsomol: Principal Results of Three Years

In summing up the Komsomol Central Committee's accomplishments during the reporting period, we shall single out the main ones:

The priority activities of the Central Committees responded to the resolutions of the 20th Komsomol Congress. Today the Komsomol gives scope to broad democratic creativity, and considers itself a subject of realpolitik and legislative activity. It is acquiring new functions and features, among which are—defending the rights and interests of its members, creation of real conditions for all-round and harmonious development of the growing personality, calling to society's attention the problems of the younger generation, active participation in working out and implementing the state policy on youth, and preparing young men and women for a full-fledged and meaningful life in conditions of continuous reform of a humane and democratic socialism. The Komsomol has made an important contribution to

establishing a wide network of youth-innovative structures in science, manufacturing, education and culture, and in the organization of cost-accounting centers and cooperatives.

The decisive condition for changes in the life of the Komsomol, as indicated by the experience of the years which have passed since the 20th Komsomol Congress, is the universal democratization of internal Komsomol life. The basic elements of Komsomol reform are: priority to primary organizations, which have been given broad rights and authority, multi-candidate elections, and democratic control of the "lowers" over the "uppers;" and creative development of the principles of organization-building.

Voluntarily rejecting a monopoly in the youth movement, the Komsomol stands for genuine pluralism. The Komsomol is open to productive dialogue and joint creative work with any elements of the youth movement in the country which stand for humane, democratic socialism. It considers the creation of a social structure for political consensus in the country to be its most important task.

At the same time, the Komsomol Central Committee has not always succeeded in keeping up with the dynamics of social changes. Adherence to old approaches and stereotypes, dogmatism and inert thinking, fear of making mistakes, the habit of acting in constant "awareness" of the party, and the inability to realistically assess the situation in society and in the Komsomol, have had their effect. But these shortcomings, which are inherent in both the Komsomol Central Committee and in other Komsomol structures, cannot be examined outside the context of the development of the country and society.

Footnote

Here and elsewhere, data is cited from research conducted in 1988 and 1989 by the Scientific-Research Center of the Higher Komsomol School at the Komsomol Central Committee.

Komsomol Draft Statutes

90US0755A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 30 Mar 90 p 3

["Komsomol Draft Statutes"]

[Text] The All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] is a voluntary, independent socio-political organization of Soviet youth. The Komsomol shall operate on the basis of the present Statutes, and in accordance with the USSR Constitution, Soviet legislation and international agreements concluded by the USSR.

The primary goal of the Komsomol is to assist a young person in his free development, and to unite young people for participation in the creation of a democratic, socialist society.

The Komsomol shall have its own Program, shall strive to take part in the administration of the country's state and social affairs, and shall use its available opportunities and authority for defending and realizing the interests of young people, and Komsomol members above all.

The Komsomol strives for ideological commonality with the CPSU; but it shall independently determine its present and future tasks, direction and form of work; and it shall cooperate with other youth organizations and others;

I. Fundamentals of Internal Komsomol Life

1. The internal life of the Komsomol shall be based on the following principles:

a) respect for the personal dignity and opinion of each member of the organization;

b) collectiveness in the work of all organizations, collegiality in the adoption of decisions, and personal responsibility of Komsomol members for matters entrusted to them;

c) election of all Komsomol organs, from the bottom up;

d) periodical accountability of Komsomol organs to their organizations, and reciprocal accountability to higher organs from organizations, on their activities;

e) freedom of discussion, and complete glasnost in the work of all Komsomol organs and organizations;

f) respect for the rights of the majority and the minority: the interests of the majority shall guarantee its right to speak and act in the name of the entire organization and the right to dispose of the organization's property; the interests of the minority shall be guaranteed by the right to defend its own position, appeal to public opinion, to officially form as an elective organ, to carry on activity that does not conflict with Komsomol Regulations, and the right to self-determination, right down to separation;

g) decisions of higher organizations shall be binding on the lower ones, if these decisions are adopted within the bounds of the jurisdiction given them by the lower organs;

h) delimitation of jurisdiction of higher and elective organs shall be established within the Komsomol. The functions and authority of elective organs shall be determined by the decisions of a Komsomol Congress, by the corresponding union republic Komsomols, and by conferences and assemblies of Komsomol organizations.

Unity in carrying out the general line and tasks of the Komsomol presumes broad independence of all Komsomol organizations in choosing the forms and methods of implementing them.

2. The Komsomol Central Committee and Komsomol committees may institute Komsomol awards.

II. Komsomol Members, Their Rights and Responsibilities

3. Any young person of the Soviet Union aged 14 to 28, who acknowledges the Komsomol Program and Regulations, takes part in the work of one of the Komsomol organizations, and pays the membership dues, may be a member of the Komsomol.

In necessary situations, a primary Komsomol organization may accept a person as a Komsomol member prior to his reaching age 14, or may extend his Komsomol membership after reaching age 28.

Komsomol members shall have a Komsomol card of a single form and marking.

4. The transfer of a Komsomol member from one organization to another shall not infringe upon his rights, as defined in Komsomol regulations.

5. Reception as a Komsomol Member.

The question of reception as a Komsomol member shall be examined and decided in the primary organization; at the same time the organization itself shall determine the need for offering recommendations to the applicants. The decision shall be considered adopted, if not less than half the Komsomol members present at the assembly shall vote for it.

6. A Komsomol member shall have the right to:

a) appeal to Komsomol organizations and organs, and to Komsomol mass information media, for assistance in the defense and realization of their interests and rights; and to make use of the political, organizational and material capabilities of the Komsomol;

b) nominate, elect and be elected to Komsomol organs;

c) discuss, criticize, and introduce proposals, and defend one's own point of view on all questions of Komsomol activity;

d) personally take part in assemblies and sessions of Komsomol organs during discussion of a question on his activity or behavior;

e) appeal to the Komsomol for a reference or letter of recommendation;

f) receive the information which is at the free disposal of Komsomol organs; appeal to any Komsomol organ with questions, statements and recommendations, right up to a Komsomol Congress, and receive a response on the essence of the appeal;

g) take part in the work of other social and political organizations and movements, the principles and activities of which are not in conflict with the USSR Constitution and which do not prevent carrying out the Komsomol Program and Regulations;

h) take part simultaneously in the work of both his primary organization and in any other, or transfer from

one organization to another with the consent of the latter, within the Komsomol organization of a union republic.

7. A Komsomol member is obligated to:

a) take part in carrying out the tasks defined by the Komsomol Program;

b) be guided by common human values, affirm social justice, bring good to society through his own work, and support the strengthening of friendship and mutual understanding among the nations of the USSR and the entire world;

c) show concern for the prestige of the Komsomol and for bringing worthy candidates to the Komsomol, and observe the requirements of Komsomol Regulations;

d) build his own relationships in the league on the basis of comradeship, respect and mutual assistance.

8. Termination of Komsomol Membership.

Komsomol membership shall be terminated:

a) by a Komsomol member, according to his own wishes, after he provides written notification of this to the primary organization, and surrenders his Komsomol card;

b) in connection with reaching the age limit for Komsomol membership, if the member has not been elected to Komsomol organs by that time, is not doing Komsomol work, is not a Pioneer Leader, and has not submitted a statement for extending his term of Komsomol membership.

9. The question of expulsion from the Komsomol shall be decided at the primary organization. A decision shall be considered adopted if more than half the Komsomol members present at the assembly votes for it.

10. Persons expelled from the Komsomol shall have the right to appeal, within a two-month period, to higher Komsomol organs, right up to the Komsomol Central Committee. An appeal shall be examined within a period of not more than two months from the day of its receipt.

III. Organizational Structure of the Komsomol

11. Primary Komsomol organizations shall be created at one's place of work, service, training or residence and on the basis of commonality of the Komsomol members' socially-significant interests (by categories of young people; for implementing social programs; in political clubs, ecological formations and so on).

12. For the purpose of coordinating their activities and for interaction with state and social organizations and organizations on a regional level, Komsomol organizations shall unite in rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray and republic Komsomol organizations, and union republic Komsomols; and when necessary in other territorial associations.

Komsomol organizations may also unite in regional and nationwide associations on the basis of commonality of socially-significant interests.

Note: Komsomol members located abroad shall unit in Komsomol organizations of Soviet institutions and collectives in the corresponding countries.

These organizations shall be direct constituent parts of the Komsomol, shall work on the basis of the Komsomol Program and Regulations, and the normative documents of the Komsomol Central Committee.

13. When necessary primary Komsomol organizations may become a direct constituent part of their oblast, kray or republic organizations or union republic Komsomols.

In these instances they and their corresponding higher elective organ shall define their position in the structure and their status.

14. Komsomol organizations shall form their elective organs—Komsomol committees (presidiums, secretaries' councils, and others) and control commissions. Elective organs may set up their own apparatus and independently define their structure and staff.

15. The highest organ of a Komsomol organization is the general assembly or conference; and for a union republic Komsomol and the All-Union Komsomol—the congress. An assembly, conference or congress shall be considered valid if more than half the members of an organization or their elected delegates take part.

16. An elective organ of an organization which unites the Komsomol members of a given territory is the highest organ with respect to all the elective organs which are a part of its Komsomol organizations.

IV. Primary Komsomol Organizations

17. The foundation of the Komsomol is the Primary organization.

The priority of the primary organization in the Komsomol guarantees its rights to:

- a) resolve all questions of its life and activities, except those which are ascribed to the jurisdiction of a higher organ;
- b) independently determine its internal structure and create organizations with the rights of primary and Komsomol groups;
- c) independently determine the periodicity of holding Komsomol assemblies;
- d) have the right of a juridical person, and possess its own financial assets and property;
- e) carry out publishing activity and have its own information organs;

f) nominate its own representatives to elective organs, give them mandates, make inquiries, hear reports, and when necessary, recall them.

18. The decision to create a primary organization shall be taken by a constituent assembly of no fewer than three Komsomol members, and shall be registered by the higher Komsomol organ.

19. A general assembly or conference of a primary organization shall elect the committee (buro, presidium and others) and (or) secretary. A Komsomol committee (buro, presidium and others), (or) secretary shall organize the day-to-day work of the organization. A primary organization may elect a control commission.

20. The decision to break up a primary organization shall be taken at a general assembly of the given organization. In case of actual cessation of its activity or if its activities contradict the Komsomol Program and Regulations, the decision on breaking up a primary organization shall be taken by the higher organ.

The Union Republic Leninist Communist Youth League

21. Union republic Leninist Communist Youth Leagues [Komsomol] shall be volunteer, independent sociopolitical organizations of the young people of union republics.

22. Union republic Komsomols shall unite with the All-Union Komsomol on a voluntary, equal basis and shall take part in the solution of common-Komsomol questions via guaranteed representation in higher Komsomol and central elective organs. They shall possess the entire range of rights, a portion of which they voluntarily invest in Komsomol central elective organs, collectively consolidating them in the decisions of a Komsomol Congress and in the Komsomol Regulations. In accordance with this they shall be guided by the Komsomol Program and Regulations, and by resolutions of a congress and the Komsomol Central Committee.

23. Union republic Komsomols may have their own programs and regulations, provided they do not conflict with the Komsomol Program and Regulations, and may have additional symbology.

All norms of internal Komsomol activity, with the exception of the norms defined in the Komsomol Regulations, shall be within the competence of union republic Komsomols.

24. Union republic Komsomols shall have the right to withdraw from the All-Union Komsomol. A decision on withdrawal shall be taken upon the results of a referendum, or by a two-thirds majority vote of all Komsomol members on the rolls of a union republic Komsomol.

VI. Komsomol Organization in the USSR Armed Forces

25. A Komsomol organization in the USSR Armed Forces shall unite within its ranks Komsomol members

who are military servicemen, and officials and employees of institutions, enterprises and organizations of the USSR Ministry of Defense.

A Komsomol organization of the USSR Armed Forces shall operate on the basis of the Komsomol Program and Regulations, and the Statutes adopted by the All-Army Komsomol Conference.

Note: Komsomol organizations of USSR KGB Border Troops and USSR MVD Internal Troops shall structure their work along the lines of USSR Armed Forces Komsomol organizations.

VII. All-Union Komsomol Associations on the Basis of Commonalty of Socially Significant Interests

26. All-Union Komsomol associations may be established by categories of young people, for implementing social programs, for uniting political clubs and ecological formations, and also on the basis of commonalty of other socio-significant young people's interests.

All-Union associations may have their own programs, provided they do not conflict with the Komsomol Program, and may take part in resolving common Komsomol questions via their own representatives in elective organs.

In defining the norms of internal Komsomol life they shall be guided by the Komsomol Regulations, and by the regulations and normative documents of union republic Komsomols.

All-Union associations may have their own additional symbology.

VIII. Central Komsomol Organs

27. The Congress is the highest Komsomol organ. Regular Komsomol Congresses are convened once every three years. The decision to convene a congress is taken by a Komsomol Central Committee Plenum.

Extraordinary congresses shall be convened on the initiative of a Komsomol Central Committee Plenum, and also upon the demand of no less than one-fourth of the union republic Komsomols; or upon the decision of Komsomol organizations comprising no less than one-fourth of the membership of Komsomol.

Note: The norm, "one-fourth of the union republic Komsomols" includes USSR Armed Forces Komsomol organizations as well as those of the union republics.

The call for a congress and the agenda shall be announced no less than three months prior to the congress. The opinions of primary organization shall be considered by closed (secret) ballots in choosing delegates to the congress. Norms for representation and the procedure for electing delegates to the congress shall be defined by the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum.

28. A Komsomol Congress shall resolve all questions, without exception, in the life and activity of the Komsomol.

The following pertain to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Komsomol Congress:

a) adoption of resolutions on reports by the Komsomol Central Committee and Komsomol Central Control Commission [TsKK];

b) adoption of the Komsomol Program and Regulations;

c) adoption of Statutes on the Komsomol TsKK, and the election of the Komsomol TsKK.

The Komsomol Congress shall affirm the authority of members of the Komsomol Central Committee elected by Komsomol organizations, and shall elect the Komsomol Central Committee first secretary.

29. In the period between congresses, the Komsomol Central Committee shall coordinate Komsomol work within the bounds of the authority defined by the congress.

In addition, the Komsomol Central Committee shall:

a) change when necessary the status of Komsomol organizations entering the All-Union Komsomol, without encroaching upon the rights of union republic Komsomols, and register nationwide Komsomol associations;

b) form the Komsomol Central Committee Buro for organizing Komsomol work in the period between Komsomol Central Committee plenums;

c) re-elect a Komsomol Central Committee first secretary and affirm the authority of newly-delegated central committee members;

d) approve the editorial rules and select a chief editor for the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA;

e) elect, from among the Komsomol Central Committee membership, central committee secretaries for carrying out day-to-day work and organizing the activities of the Komsomol Central Committee staff;

f) approve the structure, staff and budget of the Komsomol Central Committee and the report on its execution.

Note: The Komsomol Central Committee staff shall be formed by the Central Committee first secretary, and presented for approval by the Komsomol Central Committee Buro.

30. The Komsomol Central Committee Buro shall convene Central Committee Plenums at least once every six months. The convening of the plenum and the agenda shall be announced, as a rule, no less than one month prior to the plenum.

A Komsomol Central Committee Plenum may be convened upon the demand of not less than one-fourth of

the members of the Komsomol Central Committee, or no less than one-fourth of the union republic Komsomol Central Committees.

A Komsomol Central Committee Plenum shall be considered valid if more than half the elected members of the central committee take part in it.

31. The Central Control Commission [TsKK] shall implement control over observance of the requirements of the Komsomol Regulations, and shall ensure business is conducted according to established procedure; it shall monitor examination of letters, statements and complaints to Komsomol central organ; control the proper execution of the Komsomol Central Committee budget, as well as the financial and managerial activity of Komsomol Central Committee enterprises and institutions; and shall monitor other questions, in accordance with the Statute on the Komsomol TsKK.

IX. All-Union Komsomol Conferences and Referendums

32. An All-Union Komsomol Conference may be convened to resolve urgent political and intra-Komsomol problems during the period between Komsomol Congresses by the Komsomol Central Committee or upon the initiative of not less than one-fourth of the union republic Komsomols. The procedure for holding conferences, norms of representation and procedure for electing delegates shall be determined by a Komsomol Central Committee Plenum.

33. An All-Union Komsomol Referendum may be convened to resolve important political and intra-Komsomol problems which spring up in the life and activities of the Komsomol, to include those on which a Komsomol Congress was unable to reach a decision. A referendum may be called by decision of a Central Committee Plenum, or upon the initiative of no less than one-fourth of the union republic Komsomols.

An All-union Komsomol Referendum shall be considered valid if more than half of the Komsomol members take part in it. A decision of a referendum shall be considered adopted if more than half the Komsomol members taking part in it shall vote for it.

X. The Komsomol and the All-Union Pioneer Organization Imeni V.I. Lenin

34. The Komsomol shall cooperate with the All-Union Pioneer Organization imeni V.I. Lenin in the interests of a child's social development and shall render to it material, financial and scientific-methodological support, and assistance in training cadres.

A Pioneer organization shall be guaranteed representation in elective Komsomol organs. Komsomol members working in the Pioneer organization shall be elected to elective organs by the Soviets of Pioneer organizations according to quotas established by the corresponding Komsomol committees.

XI. Komsomol Property

35. Komsomol property includes monetary assets, buildings, installations, equipment, established Komsomol enterprises, and other property required for carrying out the program and regulation tasks in the interests of Komsomol members.

Primary, rayon, city, okrug, oblast, kray and republic Komsomol organizations, Armed Forces Komsomol organizations, union republic Komsomols and the Komsomol in the person of its elective organs shall affirm the competence of proprietors, with respect to that portion of Komsomol property formed at their level, which are juridical persons. In the event that an organization withdraws from the Komsomol, it shall decide the question of property in conjunction with its higher elective organ.

When a Komsomol organization or its elective organ is liquidated, the higher organ of the given organization (congress, conference or general assembly) or its higher organ shall determine the rightful recipient of the property, which is a juridical person and realizes the purposes stipulated in the Komsomol Program and Regulations.

36. Komsomol organizations may set up enterprises; publishing houses and editorships for youth newspapers and magazines; institutions and economic organizations; and they may carry on foreign economic activity. The procedure for setting them up and for their functioning, liquidation and reorganization shall be determined by the Komsomol Central Committee and the central committees of union republic Komsomols in accordance with the laws of the USSR and union republics.

37. Komsomol monetary assets shall be formed from membership dues, assets received from measures by Komsomol organizations, income from tourist-excursion and foreign economic activity, deductions from the profits of publishing houses and publications, enterprises and economic organizations established by Komsomol committees, or with their participation, and other kinds of activity. Komsomol income may also come from voluntary contributions from citizens, enterprises and foreign organizations. The Komsomol budget shall be formed from the bottom, upwards.

38. Monthly membership dues shall be established in the following amounts: those with monthly income of up to 80 rubles shall contribute 10 kopecks; from 81 to 100 rubles shall contribute 0.5 percent; from 101 to 150 rubles, 1.0 percent; over 150 rubles, 1.5 percent.

Komsomol members who are pupils and students not receiving a stipend shall pay membership dues only from the assets that they earn.

Komsomol members who have no income, and those on maternity or leave or on child-care leave, as well as those receiving support from the social insurance fund, shall not be required to pay membership dues upon the decision of the primary organization.

Komsomol headquarters shall be located in Moscow.

Drafts of Possible Resolutions of the 21st Komsomol Congress

"On the Procedure for Electing members of the Komsomol Central Committee and its Buro and Secretaries"

Members of the Komsomol Central Committee shall be elected at congresses of union republic Komsomols; at conferences of republic, kray and oblast Komsomol organizations; at conferences of Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces, Border Troops and Interior Troops; and by the Central Soviet of the All-Union Pioneer Organization imeni V.I. Lenin. By the decision of a congress or conference, the election of Komsomol Central Committee members may be both by open or closed (secret) balloting. Candidates receiving the votes of more than half of the delegates taking part in the work of the congress or conference shall be considered elected.

Komsomol Central Committee members shall be elected:

a) on the basis of representation:

- three Central Committee members from each union republic Komsomol;
- three Central Committee members from Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces;
- one Central Committee member from each oblast, kray or republic Komsomol organization, as well as from every Komsomol organization of autonomous oblasts and okrugs;
- one Komsomol Central Committee member from the Komsomol organizations of KGB USSR Border Troops and MVD USSR Internal Troops; and
- three Central Committee members from the Central Soviet of the All-Union Pioneer Organization imeni V.I. Lenin.

b) in accordance with the norms of representation from the membership of union republic Komsomols; USSR Armed Forces Komsomol organizations; and republic, kray and oblast Komsomol organizations.

The Komsomol Central Committee shall determine the norms of representation for election of Komsomol Central Committee members.

When determining the number of Komsomol Central Committee members elected from union republic Komsomols, the number of Komsomol organizations having the right to directly elect members of the Komsomol Central Committee shall not be counted among the corresponding union republic Komsomols.

The Komsomol Congress shall confirm the authority of elected members of the Komsomol Central Committee.

A decision shall be considered adopted, if more than half of the delegates to the congress or members of the Komsomol Central Committee present vote for it.

The authority of a member of the Komsomol Central Committee may not be approved in case of violation of established election procedures.

A member of the Komsomol Central Committee may be removed from the Central Committee on the basis of a resolution from the Komsomol organization for which he is a delegate. A decision on recall and by-election of a Komsomol Central Committee member shall be taken by open or closed (secret) ballot by majority vote of the participating members of the corresponding Komsomol committee. The Komsomol Central Committee may appeal to a union republic Komsomol, and to a Komsomol organization which has sent a member to the central committee, with a proposal for his recall.

A newly elected Komsomol Central Committee member shall be given his authority after confirmation by a Komsomol Central Committee Plenum.

The Komsomol Central Committee shall form the Central Committee Buro from among the members of the Central Committee. The numerical make-up of members of the Buro shall be determined by the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum. Buro membership shall include the posts of Komsomol Central Committee First Secretary and the chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA; and one representative from every union republic Komsomol, from USSR Armed Forces Komsomol organizations, and from the Central Soviet of the All-Union Pioneer Organization imeni V.I. Lenin, which shall comprise no less than two-thirds of the total membership of the Buro.

The decision on membership in the Komsomol Central Committee Buro shall be taken by delegates to the Komsomol Congress from these organizations, and in the period between congresses, at plenums of the corresponding Komsomol committees.

The Central Committee Plenum shall confirm the authority of the membership of the Komsomol Central Committee Buro.

The remaining Buro membership shall be elected at a Central Committee Plenum upon the proposals of Komsomol Central Committee members.

Komsomol Central Committee secretaries shall be elected from the membership of the Komsomol Central Committee upon being nominated by the first secretary.

Elections of Buro members and Komsomol Central Committee secretaries may be held, by decision of the Komsomol Central Committee Plenum, either by open or closed (secret) ballot. Candidates receiving the votes of more than half of the members of the Komsomol Central Committee present, shall be deemed elected.

"On the Functions and Authority of the Komsomol Central Committee, the Buro, and the Secretaries and Staff of the Komsomol Central Committee"

The 21st Komsomol Congress condemns the present practice of replacing elective Komsomol organs with apparats and combining the functions and authority of elective, managerial and executive organs. The Congress considers one of the guarantees of genuine democratization of the Komsomol to be establishment by the highest organs of Komsomol organizations of clear-cut delimitations of the functions and authority of elective and managerial organs and their apparats. In this connection the Congress **resolves**:

1. For the purpose of coordinating the activity of union republic Komsomols, and Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces, interaction with state and social organizations and organs on a nationwide level, and resolving common Komsomol questions in the period between congresses, to define for the Komsomol Central Committee the following functions:

- to work out Komsomol positions on important questions in the life of the state and society, between congresses;
- representing Komsomol interests in the nationwide organs of state power, and in social organizations;
- realizing the right of legislative initiative;
- forecasting Komsomol development, informational-analytical activity, regulation of relations with state and social organs and intra-Komsomol relations;
- working out common Komsomol and regional special-purpose programs, actions and measures, and coordinating the activity of Komsomol organizations for their implementation;
- studying and disseminating the work experience of Komsomol organizations, and rendering practical assistance to them;
- training Komsomol cadres and the aktiv at scientific-academic institutions at the Komsomol Central Committee; conducting scholarly research and rendering methodological assistance to the academic institutions of Komsomol organizations;
- supervising central Komsomol mass information media;
- working out ways for developing the Komsomol's economy; carrying out concrete financial-management activity in the Komsomol, connected with centralization of this type of activity in the state; supervising enterprises and economic subdivisions of the Komsomol Central Committee; and distributing assets formed at the Komsomol Central Committee level;

—monitoring the observance of Regulations and fulfillment of the Program and resolutions of the Komsomol Congress and All-Union Komsomol Conferences; and,

—establishing ties with foreign organizations in the name of the Komsomol.

Within the bounds of these functions, the Komsomol Central Committee shall be given authority:

- to adopt resolutions of a recomendatory nature in developing the resolutions of a congress or conference;
- to adopt resolutions binding on lower-ranking organs on questions of:

a) the periods and procedure for conducting pre-congress Komsomol reporting and election meetings, and other all-union actions and measures; and the procedure for choosing delegates for Komsomol conferences and congresses;

b) distribution of assets formed at the Komsomol Central Committee level;

c) normative documents on questions of procedure for the creation, functioning, reorganization and liquidation of Komsomol enterprises; maintaining bookkeeping accounts; and storage and issuance of blank Komsomol documents;

d) revoking the decisions of lower-ranking organs, if they contradict the Komsomol Regulations and Program.

—speaking out in the name of the Komsomol as a whole in the period between Komsomol congresses; and,

—explaining the provisions of the Komsomol Regulations.

2. Establish that the functions of the Komsomol Central Committee Buro are:

—carrying out the tasks defined in resolutions and instructions of Komsomol Central Committee Plenums;

—representing in the period between Komsomol Central Committee Plenums the interests of the Komsomol at nationwide organs of state power and in social organizations;

—supporting the organization of work of the Komsomol Central Committee, convening Central Committee plenums, preparing the necessary materials for plenums; and coordinating the activities of standing and ad hoc commissions and of members of central elective organs, and rendering assistance to them in their work;

—implementing control over observance of the Komsomol Regulations and Program, and carrying out the decisions of Komsomol Central Committee Plenums; and,

—resolving concrete questions on implementing Komsomol Central Committee ties with foreign organizations.

Within the bounds of these functions the Komsomol Central Committee Buro is given the following authority:

—to adopt resolutions of a recommendatory nature in developing the decisions of a congress, All-Union Conferences, or Komsomol Central Committee Plenums;

—to adopt resolutions binding upon lower-ranking institutions on questions of:

a) providing information to Komsomol organizations, connected with implementing the functions of the Komsomol Central Committee;

b) overturning the decisions of lower-ranking organs if they contradict the Komsomol Regulations and Program.

—speaking in the name of the Komsomol Central Committee in the period between Komsomol Central Committee Plenums.

The Central Committee Buro cannot adopt resolutions pertaining to the authority of the Komsomol Central Committee. It shall regularly report on its activity at Central Committee Plenums.

3. On instructions of the Komsomol Central Committee and its Buro, Komsomol Central Committee secretaries shall carry out the following functions: organizing the work of the Komsomol Central Committee apparat; monitoring and verifying execution of resolutions adopted; and establishing ties and representing the Komsomol on instruction of the Buro and Komsomol Central Committee Plenum at organs of state and social organizations.

4. Establish that the Komsomol Central Committee apparat shall be created for the purpose of supporting the activity of Komsomol central organs, for carrying on the day-to-day work of an organizational-executive nature, and rendering practical assistance to Komsomol organizations and their elective organs.

“On Certain Organizational-Statutory Questions in Connection with Adopting New Komsomol Regulations”

The adoption of new Komsomol Regulations creates the necessary conditions for fundamental reform of our young people's league. Putting its statutes into operation will require a certain amount of time to create a new normative base, and to restructure the entire organization as a whole, and its component parts.

In this connection the 21st Komsomol Congress appeals to the union republic Komsomol Central Committees and to Komsomol organizations in the USSR Armed Forces, with a request to organize and carry out in 1990

the necessary work for forming the normative base of their leagues on the basis of the decisions of the 21st Komsomol Congress.

For the purpose of coordinating and conducting this work, the Komsomol Congress **resolves**:

1. To instruct the Komsomol Central Committee to carry out the necessary work for rendering practical and methodological assistance in preparation of draft regulations and the normative base of union republic Komsomols, regulating and eliminating conflicts which might arise between the provisions of the new Komsomol Regulations and the provisions of draft regulations and normative documents of union republic Komsomols.

2. To bear in mind that after adoption of the regulations and normatives of union republic Komsomols, it may be necessary to introduce amendments to the Komsomol Regulations, and to form a Commission of the 21st Komsomol Congress for the purpose of studying the expedience of their introduction and the adoption of resolutions on the given questions. The Commission will be made up of representatives of all union republic Komsomols and Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces. The membership of the Commission shall be confirmed.

Instruct the Komsomol Central Committee and the Congressional Commission, in case the need arises, to introduce amendments to the Komsomol Regulations which might lead to serious re-examination of the conception of our league adopted by the Komsomol Congress, and establish an All-Union Komsomol Conference or Komsomol Congress.

3. In connection with the fact that the new Komsomol Regulations lack a number of provisions stipulating the selection procedure for examination of certain questions of intra-Komsomol life, and inasmuch as its definition has been remanded to the jurisdiction of union republic Komsomols and to Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces, the 21st Congress believes that it is possible, for the period until the Komsomol Regulations are adopted or until they establish their own normative base, to be guided when necessary by the corresponding statutes of the Komsomol Regulations adopted by the 20th Komsomol Congress.

4. Instruct the Komsomol Central Committee to thoroughly analyze all normative documents in effect prior to the 21st Congress, and adopt resolutions on their abolition, if they do not correspond with the provisions of the new Komsomol Regulations. The Komsomol Central Committee shall inform Komsomol organizations of changes in the normative base by means of the mass information media.

“On Assistance Funds for Komsomol Organizations”

The new Komsomol Regulations establish complete independence for primary Komsomol organizations in the use of their monetary assets and property. This creates the conditions for solving the political and organizational

tasks facing us, and the realization of socially-significant projects in the interests of Komsomol members.

At the very same time, the different social composition of organizations and differences in the socio-economic development of regions do not permit a number of organizations to realize financial support for their activities, and above all in student and pupil organizations, at raykoms in agricultural zones, and in Komsomol organizations of the USSR Armed Forces.

Affirming in the Komsomol the principles of comradely mutual assistance and collectivism, uniting to resolve

problems common for the Komsomol, the Komsomol Congress speaks out in favor of creating assistance funds for such Komsomol organizations.

The funds could be formed at elective organs by means of deducting a portion of the assets of primary Komsomol organizations and assets from the economic activity of Komsomol organs, including the Komsomol Central Committee.

The Komsomol organizations themselves would determine the specific amount of the deductions.

Moscow Rayon Heads on Party, Soviet Future

90UN0979A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 7, 17-23 Feb 90 p 2

[Interview with A. Nikolayev, first secretary of Moscow's Baumanskiy Raykom, and N. Gonchar, chairman of the Baumanskiy Rayon Soviet, by V. Voronetskiy and N. Zhelnorova; place and date not given—no headline as published]

[Text] In the fifth year of perestroyka we have all finally come to understand that there will be no improvement in the real life of the people without the dismantling of the old political structures of the control of society. Fundamental renewal in both the party and the soviets is essential. This is what leaders of Moscow's Baumanskiy Rayon—A. Nikolayev, first secretary of the raykom [rayon party committee], and N. Gonchar, chairman of the rayon soviet—think about this.

A. Nikolayev: 'The Serene Life Is Over'

[Voronetskiy] Aleksey Nikolayevich, is not the old way, when the party apparatus dictated the terms and put forward its own people, not being repeated in the current election campaign?

[Nikolayev] I would call the main mistake some leader communists made at the previous elections not diktat (although there were instances of such also) but passiveness. They were sure that all would proceed along the beaten track and were not properly prepared for the election struggle. The communists were not ready everywhere for active dialogue with other politicized associations.

We are trying to avoid the previous blunders. There is a struggle for power going on today and in the course of the elections it is flaring up with new force. Remaining aloof from the struggle is imprudent. At the same time it has to be considered that the times require the consolidation of all positive forces capable of moving perestroyka forward and a consideration of various viewpoints. This is how we are trying to act.

We are proceeding from the fact that the sovereignty of the soviets is possible only given their independence and real power. The basis of this should be noninterference in the economic and administrative activity of the rayon soviet on the part of the party and a limitation of interference on the part of the state authorities. Combination of the functions of chairman of the soviet of people's deputies and secretary of the raykom in the rayon management structure is inadvisable.

A reorganization of the structure and functions of the rayon soviet of people's deputies under the conditions of the full separation of legislative, executive, and judicial functions is essential. It is necessary to have within the rayon soviet a working body providing for preliminary expert appraisal of the decisions adopted by the soviet and legal supervision of compliance with the laws and

decisions of the rayon soviet and other legally binding instruments in the activity of its executive bodies.

A priority of the rayon's socioeconomic development should be an improvement in the population's work and social conditions. The consistent implementation of practical measures pertaining to solution of the housing problem—primarily thanks to rational use of the rayon's store of housing, the voluntary reallocation of living space at the citizens' disposal, a careful study of possible alternatives in an improvement in people's housing conditions, and transition to family occupation of apartments—is essential.

It is necessary to continue the removal from rayon territory of ecologically harmful industries and to tighten supervision of the installation of modern purification facilities at operating enterprises. The broadest strata of working people and the population need to be enlisted in the solution of the rayon's environmental problems.

[Voronetskiy] In the elections for USSR people's deputies there were many instances of preferential conditions having been created for party and soviet leaders: at times they were unopposed, and those who campaigned for them enjoyed advantages also.

[Nikolayev] We are making efforts to ensure that there be fewer of such instances during the current elections, and attempts have been punished. Whoever still believes that office automatically conveys both authority and power will lose. The privileged position of sole governing party in the country spoiled many party leaders. They viewed the elections to the soviets as a routine activity in which everyone would proceed as per the schedule of allocations. They simply gave no thought to the affections and confidence of the electorate. The serene life is over. A place in the soviets needs to be earned by work and the attitude toward people.

[Voronetskiy] Going by the press and readers' letters, the people are agitated, holding mass meetings and determining their leaders. Is this spontaneity of the election campaign noticeable in your rayon? What is the communists' role here?

[Nikolayev] There have been bursts of mass meeting democracy with us also, but we are groping our way toward consolidation. A voters' club, which has communists and nonparty people—people of different views—is operating. I believe that the communists—both the rank and file and, particularly, leaders—must unfailingly find their place in the debate. We should not be dividing people on the basis of party affiliation but creating in the course of the election campaign a real bloc of communists and nonparty people. The main thing is to ensure that these be restructuring forces, people of action.

[Voronetskiy] Today, when there is a shortage of everything with us, a particularly sharp view is taken of everything that is associated with privileges for leaders. Readers are asking, for example: What is the reason for

the substantial rise in the salaries of party officials? This question is coming up in the course of the election campaign also.

[Nikolayev] There is, truly, a great deal of talk about privileges, and it is good that this is now being studied at the highest levels. We need to establish clarity here and act according to the law, fairly. As far as the increase in party officials' salaries is concerned, it was triggered by the increase in the cost of living. Wage increases are now a general trend. We ran into difficulty, for example, finding a suitable candidate for the position of raykom instructor at a salary of 220 rubles. Mention should be made here of the fact that the party maintains its apparatus—from the full-time secretary of a primary party organization through the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee—on its own resources, and receives no assistance, contrary to what some people believe, from the state. Some people think that raykom apparatus officials live in mansions. But we have employees whose families occupy five square meters of living space per person and are on the general waiting list for an improvement in housing conditions. I personally obtained an apartment 15 years ago, when I was not a raykom first secretary.

[Voronetskiy] What is your opinion concerning the restructuring of the party itself and how is this process going in the rayon party organization?

[Nikolayev] A cardinal direction of the process of party renewal is connected with the democratization of party life. This was emphasized once again at the CPSU Central Committee February (1990) Plenum. The work of the party organizations currently is being fettered by the current structures and outdated rules and instructions. A gap between the communist rank and file and the leaders has formed. It needs to be emphatically overcome. It is essential to have done with the formal-party schedule approach to the selection of leaders, which leads to the exclusiveness of the cadre corps. In this respect, for example, we have filled vacant positions in the raykom apparatus on a competitive basis. We are endeavoring to enhance the role of the elective authorities. We will struggle for an enhancement of the authority of the communists and their increased assertiveness and irreproachable moral character. More than 350 persons have this year been expelled from and have quit the party.

Questions of the restructuring of the party will be discussed at the 28th CPSU Congress. Preparations for the congress are already under way. Proposals are being submitted, inter alia, for a change in the direction of a broadening of the democratic approach of the procedure of the election of delegates to the congress and the procedure of its work itself. It would be a good thing were it to be conducted in panels and individual areas of party restructuring.

N. Gonchar: 'We Need To Change the System'

[Zhelnorova] Nikolay Nikolayevich, I was most surprised at your weekly surgery by the fact that you were sparing on promises and that your visitors understood this. Why was this? It is odd because an election campaign is under way currently, and candidates for deputy usually give out promises for an improvement in life, if only in their own rayon.

[Gonchar] Our duty is to tell people the truth, however bitter. Many candidates are now saying: elect me deputy, and I will do such-and-such for you. And "radicals," who are not bound by the burden of promises unfulfilled, compile far more such commitments than the "conservatives". And often, what is more, on economic issues particularly, the "radicals" assume commitments which may in spirit be realized only in that same administrative system which they are intending changing. And the deputies will go to the same ministries and just like their predecessors, will demand for their electorate: "give, give, give". I believe that the promises method is now unacceptable.

It is far easier in the election struggle to say: there he is—that "son of a bitch" who is to blame for everything. Considerable numbers of "radicals" are trying to prove to the electorate in the course of election battles, particularly at the rayon and city level, that the "conservatives" had their chance to fulfill their promises earlier, but either were reluctant or unable to do so owing to a lack of personal qualities. But the main thing (and this is the tragedy of the "conservatives," for there are among them very strong personalities, after all) is that they were in principle unable to realize what had been planned and that the very system of administration in which they operated and which they are attempting to preserve is inefficient.

[Zhelnorova] And does your program differ from the "classical" programs of other candidates which you know about?

[Gonchar] In terms of aims, no, in terms of methods, yes. Everyone is currently talking in unison about the independence of the rayons as a panacea against all troubles. Yes, the system of "dual subordination" is discredited. But before breaking with it, it is necessary to clearly delimit the spheres of competence of the city, the rayons, and the microrayons (I understand by the latter the sphere of competence of the self-administration soviets). Each higher level of administration should be created where lower levels have a need for this. Either the lower stories cannot in principle tackle this task at their level (city-wide programs, law and order, transport, power engineering, and so forth) or it would be economically more profitable for them to create city-wide authorities rendering the rayons chargeable managerial services. Such structures should not command the rayons but serve them. And the quality of this managerial service would be evaluated not by the Moscow City Soviet but the rayons. But the same approach should extend to the

relations of the rayon and the self-administration soviets of the microrayons. It seems to me that the primary cell of a city is precisely the microrayon with a population of 10,000- 15,000. This level of administration should have its own, clearly designated sphere of competence, within whose framework its self-administration soviet would have both the right to adopt entirely independent decisions and the duty of bearing before the inhabitants the fullness of responsibility for the consequences of these decisions.

And, finally, a well-considered system of taxes—both city and rayon—should be created.

[Zhelnorova] What conclusions may be drawn from the experience of self-management which has emerged in your rayon?

[Gonchar] It has emerged not only with us but in many other rayons of Moscow also. As far as we are concerned, initially the population was utterly indifferent to their activity. But we have handed over to the self-administration authorities the solution of questions directly affecting the inhabitants' interests. And this has produced results: the indifference is gradually disappearing. Demands are already being heard in some microrayons for the replacement of self-administration soviets. In addition, some self-administration soviets aspire to a broadening of their rights. They have in practice in the last 18 months been supplanting the territorial groups of deputies and themselves been joining actively in the election campaign because they need to have their deputies in the rayon soviet.

[Zhelnorova] Following your speech in a committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N. Travkin said: "If this boy attempts to implement what he has mapped out, he will with frightening force be strangled by his own subordinates. The authorities will not give in without a fight." I was subsequently at a meeting of the ispolkom [soviet executive committee], where you were in a tight spot, and I thought that the apparatus would finally cut you down and remove you. How have you managed to survive?

[Gonchar] It has not been easy. The squeeze was and remains quite severe, although I have sympathizers, in the apparatus included. Still, people are enthused at the possibility of working independently and enterprisingly. It has been possible to save as yet the sole financially autonomous structure in the ispolkom apparatus—the Socioeconomic Development Administration—which is involved in commercial activity also. And it has been inspected many times over in the hope of some criminal or other being found....

In my opinion, the essence of my conflict with the apparatus lies not in self-administration. There are tacit "rules of the game," in accordance with which "the boss is always right". You may scoff in a whisper at the nonsensical initiative "from above" of the general closure of the wine stores type, but, for all that, he has to be reckoned with, and they have to be fulfilled. When I

became chairman of the ispolkom a year ago, I understood that the main criterion of evaluation for me was the opinion of the inhabitants. At first attempts were made to tactfully "correct" me, then I was accused of "flirting with the electorate" and later, of being "impossible to work with".

There was also the ispolkom meeting at which, as you say, I found myself in a tight spot, there was also the session of the rayon soviet at which it was attempted to thwart the plan for 1990 (if this had happened, God himself might have ordered me to resign). But there was also the reaction of the inhabitants in the voters' club and the reaction of the self-administration soviets, which supported me, for which I am inexpressibly grateful to them. Different times have arrived, evidently.

[Zhelnorova] Have not arrived, perhaps, but are coming.... Since we have begun speaking about politics, what, in your opinion, will be the most serious obstacle in the way of further transformations?

[Gonchar] It will be difficult changing in the public consciousness the content of the concept of "social justice," which is now associated primarily with equality in consumption.

The problem of elderly people requires particular attention from this viewpoint. You will agree that if a person is already in receipt of a pension, the prospects of the development of the cooperative movement and the creation of a money and commodity market do not greatly move him.... Yet without regard for the interests of this category of the population we simply do not have the right to elaborate policy! It is necessary to ensure the social protection of the elderly, the needy, invalids, and large families. In our rayon, social assistance in the past year grew by a factor of almost 30 thanks to the attraction of enterprise and cooperative resources! Although this is insufficient, as before. However, people now understand that the more efficiently the rayon's economy works, the more profitable this is to them personally.

[Zhelnorova] The property act is being discussed currently. How might this look with reference to the rayon? What is your attitude toward private property?

[Gonchar] We represent the interests of a particular territorial collective. It also must have property. Property is an economic category, not "something" that I recognize or not. We said: "No to private property!" And a powerful shadow economy emerged. What is more beneficial to the people: that they receive the taxes from this huge sphere of our economy or not? With this ideological lie and incompetence we are robbing our pensioners.... In all countries there is a shadow economy, where there are both narcotics and foreign currency, but there is no country in which the shadow economy produces women's blouses....

We are now wondering: Why do we not have "civilized cooperative workers"? But where should they come

from? The cooperative worker is an entrepreneur, and he was a social odd man out in our country. But we are now surprised that he does not listen to Mozart, does not read Ovid, does not understand the need not to conceal his income....

[Zhelnorova] We have spoken about social justice. What are your family's housing conditions like?

[Gonchar] I am married and have a daughter. We have a one-room apartment. So we live "in two houses"—at my mother in law's, for the most part. We intend changing—for the "congress".

[Zhelnorova] Knowing of the privileges of the Soviet apparatus, I doubt whether you could not obtain an apartment. Or did you not want to?

[Gonchar] You saw my surgery and heard how our people live. I have to turn down their requests very often, unfortunately, and I must have the moral right to do so.

Moscow Gorkom Plenum Discussion Reviewed

90UN1020A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 18 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by A. Gamov: "Capital Package"]

[Text] Were one to place alongside one another the stenographic accounts of the two February plenums—of the CPSU Central Committee and the Moscow Gorkom [City Party Committee]—one would involuntarily get the impression that the second meeting was a logical continuation, as it were, of the first—so keenly perceived in the plenary debates was the restless nerve of the debate begun by the Central Committee. And it is not, evidently, just a question here of the identical nature of the questions discussed—"CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform for the 28th Party Congress". One noticed primarily the high critical charge which imbued literally all the speeches of the participants in the Moscow plenum.

However, all this is perfectly explainable. As Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, observed in his report, the gorkom plenum had assembled at an anxious time for the country and the party. Contradictions in all spheres of the life of society and the political struggle are continuing to increase, acquiring explosive intensity. The socioeconomic situation is being made worse by the imperfect legal base and the incapacity of the state authorities in a number of cases to apply current legislation. Interethnic conflicts, which are now affecting a considerable part of the country, have assumed tragic proportions. For the first time Moscow also has encountered strikes on political grounds. No less complex a situation, the speaker observed, has taken shape today within the party also. A line of division has emerged, separatist sentiments are increasing, the party rules are practically inoperative and discipline is loosening. Adequate decisive political decisions are needed under these conditions.

What measures are the Muscovites proposing to lead the party out of the crisis? V.V. Nosov, secretary of the ZIL [Zavod imeni Likhachev] Party Committee, A.M. Bryachikin, first secretary of the Sevastopolskiy Raykom [Rayon Party Committee], G.A. Bokareva, electric sewing machine operator of the K. Tsetkin Experimental Engineering Factory, and others, while expressing satisfaction with the propositions of the CPSU Central Committee draft platform on the whole, at the same time observed that it fails to reflect all the questions which had accumulated in the party and in society. This omission could only be made good, in their view, by wide-ranging debate and consultation with every party member. The communist must today feel himself to be not a cog but a competent member of the party whose opinion has weight and who is listened to.

Incidentally, following the example of the Central Committee, the Moscow Gorkom has already taken decisive steps in this direction. Some 200 secretaries of the capital's primary party organizations, who participated on an equal basis in both the discussion and the voting on important and fundamental issues, were invited to the plenum. Letters from the primary party organizations, which were also accorded a "vote," were a kind of tuning-fork tuning the plenary debate.

The process of democratization, which is spreading to all aspects of life in the country, has in the opinion of our party organization had an insufficient effect on the party.... We believe that delegates to the 28th Congress should be elected not on the basis of the current CPSU Rules but according to the current party districts on a multiple-choice basis.

Ye. Lednev, member of the CPSU.

This was continued in many speeches of the plenum participants. Specifically, as S.A. Vladimirov, secretary of the party committee of the Moscow enterprises of the "VILS" [All-Union Light Alloys Institute] Association, E.I. Chernyak, secretary of the "Almaz" Central Design Office Party Committee, and others emphasized, the coming congress should be not only the highest body of the party as a whole but also of each communist individually. The plenum considered of fundamental importance, and this was enshrined in the adopted resolution, the election of delegates of rayon and city party conferences and the 28th CPSU Congress on the basis of direct, secret and multiple-choice elections by party district, in which connection it was proposed that the raykoms embark on determining the mechanism for the organization of elections and the formation of electoral districts.

...Party organization secretaries assembled on the eve of the plenum in the capital's Leninskiy Raykom to discuss one of the most exciting issues today—the formation of a Russian Communist Party. The idea was extensively supported, and a special organizational committee was formed even. Notifying the participants in the plenum of

this, V.N. Senkov, first secretary of the Leninskiy Raykom, emphasized that this question needed to be decided immediately. In his view, the creation of a Russian Communist Party would strengthen the ranks of the CPSU.

These propositions were not reflected in the resolution of the plenum but the idea of organizing a Russian republic party conference prior to the 28th CPSU Congress was supported in the appeal of its participants to the CPSU Central Committee. The plenum deemed it necessary that the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau assemble this March in Moscow a meeting of representatives of the republic's kray, oblast, and okrug party organizations and discuss questions of convening a conference on the organizational structuring of a Russian Communist Party.

We are convinced that the leading position in society of the CPSU as the governing party should be ensured not by constitutional guarantees and privileges but by constant political work with the masses on the basis of the platforms advanced by the party which reflect people's interests and political competition with other social and political organizations. The people's trust in the CPSU should be confirmed each time democratic elections to the soviets are held. In this connection we consider the enshrinement of the leading role of the CPSU in the USSR Constitution to be contrary to the democratic principles of a state based on the rule of law.

*V. Chernikov, secretary of the party bureau,
USSR State Bank External Security Service.*

Evaluating the CPSU Central Committee draft platform, the participants in the plenum observed with satisfaction that a notable step had finally been taken toward radical, long-due transformations within the party itself and in the relations of the CPSU and the state. A clear-cut position on Article 6 of the USSR Constitution was defined and the renunciation of a monopoly of power and a readiness to operate under the conditions of a real multiparty system were announced under the influence of many speeches.

"However, we need to go further," the first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom emphasized in his report. "The governing party's recognition of the possibility of a multiparty system is merely the start. In practically all civilized countries the emergence of parties is regulated by legislation determining their sources of finance and minimum numbers necessary for registration. Therefore political logic will require, following the change in Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, the elaboration and enactment of a law on parties and other public and political organizations."

Both the report and many speeches of the participants in the plenum called attention to the fact that the draft platform is being discussed under conditions where the democratization of party life has brought into being new

forms of unity among communists—clubs and horizontal structures, where various versions of platforms, propositions, and rules of the party are being engendered—are being formed everywhere. They include also documents drawn up in the Moscow Higher Party School, Moscow State University and the Moscow Aviation Institute and many of the city's raykoms. Your author has familiarized himself with some of them. I therefore have to agree with the opinion of speakers at the plenum that on a whole number of questions—the party's place and role in society, the attitude toward Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, the procedure of the election of executive bodies and the formation of their apparatus and so forth—the CPSU Central Committee draft platform and other analogous materials have much in common.

Of course, there are differences also. But, I believe, the plenum was perfectly correct to raise the question of whether they are so irreconcilable that we need to be speaking about the formation within the CPSU of a separate faction with its subsequent conversion into an independent party? Do not the appeals for the speediest demarcation of the CPSU conceal the aspiration of individual politicians to realize personal ambitions and achieve goals which have nothing in common with the platforms which they propose?

In a word, the approach here should be differentiated. Perfectly appropriate in this connection is the conclusion of the Moscow plenum, reflected in its resolution also, that a principal direction of the activity of the party organizations in the pre-congress period should be wide-ranging public dialogue, cooperation, and consolidation, an exchange of opinions with various public and political movements and unification with all patriotic forces sharing the socialist choice.

I have the impression that the gorkom, having drawn up the Moscow Gorkom election platform, is adopting a passive attitude toward election tactics and strategy. It is no secret that the so-called amateur associations are building their election struggle on criticism and on counterposing themselves to the CPSU. They have put together many arguments and inventions and are not inhibited in the juggling of facts. It is time to come out of the trenches. We ourselves will investigate our party's affairs without the promptings of its ill-wishers. There should be a clearly defined position, not the now customary retreat under the convenient signboard of a search for political compromise.

*B. Gaydukov, member of the CPSU,
candidate for people's deputy of a rayon soviet*

There is, evidently, a regularity in the fact that the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th Party Congress appeared at the very height of the political struggle, on the eve of the elections of people's deputies to the republic and local soviets. I recall that at the last gorkom plenum, which adopted the Moscow Gorkom

political theses for the elections, there was a lively debate on what the forms and methods of the pursuit of party policy in the soviets of people's deputies should be. And on this occasion also there was discussion of a fundamental restructuring of the activity of the party groups of the soviets, which could formulate a common policy of communist deputies on matters of principle and avail themselves of the right of legislative initiative. Even now the gorkom is preparing a package of specific proposals, which will be submitted for examination by the new soviets. Yu.A. Prokofyev dwelt on some of them in his report.

"It is difficult to imagine another region of the country," he observed, "which is so rent by ministries and departments as Moscow. This is expressed in the unwarranted increase in capacity in labor-intensive industries, in the creation of new scientific establishments, the extremely slow withdrawal and reprofiling of industries which are germane to the capital and the protracted introduction of ecologically clean technology. The social interests of Muscovites themselves are being considerably infringed on as a result. Even today transport and trade are working flat-out, the waiting list for better housing conditions is at a standstill, the municipal infrastructure does not have a chance to restore itself, a disturbing ecological situation is taking shape...."

But, despite this, the ministries and departments, in particular disregard of the opinion of Muscovites and the city's possibilities, are continuing to create in the capital a variety of managerial offices and associations, the expediency of whose location is questionable. For instance, how is the "Asbest" concern related to Moscow if asbestos is not mined in the city? And how can the fact that more than half of all the joint ventures with foreign firms which have been created in the country have also located their offices in Moscow be justified? At first sight it might seem that all these problems are unrelated to the draft platform. But the natural and far from idle question arises: "Who is the boss in the city?" One answer suggests itself here: "The boss should be a strong Moscow City Soviet with strong deputies." It was the unanimous opinion of the participants in the plenum that only on this basis is it possible to improve fulfillment of the socioeconomic programs which are aimed at raising the living standard of the city residents, which is a principal task of the Moscow city party organization.

Only certain fragments of the debate, which lasted at the Moscow Gorkom Plenum more than six hours, have been mentioned here. Questions connected with the commissioning of a number of propositions to extend the rights of the primary party organizations and local party authorities and to notify the communists of the formation and expenditure of the party budget were also discussed.

"I believe that the discussion at the plenum was constructive and high-minded and that it reflected the entire spectrum of views and viewpoints and the breadth of

opinions which exist today in the city party organization," Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom, told me. "The assessments made of the draft platform coincide with the opinion of the gorkom bureau. Truly, this document could serve as a good basis for the development of the pre-congress discussion, but it is in need of considerable additional work. Its final version should be the fruit of the collective creativity of the communists of the whole country. Let us hope that the proposals of the Moscow city party organization are taken into account in the CPSU Central Committee platform."

Moscow Ispolkom Chairman Interviewed

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[Report on interview with Valeriy Saykin, chairman of the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom by Georgiy Dolgov: "...Muscovites Also Live in a World of Illusions"; date and place not specified]

[Text] Not so long ago, our capital city was named "an exemplary communist city." By now, it is well known how far this definition was from the truth. The issues and troubles of the first city of the country and the Russian Federation are largely characteristic of the capitals of other republics and major cities. Moreover, they are intertwined.

This was the topic of our interview with the chairman of the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom [Executive Committee].

[Dolgov] Valeriy Timofeyevich, is it difficult to be the mayor of our capital city?

[Saykin] It is difficult to be the chairman of the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom.

[Dolgov] Is there a difference in more than the name?

[Saykin] Of course. I understand, from communicating with my foreign colleagues, that they mainly handle general, strategic issues concerning the development of their cities and the operation of all city services. Certainly, they do have to resolve some current issues; this does happen. However, the system of municipal management is organized better in their cities; it has good facilities and skilled cadres. This allows my colleagues in, say, Washington or Paris to focus their attention on more general, long-term prospects. Incidentally, they have enough problems there. Some of the problems are similar to ours while others are peculiar, characteristic of a particular capital only. They handle these issues in a very businesslike and purposeful manner. We are merely approaching this. Unfortunately, the Moscow Soviet Ispolkom, including me, has so far had to spend much time attending to current and petty operational issues. Recently, the number of such issues has even begun to increase.

[Dolgov] This is our peculiarity, is it not?

[Saykin] Definitely. For many years, a lot has been said about, for example, the need to refrain from developing industry in Moscow. Nonetheless, it was developed. At present, the city's economy looks very strange. We need developed trade and service structures, but they do not exist. Even the reconstruction of production facilities proceeds listlessly and inefficiently. Because of this, the tangle of problems swells and becomes increasingly acute. In the process, new problems keep being added to the old ones.

[Dolgov] Do you mean ecology?

[Saykin] Yes, among other things. The city is choking; by now, this is clear to all people. However, there is no overall solution to this problem yet. There are just individual measures, patches which we urgently apply. Meanwhile, we need radical solutions.

[Dolgov] At present, they are making a lot of very heated statements once again about moving industry outside the city limits.

[Saykin] As I see it, this has been talked about incessantly over the last five years. However, we should immediately consider what we will replace this industry with, what the people employed in it are going to do, and where it is to be moved from the capital city. I must say that the removal of production enterprises will not solve the ecological problem in its entirety. Look at Paris. In the French capital industrial production is virtually absent, at least within the boundary of the historically developed city. Still, there is nothing to breathe with over there, and Parisians are also choking because the number of cars there is very high. After all, at present car exhaust is the main source of pollution in Moscow too. If a car moves at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour the engine produces exhaust because it is not operating at capacity. As soon as the speed goes up to 70 kilometers, the amount of harmful exhaust declines abruptly because it is burned up in the engine.

Meanwhile, in our city the cars barely move. Harmful admixtures are discharged into the air by the ton at every traffic light. This is what is responsible for our troubles. In Tokyo they took this into account and took a different path. Over there, they retained their industry. However, tremendous funds were invested in road construction and traffic management—high-speed roads at several levels, interchanges, and so on. There the cars do not stand still and do not puff but speed along instead. The breath of the city is easy and free; its lungs are full. Meanwhile, they also had been on the brink of choking.

For Moscow, this would be an ideal way out. Unfortunately, for now it is not realistic. We still cannot determine our priorities, what is more important and necessary for us at present and how our desire to preserve the historically valuable part of the city is to be combined with reinvigorating its ecological environment. For example, it has been decided not to let through motor traffic drive through the city. After all, up to 70,000 heavily loaded trucks drive through the city. Given our

roads, it is easy to imagine the amount of poison they discharge into the atmosphere of our capital. There is one more way. We have prohibited enterprises which have their own spur lines from using motor vehicles to transport freight from freight terminals. After all, if they have a rail line let them use it. We should also take into account the fact that a lot of motor vehicles are involved in altogether unnecessary hauling. Take wholesale warehouses, for example; we have a lot of them in our city. They receive freight by rail and then later they take it by truck to warehouses across the city, put it in different containers, and take it back. It does happen that freight from the Far East is again shipped back to the Far East but through Moscow. Neither our economy nor our ecology is capable of withstanding such haulage. We are taking certain reinvigoration measures at present but, I repeat, they are not solving the problem.

[Dolgov] Could a transition to financial independence and economic accountability give us such an opportunity?

[Saykin] Of course, we hope so. The government has resolved to introduce self-financing in Moscow. The primary objective is the mutual interest of the city and all enterprises and offices located in its territory. You see, at present they give nothing to the city, but they should. We have 13,200 enterprises and offices. At present, they consume between 50 and 70 percent of the natural and energy resources of the city. They should pay the city for this without exception. Only in this case will we be able to solve our pent-up problems somehow. The slogan "All power to the Soviets!" will become realistic; its thrust will become economic rather than administrative-command.

[Dolgov] Will cooperatives also be a part of it?

[Saykin] Definitely. By now, more than 15,000 cooperatives have been registered in Moscow. They employ more than 400,000 people. The volume of work and services performed comes to about R5 billion. They are a force, and it cannot be ignored. We should say that there are many splendidly operating cooperatives in the city which indeed benefit the Muscovites in a tangible way. At the same time, there are negative phenomena which cause many justified complaints. I am not going to talk about [trade in] shashliks here. I would like to talk about something else. Take construction cooperatives. They would seem to have their work cut out for them. Just work, and everybody will be grateful. They work... Recently, we had several hundred of them inspected... Well over half of them were unable to provide intelligible explanations or any documentation for the construction materials acquired. As I see it, the cooperatives are coopting the ranking functionaries of state and economic organs.

Not a whole lot is done for the Muscovites themselves. After all, 85 percent of all cooperative construction work is performed for enterprises and organizations. Meanwhile, for example, repairing your dwelling is as difficult

as it used to be. Non-cash funds are converted into cash; more than 70 percent of profits are used for remunerations. Their productivity per one ruble of outlays is considerably lower than in the state sector. A tremendous number of skilled people are involved in equipping and building saunas and offices for various leaders. Incidentally, the managerial apparatus in the capital city has not only failed to shrink recently, but, according to preliminary estimates, has increased considerably. Do you know how?

[Dolgov] Unfortunately, I don't.

[Saykin] Indeed, it is unfortunate. Both the number of ministries and the apparatus of those retained have been reduced considerably. However, a great many associations, societies, unions, public organizations, and entities have appeared and continue to appear every day! After all, it is only in our vociferous pronouncements that all the new organizations we have are volunteer ones. Actually, as soon as one is created, it immediately sets up an office, it definitely gets rooms, staff, wages, and the like. Therefore, as I see it, a new bureaucracy is vigorously developing at present, this time a social bureaucracy.

It looks like that is fine, let them live. However, this process is very ambiguous, and we should be aware of its consequences. After all, even now there is a shortage of manpower at many of our enterprises. There are approximately 100,000 vacant jobs in the city. A considerable segment of the people has left for cooperatives. For example, construction cooperatives have absorbed approximately 40,000 employees. Some enterprises are facing the threat of stoppages. However, you cannot stop them just like that; a chain reaction will begin. Therefore, the ghost of quota migrants will loom again for Moscow. Is it going to be good for anyone?

[Dolgov] Is the housing situation getting tense again?

[Saykin] What do you mean by "again?" It has never improved. On the contrary, it has been constantly deteriorating. This year we have failed to fulfill the plan for commissioning housing. This has once again affected Muscovites. There are not enough workers at the construction sites, there is a shortage of materials. This is what the situation is. We should also take into account the fact that we live in the capital, with all the attendant unfavorable phenomena—paradoxical as it may be. The personnel of government and other union organizations is being renewed. Every new employee should be allocated housing, and good housing at that, no worse than what he left behind in some city in the provinces. Relevant organizations do come up with housing; there is nothing to be done. However, this housing is allocated at the expense of long-suffering Muscovites, especially those natives who have lived here all their lives. I am not aware of a single case in which such a migrant returned to his native locality once his job was completed. All of them stay in Moscow. The city grows and swells, and contradictions in it become acute.

We should also take into account the multinational nature of Moscow. There is hardly a nationality in the country which is not represented among the residents of Moscow. We also keep this in mind. At present, all kinds of national cultural societies are being created vigorously. Some are already in operation while others are being set up. We have already run out of non-residential space to meet all the requests. However, we have been looking, we have been helping, and we will go on helping. It would be nice for these societies not to become the focuses of tension and also to promote a solution to interethnic problems and the reinforcement of friendship among the peoples of our country.

[Dolgov] Valeriy Timofeyevich, despite the entire tangle of problems you have referred to, many people are still eager to go to Moscow. It lures them with its bright lights and entices them.

[Saykin] There is no reason for them to be eager. Many cities in our country do considerably better than the capital on a number of scores. In other places the pace of life is much quieter; there is considerably more greenery; it is more peaceful. The people are more even-tempered. Transportation is better. The only consolation is that in our city sausage is sometimes found on the counter. However, Muscovites do not see a whole lot of it. After all, it is only on paper that our trade turnover has been increasing and has already reached R26 billion. How many of these billions go directly to the Muscovites? Not a lot. And this is exactly the point. During the day, the Muscovites work, and they have no time to go shopping. In the evening, you can hardly buy anything. The visitors have already taken what was put on the shelves during the day. To be sure, we try to ensure that goods are available in the evening as well. However, we must face the truth. I have drawn a lot of criticism for organizing traveling sales facilities at enterprises. Indeed, there are shortcomings in the way they are organized. However, so far nobody has come up with another realistic way to help a Muscovite purchase at least some of the goods which are in short supply.

Moscow does not look good compared to other cities in our country on other indicators as well. For example, we trail in the availability of housing. We have only 82 percent of the schools we need, 86 percent of the hospitals, and 84 percent of the polyclinics. The availability of sales space amounts to only 77 percent. I'd rather not talk about the volume of unsatisfied demand.

As I see it, a Muscovite lives by illusions. I myself live by them. So, he goes past the Bolshoy Theater and he begins to feel that he can go there provided he wants to, of course. To be sure, if he really wants to he will hardly be able to get there anyway, or to any other theater, a circus, or a concert by his favorite performer. However, the very perception that all of these joys of life are located in his native city and sort of meant for him somehow makes him feel better and even gives rise to a feeling of pride and being the chosen one.

Actually, it is much more mundane. You have to commute to work for almost an hour, plus the same coming home, plus shopping, and so on, and so forth... Forget about arts every day and an intense spiritual life. Here I am not referring to individuals who indeed live such a life (to be sure, the best assets of our native culture, literature, and art are concentrated in the capital) but rather to the overwhelming mass of common Muscovites, workers, clerical employees, physicians, teachers, and all kinds of staffers of various offices and departments. Our life is difficult and complex at present. We can only improve it ourselves.

Prokofyev Report at Moscow Gorkom Plenum

*90UN1041C Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 17 Feb 90 pp 1, 2*

[Report by Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of the Moscow Gorkom: "Results of the Party Central Committee February (1990) Plenum and the Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress"; at the 16 February Moscow Gorkom Plenum]

[Text] The gorkom [city party committee] plenum has assembled at a worrying time for the country and the party. Contradictions in all spheres of the life of society and political struggle are continuing to become more strained, acquiring explosive intensity. The socioeconomic situation is being made worse by the imperfect legal base and the incapacity of state authorities in a number of instances to apply current legislation. Interethnic conflicts, which are already affecting a considerable part of the country, have assumed tragic proportions. We have encountered strikes on political grounds in Moscow for the first time.

No less complex a situation has taken shape today within the party also. Lines of division have emerged, separatist tendencies are intensifying, the party rules are practically inoperative and discipline is loosening.

Adequate, decisive political actions are needed under these conditions. The communists had a right to expect such actions from the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. And although the overall balance of its assessments is positive, it has nonetheless to be confessed that expectations have not been justified in full.

At least a year late in formulating the party's political platform, the authors of the document were, to all appearances, forced into haste, permitting imprecision and vagueness on a number of most important standpoints. The communists express serious complaints in connection with the fact that the document was not published sooner and that the version submitted for discussion by the Central Committee Plenum failed to reflect a number of fundamental proposals which have won the support of many members of the party and the party organizations. We base our judgment on the results

of the all-Moscow party debate and numerous meetings with secretaries of primary party organizations and the communists.

This was said at the Central Committee Plenum itself also. The Editorial Commission attempted to take account of the main complaints of its participants. As a result, the draft platform which has been published was acceptable for discussion in the party organizations, although it still leaves many questions.

Undoubtedly, we can only make a comprehensive evaluation of the draft platform after it has been discussed in the lower party components. But the hollow nature of some of its sections is apparent even today, which makes them similar to a compilation of election promises.

While criticizing the past, the party should make a more self-critical analysis of its present-day practice. It is necessary to evaluate more strictly the progress of the economic reform and speak more specifically about the mistakes which have been made, not absolving ourselves of responsibility either for its so far depressing results.

Nonetheless, taking the draft platform in a broader context, it has to be recognized that at present it determines the main political reference points for the party and society.

Confirmation of adherence to the socialist development path and the statement that the party will oppose social injustice and man's exploitation of man in all its manifestations are of fundamental importance. This is the ideological foundation which determines the communist nature of our party.

The CPSU Central Committee advocates—and we support this—the irreversible replacement of the long-obsolete mechanism of the interaction of management and policy and the abandonment of dogmatized ideology, which for many years "mothballed" the state-administrative model of socialism.

A pronounced step has finally been taken toward radical, long-overdue transformations in the party itself and in the relations of party and state. Under the impact of many of those who spoke at the plenum a clear-cut position on Article 6 of the USSR Constitution was adopted and the renunciation of the monopoly of power and a readiness to act under the conditions of a real multiparty system were declared.

However, it is necessary to go further. Recognition by the governing party of the possibility of a multiparty system is merely the start. In practically all civilized countries the emergence of parties is controlled by legislation determining their sources of financing and the minimum strength necessary for registration. But in our country some people think that if several people have gotten together and put forward one or two slogans, here is a new party, if you please.

For this reason political logic demands, following the change in Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, the

elaboration and enactment of a law on parties and other public and political organizations.

Our position is that the USSR Constitution and other legislative instruments secure for the CPSU, as for any other party, the right to pursue its policy via party organizations, the media, and the party members elected to organs of people's power and working in state establishments.

The transition to a multiparty system is a complex and very difficult process. We must not allow the country to be engulfed in political chaos or let the renunciation of the monopoly of one party result in a monopoly of other political forces. No party diktat is permissible. Decisive power must truly belong to the soviets.

Having ceased to be the core of the administrative-bureaucratic mechanism of control, the CPSU is shedding legislative and executive functions. It should undoubtedly renounce the party organizations' right of supervision of management activity. A colossal reorientation of work in the party lies ahead. The role of the party's political dialogue with the main social forces and strata of society is growing and the need for an active search for supporters and the struggle against ideological opponents arises right away.

The draft platform does not today define these new tasks. Having enshrined these positions, the CPSU will specifically once again have confirmed its resolve to pursue policy via the communists and its sympathizers.

Nor can we be satisfied today that a whole number of urgent problems of intra-party life was not resolved at the plenum or reflected in the platform. This applies primarily to the mechanism for the direct incorporation of the party masses and each communist in political life.

A decision on the procedure for the election of delegates to the party congress was postponed, although communists' sentiments are well known—they insistently demand the direct, multiple-choice, and secret election of delegates. The versions of elections proposed to the participants in the Central Committee February Plenum are manifestly inferior to the collectively formulated proposals on this of the meeting of secretaries of Moscow's primary party organizations.

The Moscow Gorkom Buro believes that at the present gorkom plenum we must declare with all certainty that the principle of direct elections will be realized in Moscow. It is necessary even now to embark on the formation of the party districts, with regard, naturally, for the particular features of each rayon.

It is essential that the CPSU Central Committee Platform formulate a mechanism for party self-cleansing. We should return to this idea once again. For example, to the proposal concerning the organization after the congress of an exchange of party cards in order to rid ourselves of "ballast" and those who are in principle at odds with party policy.

As you know, the Central Committee Plenum also discussed the possibility of reducing the numbers of the executive party bodies. In the history of the party this question is not new. Lenin even insisted in his "Letter to the Congress" on an increase in the number of Central Committee members to 100, and at that time the party had only half a million communists approximately. Today, however, when there are 19 million communists in the party, it would seem the right time to raise the question not of a reduction but an increase in the number of Central Committee members. We need not to cut back the Central Committee but to decisively and regularly renew it, and the party conferences conducted between congresses should be accorded this right.

The establishment of the offices of party chairman and his deputies does not elicit unconditional support. It is a question of whether this corresponds to the principle of the collective nature of leadership and the development of democratic principles in the party. Would not such a step lead to a big gap between the Central Committee and its leadership? It is not clear what renaming the Politburo the Presidium would do. Is this not simply a change of name, a "change of decorations"?

I am convinced that our plenum must express its attitude also toward the timing of the report and the election campaign in the party organizations. The question cannot be considered settled.

The Central Committee's proposal that this campaign be staged prior to the congress runs counter to many speeches at the Central Committee Plenum itself and puts the party committees and their secretaries elected prior to the congress in an ambiguous position. Following approval of the new rules, their authority could be in jeopardy.

It is necessary at the next CPSU Central Committee Plenum to return to this matter once again and weigh all the pros and cons. The optimum solution, in our view, would be to conduct the report and election campaign after the party congress. But another version is possible also—according each party committee the right to make a decision on this independently. The gorkom plenum should, I believe, display insistence in the face of the Central Committee here.

One further serious problem—the party's monetary resources. It is essential to regularly publish information on the budget of the CPSU as a whole and its republic, kray, oblast, okrug, city, and rayon organizations. To know how and on what party resources are spent is the communist's inalienable right. This would do away with a pretext for political speculation aimed at undermining the party's authority.

Today, however, it is obvious that it is necessary to urgently settle the question of party contributions. The primary party organizations should dispose of up to 50 percent of the resources collected.

It would be expedient to determine even now that they may be spent on the organization of political activities, agitation, and propaganda and material support for party veterans and needy communists and also on the remuneration of full-time primary party organization officials.

And they should be accorded this right immediately. We cannot close our eyes to the fact that it is essentially realized on the spur of the moment. The communists do not understand why this question, which was raised at the Central Committee Plenum repeatedly, has remained overlooked. And it simply will not be understood if the next Central Committee Plenum fails to make changes to the formation of the party budget.

It would be correct, I believe, were the gorkom plenum to assume responsibility in solving one further protracted problem—the development of independent production and commercial activity. The party organizations manifestly lack resources for performance of their political and ideological work. It would evidently be correct, therefore, with regard for the fact that the rules do not prohibit such a form of activity, to recommend that the raykoms [rayon party committees] involve themselves more actively in independent financially autonomous activity. The gorkom has already taken a number of steps in this direction.

The CPSU Central Committee Platform needs to be more precise about the party apparatus also. Numerous calls are being heard currently for its reduction and elimination even. But it is necessary. No party today can manage without functionaries. What kind of apparatus is necessary to support the work of the elective party authorities is another matter.

In our opinion, the change in the structure of the apparatus and its cutback in 1988 were effected formally, on the basis of a volitional approach. It is obvious that we should determine the structure of any managerial body and its numbers by proceeding from its functions. This was not done. As a result, the efficiency of the work of the apparatus currently is not that great, and it frequently fails to accomplish new assignments.

Such a mistake must not be repeated. Following approval of the CPSU Central Committee Platform, the 28th Congress will finally formulate the party's tasks at this stage of perestroyka and its functions. We need on this basis to begin work on optimization of the structure of the party apparatus. Obviously, it should be flexible, mobile, and highly professional. Its structure should include such subdivisions as the sociological and forecast and analysis subdivisions and a press office. The local party committees should have complete independence on matters of determining the strength and structure of the apparatus.

One further question on which we are obliged to have our say today. It is a question of the possibility of the creation of a Russian Communist Party. An ambivalent problem, let us be blunt.

Among Russia's communists, those of Moscow included, there is currently a predominant mood in support of this idea, and they have weighty justification. Primarily the need for the political protection of Russia's economic and social interests. Is it not owing to the absence thereof that, say, the question of granting the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] real economic independence and the establishment of its just relations with the other republics is being dragged out to such an extent? It has to be considered also that, despite the efforts of the center, separatist tendencies in the state are continuing to grow. Some republics are not concealing their desire to secede from the USSR. Under these conditions the RSFSR has, of course, the right to its own party organization. The more so in that Russian republic structures have been created in the unions, the Communist Youth League and the Academy of Sciences and that there are such in practically all other public organizations.

At the same time there are also serious doubts as to the expediency of such a step. Russia has 54 percent of all the country's communists. The formation of a Russian Communist Party would immediately render pointless the organization of CPSU congresses inasmuch as their decisions would be predetermined by those of the congresses of Russia's communists. This is the first thing. Second, in solving their questions the party organizations of the autonomous republics currently have an "outlet" directly to the party Central Committee. The creation of an intermediate link could prompt them to officially structure their own independence also. Thus we could be faced with the existence not of a united CPSU but of a federation of communist parties. While advocating the maximum independence of the republics we need, nonetheless, to completely defend party unity as a guarantee of the preservation of the Soviet federation.

In a word, there are different viewpoints, different approaches. It was therefore not fortuitous that at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum this question also evoked heated argument. As a result, there is in the draft pre-congress platform an entry concerning the expediency of submitting this question for discussion by the communists of Russia themselves with its subsequent examination at a republic party conference prior to the 28th party congress.

While sharing this approach, we would consider it extremely important not to tarry in organizing an all-Russia party conference. A working meeting of secretaries of kray, okrug, and oblast party committees and primary party organizations of the republic could, as a first step, be held at the start of March in Moscow, the capital of the RSFSR. And questions about convening the conference could be discussed at it as a preliminary.

Renouncing the functions of state and economic control, the party is faced with the need, relying on the communist deputies, to step up its work in the soviets of people's deputies.

It is essential to urgently undertake the formulation of the forms and methods for pursuing CPSU policy in the soviets of people's deputies. The activity of the party groups of the soviets, which could formulate communist deputies' common line on matters of principle and avail themselves of the right of legislative initiative, must be restructured fundamentally. The diktat of the party committees and attempts on their part to put pressure on the deputies and impose their viewpoint must undoubtedly be ruled out here.

The draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress has appeared at the very height of the political struggle on the eve of the elections of people's deputies to the republic and local soviets. We defined our position in this struggle and our political credo at our last plenum, adopting the Moscow Gorkom Political Theses for the elections.

They reflect the priorities which the gorkom intends to accomplish through the soviets and through its representation in them and in plans for the future.

But even now the gorkom is developing a package of specific proposals, which it will submit for examination by the new soviets. I would like to dwell on some of them.

It is hard to imagine another region of the country which is so rent by ministries and departments as is Moscow. The social interests of Muscovites themselves are being considerably infringed here and need to be protected.

Even today transport and trade are working flat-out, the waiting list for an improvement in housing conditions has become frozen, the municipal infrastructure does not have a chance to restore itself and the ecological situation is alarming. All this is the result of the unmeasurable exploitation of the capital by the ministries and departments. It is expressed in the unwarranted increase in capacity in labor-intensive industries, the creation of new scientific establishments, the extremely slow withdrawal and reprofiling of industries not germane to the capital and the protracted introduction of ecologically clean technology.

In addition, the ministries and departments, in particular disregard of the opinion and possibilities of the city, are continuing the practice of creating a variety of managerial offices and associations, whose numbers not only are not diminishing but growing, and in a number of cases this is because of out-of-town specialists brought into Moscow, what is more.

The expediency, however, of locating many executive authorities in Moscow is doubtful. What is the relationship, say, to the capital of the "Asbest" concern when asbestos is not mined in the city, of the "Rudprom," when there is not a single strip mine in the city, and of the "Metallurgprom," when all its 24 enterprises are not only outside of Moscow but of Moscow Oblast also.

Not only our domestic but also foreign managers have now begun to conquer Moscow. Thus more than half the joint ventures with the participation of foreign partners created in the country have located their offices in Moscow. The Moscow City Soviet Executive Committee lacks the opportunity to influence the process of their formation.

The legitimate question arises: Who is boss in our city?

We believe that the Moscow City Soviet should be the sole boss. But relations which are built on a legal and economic basis should be determined for the exercise of the capital's functions between the Moscow City Soviet and the union, republic, and oblast authorities. This should be enshrined in the draft law on the status of Moscow as the capital city, which is being prepared on the initiative of the gorkom.

Only on this basis can we really close off the mechanical influx of out-of-town manpower into the city and gear up the fulfillment of socioeconomic programs which are intended to raise the Muscovites' living standard.

In this connection I would like to speak about one further specific proposal of ours.

We are all worried by the decline in the living standard of considerable numbers of the population, primarily citizens on a fixed income. These are primarily pensioners, invalids, students, and the low-income categories of working people. It is they who feel the burden of inflationary processes to the greatest extent.

It is essential today to pose the question of increasing the subsistence minimum of the population and to resolve it on the territory of the capital on the basis of an expansion of regional independence. We are talking not about a one-time act, but the creation of a permanent compensation mechanism. Naturally, all this must be resolved mainly from the municipal budget. Of course, the possibilities for this will be the greater here, the better Moscow's national economic complex operates.

In restructuring relations with the soviets the city party organization does not absolve itself of responsibility for the situation in key spheres of city life. Nor could it because the long-standing habit of holding the gorkom responsible for everything—for the state of the streets and the organization of trade, observance of law and order, the housing problem and much else—is strong. We see as our influence on a solution of these day-to-day problems not the imposition on business managers of an operating technique but the eradication through party influence of callousness, indolence, bureaucratism, and selfish ambition wherever they arise against the interests of the Muscovites.

This dictated the decisions of recent meetings of the Moscow Gorkom Buro, which made a high-minded, strict evaluation of the activity of the communist leaders of the construction complex and transport services. Two

days ago party proceedings were instituted against communists of the RSFSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education and a number of higher educational institutions who have brought the "Dorogomilovo" student campus to a lamentable condition.

Encountering such instances, one sees for oneself time and again that our greatest defect is bureaucratism, which has been unsuccessfully combated throughout, most probably, the whole history of our state. Nonetheless, this social phenomenon is, as before, characteristic of our reality. Many decisions remain no more than declarations. The same fate befell the resolution of the 19th All-Union Party Conference "Struggle Against Bureaucratism". Organizing work to implement it was not developed, including by the gorkom. Throughout the vast city party organization one may count on one's fingers instances of party proceedings being instituted for a formal, heartless attitude toward the people and inattentiveness and red tape upon an examination of their appeals to the party and state authorities and the fulfillment of their legitimate demands.

In proclaiming our devotion to humane, democratic socialism and putting man at the center of policy it is essential first of all that society rid itself of bureaucratic arbitrariness. The democratization of political life has as yet merely imparted a new, parliamentary mutation to bureaucratism, when immediate business is drowned in endless debate and one-sided, unfinished laws causing a mass of contradictions and paralyzing the activity of the local authorities are being enacted.

We are on the eve of elections to the republic and local soviets. Whether the city soviet authorities will be able to rid themselves of bureaucratism in all its manifestations will depend on who is elected to them and on their common sense and competence.

I would like to emphasize once again the position of the gorkom—it is not important who nominates the candidate for deputy, it is important who is nominated. Everyone—both communists and non-party people—has a vital interest in the organs of people's power containing people who are really capable of working for perestroika. At this difficult time for the country and the party the consolidation of all progressive forces and civil harmony are essential.

Extremist appeals and inordinate emotionalism blinding reason, which could lead to tragic consequences, are hardly capable of aiding the process of democratization.

We must declare once again today, on behalf of the gorkom, that we condemn chauvinism, nationalism, and racism in all manifestations, wherever they emanate.

Simultaneously we must say a decisive "no" to the calls for violence, psychological pressure on the state law enforcement authorities and the army, to the persecution of the people working in them, and to anarchy and lawlessness.

The discussion of the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee which we have to initiate in the party organizations of the city and in which not only the communists but also non-party people will undoubtedly participate must serve the modification of this document and the achievement of social consensus.

It has to be seen that the platform for the 28th CPSU Congress will be formulated under conditions where the democratization of party life has brought about the appearance of new forms of the communists' unity—clubs and horizontal structures—and the creation of various versions of party platforms, theses and rules. And it has to be said that many of them, about 20, at least, have appeared in the city. They include documents drawn up in the Moscow Higher Party Institute, Moscow State University and the Moscow Aviation Institute and many raykoms. The "Democratic Platform"—as it calls itself—emerged recently. On a whole number of problems—the place and role of the party in society, attitude toward Article 6 of the USSR Constitution, procedure for the election of executive authorities, formation of their apparatus and certain other propositions—the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee and other similar material do not conflict in principle.

There are differences, of course. But let us ask: Are these different approaches which have been revealed at the stage of discussion in the party so irreconcilable and so blatant that we should be posing the question of forming a separate faction in the party, with its subsequent conversion into an independent party?

In our view, the CPSU Central Committee Platform advances the process of democratization in the party and affords a real opportunity for the party organizations' manifestation of independence in their approach to the solution of the main problems of society.

Let us consider once again whether there is not behind the calls for the speediest demarcation of the CPSU by faction and the creation of new parties the aspiration of certain politicians to realize their personal ambitions and goals distinct from the actual essence of the platforms they are proposing.

We support constructive dialogue, we support the ideological and organizational unity of the party under the conditions of the transition period. At the same time the proposition concerning a multiparty system is not simply a propaganda declaration. If conditions become cramped in the CPSU for some people, they may leave and determine their political future at other than the party's expense.

As we have agreed, discussion of the CPSU Central Committee Platform is the second stage of the all-Moscow party debate. It should incorporate also discussion of the new party rules, the draft of which will be made public very soon.

We cannot allow the documents under discussion to be taken as routine circulars, which are forgotten soon after they have been read.

We would ask the gorkom members to provide their specific proposals and observations which gorkom commissions might collate. And to enlist in this the working group for the organization of city-wide party debate. Considering the particular importance of the moment, it would make sense to enlarge this group, affiliating thereto professional political scientists and scholars.

I propose that a special gorkom plenum be devoted to the formulation of our final proposals for the 28th Party Congress and then that they be submitted for discussion by a city party conference.

Prior to it, we look for the active position of the primary party organizations. Not only the party committees but also various party clubs and city councils of secretaries of party organizations could specify their particular opinion.

We hope that the communists of USSR Academy of Sciences institutes will continue their active line. It is probably necessary at this stage that the social and humanities institutes of the Academy of Sciences do some work on their alternative proposals.

I am sure that the media, which have accumulated considerable experience in the formulation and discussion of the party's problems, will display an active and involved position.

In their collation of the proposals and formulation of their own positions the raykoms should rely on the most qualified social scientist and propaganda worker personnel.

All that is of value in the debate which has been initiated must be taken into consideration. In other words, the entire intellectual potential of the Moscow city party organization should be included in the preparations for the congress.

These, comrades, were the considerations and thoughts with which the gorkom buro deemed it necessary to preface today's discussion at the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee Draft Platform for the 28th Party Congress.

Bashkir Pre-Election Activities Viewed

*WA0203201490 Moscow SOYUZ in Russian No 6,
5-11 Feb 90 p 2*

[Article by Radik Abdullin, Ufa: "The Leaders and the Led"]

[Text] The registration of 938 candidates to the post of Bashkir ASSR people's deputy has been accomplished for 280 seats in this major autonomous republic. This is

still not the final figure, however. The candidates themselves are presently engaged in an election before the election.

It was an event which surprised and puzzled many—Lenin Prize winner and Bashkir People's Poet Mustay Karim, serving years on end as RSFSR and Bashkir ASSR Supreme Soviet deputy, withdrew his candidacy both for RSFSR people's deputy and Bashkir ASSR people's deputy.

"I have never fought for any seat," Karim said. "And I have decided to continue in this manner in the future."

Mustafa Safich extended his support to his rival in the electoral district, engineer G.A. Yakovlev, "a very decent person, energetic and businesslike."

And now a contrasting situation. Taking the podium and subsequently announcing his candidacy at a meeting of the Ufa station locomotive depot labor collective to nominate candidates for Bashkir people's deputy from Railroad District No 60 was technical college teacher A. Yumagulov, local residents' representative and deputy block committee chairman. His clear and convincing speech, not so much about industrial production as about the problems faced here by Ufa residents, elicited an ovation. Passing through the sieve of competition—among five contenders, including the head of the railroad section—Yumagulov amassed the greatest number of votes.

"I am grateful to the railroaders' collective for showing solidarity with the residents of the microrayon," the "surprise candidate" stated. "The struggle underway for many years for humane living conditions has hardened us and taught us how to fight for the interests of simple people..."

And so we see one person withdrawing his candidacy, and another advancing his. These are just a few of the most contrasting instances which can be seen in the pre-election campaign that is literally stirring up the republic with unprecedented numbers of candidates to the post of deputy. The activity of the most progressive portion of the population and the deliberate passivity of another have at their roots essentially the same cause—dissatisfaction with the tempo of perestroika, powerlessness before an apparatus which is truly undying, and an abyss between supply and demand which is widening not by the day, but by the hour.

Thus we see three and more candidates to the post of people's deputy in the overwhelming majority of districts. Two-thirds of them are being nominated and registered for the first time. The contention for deputy seats is being waged by 681 representatives of labor collectives, 201 nominees of social organizations, and 56 individuals from meetings conducted on the basis of place of residence.

I was familiarized at the Central Election Commission—which has shifted now to a daily work schedule—with

the most recent statistics which have come to light in the 1990 election campaign, identifying both the leaders and the led. Thus, of those registered, 801 are CPSU members but only 11 belong to the Komsomol (slightly more than 1 percent!). There are 119 workers, 85 kolkhoz [collective farm] workers, and...not a single student representative. But now for the first time, the labor collectives of secondary and higher specialized educational institutions have been afforded the right to nominate their own representatives to the republic parliament. Alas, this right is being disregarded here.

One other feature—in 27 districts, it seems, elections have been conducted prior to the elections, with the registration of...a single candidate to the deputy post.

Such is the pre-election distribution of forces to date in one of the most ethnically mixed of the autonomous republics, although I repeat—these are not yet the final figures, and the republic press continues to publish lists of registered candidates and candidates who have...retired. The reasons are diverse—ranging from a lack of self-confidence to a shifting of votes to representatives of the working class and the peasants. Well, there you have it—everyone has the right to choose.

Ouster of Belorussian SSR Leadership Demanded

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in Russian 25 Feb 90 pp 1, 3

[Report on interview with Nil Gilevich by unidentified BELTA correspondent: "Forgery or Provocation?"]

[Text] Two days ago leaflets made their appearance in Minsk calling on the city's inhabitants to participate in a public demonstration on 25 February. Some of them contain calls for the ouster of the republic's political leadership and the demand for the immediate elimination of the party organizations.

The Belorussian Language Society is named as being among the informal organizations that signed such proposals. A BELTA correspondent telephoned the writer Nil Gilevich, chairman of the board of the republic society, and asked him to comment.

"Our board has made no decision on participating in the release of leaflets containing such appeals," Nil Gilevich said. "The last meeting discussed the need for the nomination for candidates for deputy of as many members of our society as possible so that they may defend the interests of the Belorussian language and Belorussian culture in the government. Our secretariat expressed indignation and a protest in connection with the undemocratic decree of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet Presidium prohibiting the registration of candidates for deputy of certain public formations. True, this decree was revoked, but unfortunately we have already lost many candidates.

"As far as the political demands and declarations allegedly expressed on behalf also of the Belorussian Language Society are concerned, I state categorically that they have nothing to do with us. The society is an educational suprapolitical organization working within the framework of the Belorussian SSR and USSR constitutions. Its principal mission is the revival of Belorussian, propaganda, and a fostering of love for the native tongue. In accordance with its statutes, the society has no political aims and is ready to receive as members people of different political views, directions, and philosophies. Marxists, religious figures, and members of party committees may assist the revival of national self-awareness by means and with the help of the native language. Incidentally, there are among the members of the society board professional party officials, communists, and members of the 'Revival' Belorussian Popular Front Sojm. "All who are familiar with our statutes and who follow the society's activity could not have failed to have noticed that its goal—the revival of Belorussian—is international and without even a hint of internecine discord and confrontation. The society's very existence would otherwise be pointless.

"If these leaflets are a provocation and if some people have for their own selfish purposes taken advantage of the association's good name, we condemn such actions and will not allow ourselves to be pulled into the petty intrigues of political extremists.

"I wish to say in conclusion from myself personally that if in society one lie replaces another, if one bureaucratic lawlessness replaces another, whatever it is called, things will be very uncomfortable for the individual in this society. As a man of letters and professor who has devoted his whole life to the education of the youth, I cannot accept and approve such a replacement."

Mutalibov's TV Address on Baku, NKAO

90US0553A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
28 Jan 90 p 1

[Address of A.N. Mutalibov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, delivered 27 January 1990 on republic television]

[Text] Dear Fellow Countrymen!

During these mournful days, all our people are painfully enduring the death of our courageous sons.

As a son of my people I express, for myself personally and in the name of my family, condolences accompanied by profound grief to mothers and fathers, brothers and sisters, to all relatives and persons close to those who have perished.

Their memory will live eternally in our hearts.

It is very important at this time to warm the hearts of people shaken by tragic events, to help them live through this disaster, to inspire in them a confidence in tomorrow.

Life goes on. Grief cannot obscure judgment. We must do everything possible to bring the republic out of deep crisis and return to a normal working life.

A great trust has been placed in me at this difficult, critical stage. I see my very first duty as that of staunchly and faithfully serving my people. I assure you that I will do this not in words, but in deeds.

I am very much expecting and counting on the aid and support of each one of you in my work. After all, it is not said for nothing that "he who leans on the people for support will not falter." And also—"You won't turn out much with just one hand."

The most important thing today is to provide order and calm, to create a foundation for the earliest possible repeal of the state of emergency in Baku. This is not just a question of principle, but of our honor as well.

As you know, a commission was established by a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and entrusted with conducting an analysis of the reasons behind the tragic events in Baku, with developing a political evaluation, and adopting appropriate measures. A thorough investigation of what occurred is also being conducted by a deputies' commission of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Soviet.

The results of the commission's work will be delivered to the community. I assure my people that no one will escape responsibility for the deaths of absolutely blameless individuals.

Nor will those people escape responsibility on whose conscience lie the destabilization of the economy, chaos in industry, and the tremendous loss of material valuables necessary to the people, necessary for refugee resettlement. We are faced with the threat of closed down electric power facilities. About a year will be required to get our oil fields operational. Thousands of families may remain without water, heat, light, and food. Is this what we strived to attain? What government, what leadership could reconcile itself with such a state of affairs?

I appeal to workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, to all laborers of the republic to renew their efforts without delay, to make up for what has been lost. For on this depends the welfare of each and every one of us, on this depends the today and tomorrow of our republic.

You should know that the republic leadership is monitoring the situation. We are striving to avoid any and all dangerous incidents, and all such instances are being met with operational measures.

At the same time, I call upon everyone to show vigilance, to refrain from giving in to false rumors and panic, to avoid provocation with respect to servicemen.

I call upon all residents of Baku to show an understanding of the situation. Representatives of labor collectives could engage in joint patrolling with troops. The sooner we provide calm and quiet in the city, the sooner troop withdrawal will begin.

I also want to say that the presence of military units in the border regions with Armenia has enabled the bloodshed to cease; armed attacks have stopped completely and the situation in Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] is stabilizing. Life is gradually returning to normal.

At our request, the transfer of families of servicemen has been suspended by order of the Minister of Defense. Departure of the Russian-speaking population from Baku has also ceased. I am grateful to all who have provided words of wisdom these days at their plant, domicile, and rallies, over radio and in the press, to assist in removing the mental tension and discarding rumors of panic. We must guarantee the security of every inhabitant and eliminate all provocation. It must be clear to all that those who strive to drive a wedge between the Azeri and Russian peoples are playing into the hands of our enemies.

We have engaged in practical effort to bring order to Nagorno-Karabakh. Under the state of emergency, a number of extremist groups have been neutralized, people inciting interethnic strife have been arrested, nationalist organizations have been disbanded.

A republic organizational committee has begun to operate with the aim of restoring once and for all the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan SSR in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. This is a complicated effort and we call upon the population to show endurance and restraint so that the charted program is not undermined. We are counting on the assistance and support of all.

Let me use this occasion to briefly state how we see Azerbaijan's paths of national development.

In the socio-political sphere. Here we see a broad and candid dialogue with all democratic, healthy forces, consistent affirmation of the principles of glasnost and pluralism, and at the same time—and I wish to state this with all certainty—the decisive eradication of all-permissiveness and anarchy, the universal consolidation of discipline, law and order.

Nor can we help but state quite frankly that during these days the party organization of the republic is also undergoing serious crisis. Communists have never retreated from responsibility, and today we see errors committed, gross blunders in their work.

But historical truth consists in the fact that the difficult road of social progress and national rebirth traveled by

our people has been accomplished under the leadership of the Communist Party. And further forward movement can be accomplished only if we take a decisive turn towards renewal and a self-cleansing of the Communist Party of the republic.

This process presupposes the rendering of a critical interpretation of the activity of each communist. But it does not mean that someone may assume the right to defame party members or use threats and blackmail to force them to turn in their party cards. We are proceeding towards a confirmation of democratic relations. The use of such methods in political struggle is incompatible with democracy as well as with the convictions of communists.

In the socio-economic sphere. Here we see the embodiment in practical terms of the principle of economic independence for the republic, the use of natural resources in the interests of our people and our republic, and the establishment of direct access to foreign partners. We see an improvement in the life of every family, primarily those with many children—I have in mind food, housing, and job placement.

In the spiritual sphere. Here we see a new, more thorough reading of the history of Azerbaijan, the elimination of "gaps" in it. We see the creation of favorable conditions for the development, active functioning, and study of the Azeri language. We are talking about a genuine rebirth of national traditions, holidays and, finally, something which is also disturbing to people—setting straight the names of streets, enterprises, and educational institutions.

I have mentioned only a few features of the coming multi-faceted effort. We will be consulting with you again many times about this.

And here there is something special I must say. Many of our troubles have been related to the habit which took root of making individual decisions. I want to state firmly and responsibly that the new course, the course leading to rebirth of the republic, will mean first of all a collegiality of leadership, democratic decisionmaking. All matters—the future of Nagorno-Karabakh, prospects for national development—all fundamental problems will henceforth be worked out on the basis of widespread discussion, taking the people's opinion into account.

We can now implement everything we have planned under one absolutely necessary condition. Like never before, our entire people must achieve consolidation, unity. Everything depends on us ourselves, on how we will set about the task. We are obliged to do everything we can to ensure that peace and calm reign in every city, every village, and every home.

I call upon all of you, dear comrades, for all of this.

Azeri Concerns Expressed as Nakhichevan Blockade Continues

90US0642A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
22 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by B. Bekirzade: "How to Break the Ring of the Blockade?"]

[Text] Many people are interested in what is happening now in Nakhichevan. But not everybody in the country, as well as in Azerbaijan, knows how and by what the autonomous republic lives. There is but one answer to this question—life has stopped here. The plants and factories have stopped; the railroad is paralyzed. Everything—food, fuel, reserve fuel, as well as human patience—is coming to an end. But there is more uncertainty and suspicion than before. Nobody knows what is going to happen in a minute, or in an hour, or in a day.

"Blockade" is the most frequently heard word now in the autonomous republic, and not only here. The USSR people's deputies from Armenia talk about the blockade at the 3rd session of the Supreme Soviet. They talk with the forcefulness which is typical for them, they demand that the damages be paid. All right, let us talk about the blockade.

It is true that the railroad is not functioning. The engineers of the Dzhulfu locomotive depot are on strike. Why then do none of the Armenian people's deputies say at the session that we are not receiving shipments because of the Dzhulfu depot and let the Nakhichevan Autonomous republic reimburse our losses?

The answer to this is obvious. It serves somebody's advantage to put the guilt for the blockade on Azerbaijan, without mentioning the autonomous republic. If they do mention that then it will transpire that the republic is besieged itself. And such an admission is too much to the disadvantage of the opposite side.

All the highways and railroads to Nakhichevan go right through the territory of Armenia.

The highway traffic has died down completely. There is only the railroad left. The sector of the railroad that goes through the territory of Armenia (Meghinskiy rayon) is being raided by organized armed gangs. "The bearded ones" shoot at trains, take hostages, beat people up and make them testify falsely against the Azeris. The Armenian authorities gave their silent encouragement to these lawless actions until the Azeri engineers lost patience and stopped working. Since that time the neighboring republic started to talk hysterically about the "blockade".

Everybody must remember the newspaper reports about the catastrophically diminishing reserves of paper and gasoline, about the shortage of construction materials which failed to arrive in the disaster regions, seemingly, because of Azerbaijan. The Nakhichevan ASSR [Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic] blends into the background or, to be more precise, gets totally forgotten.

Last year the USSR Ministry of Railways Deputy Minister Pingarev visited the autonomous republic and asked the engineers: "Why are you on strike?" I wrote down in my pad the reply of an engineer Bayram Khudiyev: "Who told you we are on strike? We are carrying 85 percent of our shipments to Armenia. During the earthquake we did not get out of our diesel locomotives for days. And now when we happen to be on the territory of the Megrinskiy rayon in Armenia we have a feeling we are back in 1941 again. Instead of watching the road we watch the bushes from where they shoot at us. There are six of my family waiting for me at home. I am thinking about them. Who will save us from a bullet?"

Since that time no security has been provided for the engineers in spite of all the promises. And again the problem of blockading Armenia is pushed in the foreground.

"It is two years now," says the head of the Nakhichevan railroad branch Malik Farayev, "that the Armenian authorities have taken no measures to instill order on the territory of the Megrinskiy rayon. At the same time they are using the central organs to make the locomotive depot renew working. True, they increased the number of military details on the territory of the Megrinskiy rayon and arrested some of the extremists. But there is still no guarantee of safety for the railroad traffic."

The leaders of the autonomous republic and the workers of the Dzhulfa depot have been conducting negotiations for over a month now. The engineers demand that the authorities find and punish those who are to blame, those who shoot at them and blow up the tunnels. At the procuracy of the railroad branch we were told that there were about 80 crimes committed in the last two years on the railroad in the territory of Armenia. Those responsible for the crimes were identified but criminal proceedings were started against none of them. For instance, over a month ago somebody shot at a freight train at the station of Karchivan in Armenia. On the same day somebody also shot at an engineers' team and took Senior Lieutenant Igor Chaikov hostage.

"They beat him up," added senior lieutenant of the Dzhulfa railroad militia department R. Aliyev, "and this is not the only time that a hostage or an engineer was beaten up by Armenian law enforcing officials in the territory of the Megrinskiy rayon."

"We are tired to no end," says an assistant engineer S. Kurbanov, "since last summer on the territory of the Megrinskiy rayon our diesel locomotive was shot at from hunting rifles, submachine guns, sniper rifles, and machine guns. Who blasted a whole round from a submachine gun at the locomotive of G. Ismaylov who miraculously survived? You know, when you are in the middle of the night with 60 cars of freight and petroleum products behind your back and you know that the

'bearded ones' are waiting for you and for the shipment at every mile of the road, there is only one thing left for you—to stop working."

I had no objections to these words of the worker.

It was also here, in Dzhulfa, that I met with Alesker Sadykhov, first deputy chairman of the Nakhichevan ASSR Council of Ministers.

"We have been negotiating with the depot employees for over a month," said he. "The engineers demand quite fairly that security be provided in the territory of the Megrinskiy rayon in Armenia. Unfortunately, the leaders of the autonomous republic cannot comply with these demands right now. Even after we agreed with the Armenian side on the unhindered railroad traffic, there occurred several raids of the extremists. It is not Armenia but we who are in a blockade, isolated from the outside world. For us the railroad is a road to life. The destiny of the autonomous republic depends fully and entirely on the road functioning. The situation in the autonomous republic is critical. The factories and plants are stopped, the construction sites are empty. We expect huge losses of cattle. The store shelves are empty and the speculators are thriving everywhere. There is no flour and other foodstuffs."

The negotiations between the representatives of the Nakhichevan branch of the People's Front and the Armenian all-nation movement were not successful either.

How to find a way out? If the trains start moving tomorrow, will they make it to their final destination? Isn't it time to declare a state of emergency on the Megrinskiy sector of the railroad and to take realistic measures to make the situation normal and provide security for the engineers? The leaders of the autonomous republic should start negotiating to continue the construction of the remaining 8-kilometer sector of the Baku-Nakhichevan highway in the Megrinskiy rayon. The central power organs as well as the people's deputies can mediate the talks.

Armenia needs the shipments and Nakhichevan railroad workers need security. And it is Armenia who has to maintain order in its territory.

Yesterday as the newspaper was put together, an Azerinform correspondent sent the following from Nakhichevan: After a 40-day interval they restarted through traffic in the direction Mindzevan-Dzhulfa-Norashen-Masis. At the same time the trains started going from Mindzevan to Kafan; the traffic renewed in the direction of Iran and back.

The engineers of the Dzhulfa locomotive depot were guaranteed full security by the military and they promised to help as soon as possible to put an end to the difficult economic situation in the Nakhichevan ASSR. This situation was caused by the railroad blockade on the

territory of the Megrinskiy rayon in Armenia. Everything is quiet now at this sector of the road. Its 45 kilometers are guarded heavily by the military. The employees of the Nakhichevan railroad branch fully repaired the signal systems that had been broken down.

In general, the tension felt lately by the people of the Nakhichevan ASSR diminished somewhat. But the transportation and agricultural, industrial and construction enterprises are not working to their full capacity yet. Some of the schools did not yet reopen. The people of Nakhichevan can get to Baku and other areas in Azerbaijan still only by air.

Georgian Deputies on Office of Presidency

90US0738A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
15 Mar 90 p 2

[Interviews with USSR People's Deputies from Georgia: Akakiy Bakradze, Eldar Shengelaya, Parmen Margvelashvili, Valerian Advadze, Zeynab Kurashvili, Vakhtang Kublashvili, Guram Chigogidze, and Zurab Pirtskhalaishvili, compiled by ZARYA VOSTOKA correspondent Vitaliy Tsereteli: "The Office of the President: The Position of the Deputies from Georgia"]

[Text] The extraordinary 3rd Session of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies is considering the Law "On the founding of the office of USSR President and the introduction of alterations and supplements to the USSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)." The discussion of office has dragged on, having immediately gone beyond the framework of the Congress's working procedure instituted at its opening. And the talk instantly got around specifically to the founding of the institute of the presidential board, somehow leaving in the background USSR Constitution Article 6, which quite recently agitated everybody, and the alteration of which the seeming majority, even those who were in favor of it yesterday, had considered a certainty. Even the proposal to remove from the new version of Article 6 the words "Communist Party of the Soviet Union" did not elicit "animation in the hall" and an indignant murmur, but was heard out quietly and calmly. True, the proposal was rejected by vote, even though the majority did vote for the removal of these words. Nevertheless, the behavior of the Congress is surprising. What is this, its rapidly growing insight or simply its ability to contrive? That, however, is already another conversation...

But let us return to the hall of the Congress and address the first point of the Law under discussion: "To found the office of President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" and further on, a fairly important and substantive paragraph talking about the fact that the founding of this office does not change the legal status of the union and autonomous republics secured by their constitutions and the USSR Constitution. It was this that was placed first for the roll call vote, and the Congress adopted it by an overwhelming majority, to the applause of the hall.

At this Congress, the deputies from Georgia took the position determined by the last session of the republic Supreme Soviet. The Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet decree "On the guarantees of the defense of the state sovereignty of Georgia" was officially forwarded to the Congress Presidium, and also broadly disseminated at the Congress, including among representatives of the press, in addition to a letter signed by a large group of people's deputies, the text of which says, "Based upon the 9 March 1990 Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet decree, and sharing this completely, the deputation from Georgia has resolved not to participate in the discussion and vote on the issue of the presidential board and the election of the President at the 3rd Extraordinary Congress of USSR People's Deputies." This concrete formulation, announced before the start of the Congress, by all appearances played a positive role in the discussion of the law, but at the same time, the opinion of several of our deputies changed during its course. And it should be assumed that they made this already final decision for themselves on how to act having thought everything over comprehensively.

[Akakiy Bakradze] I participated in neither the discussion nor the vote. Why not? First of all, I feel that the USSR Constitution is being violated, that is, the new amendments which the Congress is now introducing into it. They state that the election of the President must be conducted by universal secret and direct voting on an alternative basis, that is, the entire people must elect the President. But now he will be elected at the Congress, and that, from the very start, violates the constitutional statute. I feel that such things must not occur, because if we violate the Constitution from the very start, then what kind of guarantee is there that we will observe it punctiliously in the future? This is the first reason. The second is that the Georgian people are now struggling for the independence and freedom of their country. I personally feel that we will get this freedom very soon. A vivid example of this is Lithuania. It has already left the composition of the Soviet Union, and I am certain that no one will ever return it to the composition. I think that the same will take place with us in Georgia as well. Thus it works out that I am a citizen of the Georgian republic, and not a citizen of the Soviet Union, and I have no right to participate in the election of another country's President. These are the two reasons that determined my attitude toward the Congress. There are others as well, but we will talk about them later.

[Eldar Shengelaya] I did not take part in the voting because the position that was expressed at the session of the Georgian Supreme Soviet was, in my view, correct, for in it we are relying upon our history, that is, we proceed from the position that Georgia is in fact an occupied country. Therefore, I personally, as a citizen of Georgia, do not have the right to take part in the institution of the presidential post in the USSR. This is the concern of those who consider themselves to be the legal representative of that state.

Yet I want to say straight away that a meeting took place between our delegation and M.S. Gorbachev at which he also spoke about the fact that he fully supports our republic's sovereignty, and that if the issue of leaving is to arise, he will play a definite role in that. But this was, nevertheless, a private conversation with our delegation. And at the Congress today he told the Lithuanians and Estonians that he is prepared to hold negotiations, adding that the Georgian and Azerbaijanis are raising this issue. So, proceeding from his position on this issue, when the voting is held for a concrete candidacy for the office of President, I will vote for M.S. Gorbachev: He has publicly stated that he favors negotiations with those republics which are having the same problems.

[Parmen Margvelashvili] I did not participate in the vote, and primarily because that was my understanding of the decisions of the session of the Supreme Soviet of Georgia. Yet I must make note of the progressive aspects of the work of the Congress as well. And this is first of all the principled recognition of the multiparty system, which is the call of the times. If our republic manages to consolidate itself, then we can go further—toward genuine independence. The most important problem now is that we ourselves must define ourselves within the republic. If we do this, I think that independence and freedom will soon become accessible to us as well. Everything must be done first of all with our own hands in our own republic.

[Valerian Advadze] I did not take part in the vote. That was the position expressed from the very beginning, even back in Tbilisi. That was the position of the republic Supreme Soviet, that the Georgian deputation's participation in the discussion of this draft law is intolerable. I fulfilled this instruction.

[Zeynab Kurashvili] I openly expressed my position in advance, having signed the statement of the USSR people's deputies from Georgia, and I confirmed it at the Congress by not taking part in the vote during the institution of the office of President of the USSR. Thus I fulfilled the decision of the session of the Supreme Soviet of our republic.

[Vakhtang Kublashvili] I voted against the institution of the post of President of the USSR because I feel that we must first of all elect the president of our republic, and only then express our attitude toward the union draft law.

[Guram Chigogidze] I am in that group of our deputies who voted for the introduction of the post of President of the USSR. In my view, those comments that we had on the draft law proposed by the Congress were almost all taken into account during the course of the discussion and resolved positively, which impelled me to vote "in favor." And finally, I feel that there must also be a president in the republic.

[Zurab Pirtskhalaishvili] Before the start of the Congress, I decided for myself that I was not going to take part in the vote when the office of President of the USSR

was to be confirmed. Yet during the course of the discussion that unfolded at the Congress, I understood that there exists a definite opposition with regard to M.S. Gorbachev, and I decided to give him my vote during the election of the President. I do not see today in the office of President of the USSR any individual other than M.S. Gorbachev who would be capable of further continuing the democratic transformations under way in the country. I believe that he will support our republic's aspiration to become free and independent, and as President, will in no way infringe upon our sovereignty. Those alterations and supplements to the USSR Constitution adopted by the Congress will serve as the guarantee of that. All that has been achieved over the years of perestroika must not perish.

New Ossetian Obkom Chief Interviewed

90US0570C Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
31 Jan 90 p 1

[Interview with V. Tskhovrebashvili, first secretary of the South Ossetian Obkom, member of the obkom bureau, conducted by correspondent Anatoliy Khugayev: "Expressing People's Interests"; date and place not specified]

[Text] [Correspondent] Valnin Vladimirovich, you have become first secretary of the obkom [oblast party committee] at a difficult time. What now, in your view, is the social and political situation in the autonomous oblast?

[Tskhovrebashvili] Yes, you are right, a difficult period indeed. What should not have happened has happened. In other words, a confrontational situation between two fraternal peoples has taken shape. It is difficult for me to talk of this because I know well both Ossetians and Georgians and the history of their joint life and struggle against common enemies over many centuries. What happened must be thoroughly investigated.

What are things like at present?

I have to say that as a result of the measures being adopted by the republic and oblast party, soviet, and law enforcement authorities and the efforts of the local population a trend toward stabilization of the social and political situation has been observed.

I have already met with the leaders of the oblast's law enforcement authorities, and specific measures for strengthening public order have been mapped out. All efforts now are being geared to not only restoring the weakened ties of friendship between the Georgian and Ossetian peoples but strengthening them even more. And, I am sure, we will achieve this. Such is our historical fate, we have no other way.

The meeting in the obkom on 26 January with secretaries of the party committees of Goriyskiy, Khashurskiy, Karelskiy, and Kaspiski rayons will also contribute to this, I hope.

We also expect help from the media. Let us seek and propagandize what brings us closer together. I stress: what brings us closer together, not disunites us.

[Correspondent] Do you have a specific action program? With what have you begun your work? What do you consider the main thing at present?

[Tskhovrebashvili] The main thing is to establish a dialogue with the community, with the people. And I began my work with meetings and frank discussions in the work force. In this difficult situation I considered it necessary to confer with people before settling on an action program. I have had meetings with workers at the Tskhinvali "Elektrovibromashina" Plant, the Garment Factory, the Bus-Maintenance Plant, the Timber Works and the Linen Underwear Plant and with the workforce of the oblast hospital and a number of the city's schools.

I have seen for myself once again that the situation is complex. And not only the political but the economic situation also. The oblast's industry has fallen short by a sum total of approximately R14 million in the supply of commodity products, and in profits, by almost R2 million.

Nor are things any better in agriculture.

[Correspondent] You have "inherited" the current party apparatus. Do you intend to redesign it in any way? If so, how?

[Tskhovrebashvili] You know, I would not use the word "redesign" here inasmuch as everything still needs to be closely investigated. How I envision the work of the party apparatus: Being in the thick of people and living their interests, is another matter.

[Correspondent] And interaction with the variety of public organizations and formal and informal associations?

[Tskhovrebashvili] In interaction with public and informal associations it is necessary to proceed from the goals which they pursue. If these organizations' programs coincide with the interests of society and are aimed at rapprochement and the strengthening of friendship between peoples, it is necessary to seek forms of joint work with them and direct their initiative to benefit the common cause.

[Correspondent] Do you intend to announce your position? What form will you choose for this?

[Tskhovrebashvili] What form? This may be done both through the media, which I am partly doing today, and in the course of meetings with the work force.

But there are other forms of declaration of one's position also. The main thing, in my view, lies elsewhere: Determining a correct position, and the form of its declaration will be suggested by life itself.

[Correspondent] You can hardly count solely on yourself. Who will be your main support upon implementation of your chosen policy?

[Tskhovrebashvili] There's no denying that one man, whoever he may be, cannot encompass everything. The main support in the achievement of the planned goals will be the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia. In my view, only the unity of these forces assures success today. Their support and recognition can only be achieved, in my view, if people are persuaded that you have understood them and are expressing their interests and just demands. Today the people will follow those who tackle actual problems. It is from this that I intend to proceed in my work.

Azeris Blast Georgian Approach to NKAO*90US0749B Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
20 Mar 90 p 4*

[Article by A. Sharifov under the rubric "AZERINFORM Commentary": "'The Transcaucasian Home.' At Whose Expense?"]

[Text] Dozens of telephone calls from irate readers are ringing through AZERINFORM. The reason is an interview with Georgiy Chanturiya, chairman of the Georgian Social Democratic Party, published in the newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA on 10 March 1990 under the headline, "The Goal—To Create a 'Transcaucasian Home'." What is discussed in the material, what there has displeased our countrymen? It turns out that recently in Tbilisi, at this party's initiative, a meeting took place between the leaders of the informal organizations of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Well, at first glance, not a bad thing; it is high time to sit down to the negotiating table.

"What did the Georgian National Democratic Party bring to the meeting?" asks the correspondent. G. Chanturiya replies, with the idea of creating "a single Transcaucasian common home," but the main thing brought was a draft of a joint communique on NKAO. The essence of the latter is in its three-in-one formulation, specifically: "The first thing is that the Azerbaijani side recognize the controversial nature (?) of the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The second is that the Armenian side refrain from any actions with regard to the NKAO until Armenia achieves independence. And the third—after the achievement of independence by the republics of the Transcaucasus, the given issue will be considered together with representatives of the UN." Upon reading this, I felt like asking the Georgian leader, will the issues of the Abkhaz and Adzhar ASSRs, and the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast also be considered with UN representatives, or is he only worried about Azerbaijani Karabakh?

He gets in even deeper. On the question, "How was your proposal received?" Chanturiya boldly reports, "Calmly, benevolently, with interest. By our next joint meeting, which we plan to hold in April, sides have promised to bring the results of the discussion of this proposal with their peoples." But he got a very persistent interviewer-journalist, and she asked G. Chanturiya again, "But all the same, concretely, how were the first two points of your proposals on the NKAO greeted by the negotiation participants?"

The leader of the Georgian national democrats has no doubts: "The Azerbaijani side had a very good attitude toward them; I have in mind the first point concerning Azerbaijan. The Armenian delegation did not express unconditional acceptance of the second point. I think, however, that this will finally take place." The basis for his confidence is the hope that from abroad will return... Paruyr Ayrikyan, the not-known chief ideologist and organizer of the "Karabakh" committee. He, it is said, will regulate the Karabakh issue with his authority.

So one really feels like asking, how many more of these "high-protectors" of the Karabakh land are there going to be, the Balayans, Pogasyans, Manucharovs?...

That the Georgian leader is having his game under the guise of creating a "Transcaucasian home" is understood. But what has Karabakh got to do with it? What is this, small change for the satisfaction of some people's political ambitions? And if indeed these national democrats are such great democrats, then let them first achieve the exit from the body of the Georgian SSR of the Abkhaz ASSR, then the Adzhar ASSR, and then the South Osetian Autonomous Oblast as well. Incidentally, all three autonomous formations could go simultaneously. Because of my lack of experience here, I am no adviser.

Another thing troubles us: Who could, in the name of the Azerbaijani people, take upon himself the mission to recognize the controversial or non-controversial nature of even a piece of the territory of our sovereign republic? Enough of this; much land has been passed around under assorted sauces "in the name of the friendship of the peoples." It is not without reason that they say among our people "Torpagdan pay olmaz" (there's no separating the share from the land).

As one participant of the Tbilisi meeting stated to us, the Azerbaijani delegation unanimously and categorically rejected the first point of the draft, and proposed the introduction of a moratorium on all territorial claims in the Transcaucasus. The Armenian informals did not, of course, support this.

Politics is a serious and perfidious lady. This should be remembered when sitting down to the negotiating table, in order not to later give cause for provocational fabrications.

Problems Encountered by Troops in Baku*90UM0303B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 7 Feb 90 p 4*

[Article by special correspondent A. Krayniy: "Tanks and Truth. Baku: The View From Within Armor"]

[Text] "Things are frightening at night. My heart thumped in response to every sound outside the door, every footstep and sigh. I couldn't sleep. I would roll up in the chair and count the minutes—if only dawn would come sooner, if only it would be day sooner. And Mitka, snoring away, was oblivious to it all.

"It's as if someone is slowly choking you with his hands, and you don't have the strength to pry him away, to scream, and anyway, who is going to hear? We were alone on the stairway landing. While the pogroms against the Armenians were going on, we shook with fear, and my husband bit his lip: 'Where are the troops?' Then the troops came into the city, and once again we shook with fear.

"During the day he managed to break through to the outside for a few minutes. He was pale, and I felt sorry for him—he was unable to find a place for himself in all of this either. And then we were driven away not by him but by his soldiers. One assault rifleman was assigned to us, Mitka and I lay down on the bed of the vehicle, and we drove away. To the military airfield. It would seem that everything should now be behind me, that there is no longer any danger, but inside I feel like my chest is in an icy grip; even here in Moscow, at my mother's, I can't relax...."

(From the story of an officer's wife who asked not to be identified).

The shots broke out suddenly like rain. Tension had already been hanging over the city for a week now, but the troops did not appear on the streets of Baku until 0030 hours on the twentieth of January. The militia patrols—reinforced to six men—were there more to create an appearance than to keep order. They stood at the intersections, while just 200 meters away people whose only fault was that they were born Armenian were being plundered and killed. A regiment of internal troops that had managed to break through was guarding the buildings of the Central Committee and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and they would not venture out into the streets. The Baku garrison was blockaded in its barracks, and units that were arriving in the city were bottled up at the airfields. The regiments had run out of food, and the soldiers had already spent several days on dry rations. Attacks on armories had begun both in Azerbaijan and in Armenia, highway and railroad traffic had come to a standstill, and commands to put an end to the lawlessness never came in.

Knowing little at that time, I tried to gain an understanding of what was going on: Why was this happening? The explanations I heard—"There wasn't enough time, it was technically impossible"—were not persuasive to me: What if war were to break out tomorrow? Would we have time then? I don't know, I don't know. All I know is that the roads to Baku were still open on the twelfth and thirteenth of January, and wherever they were blockaded, it was on a makeshift basis.

An opportunity was lost, and that which could have been done, literally with little bloodshed, was finally accomplished with considerable bloodshed. Very considerable, if you remember that Soviet troops were entering a Soviet city. They entered in order to restore order, justice and law. What sort were they, these occupation troops? What in Baku could be occupied by Senior Warrant Officer O. Akhundov, an Azerbaijani who died in the hospital from "a bullet lodged in the rib cage and a bullet through the abdomen"? Or Colonel Nikolay Ivanovich Opalev, the military hospital's deputy commander for political affairs, who concealed Armenians in the hospital together with his chief until the arrival of the troops? In a hospital which was practically defenseless, and in which the only weapon was a scalpel. Or Sergeant Volodya Kuskov from Leningrad, who was strangled

with a piece of wire (an Afghan technique by the way), though luckily surviving, being a strong lad?

Gunfire. Single reports were followed by bursts of automatic fire, which crackled with a dry sound, like tearing paper. Flocks of fiery-blue tracer rounds criss-crossed the night sky. The engines of tanks and APCs roared in the distance.

Zhenya Solovyev, the 23-year-old commander of a motorized rifle company, was late for the start of the battle. He was still standing on the threshold of the weapon storage room, on the threshold between light and darkness, personally issuing ammunition, when shots rang out quite close, near the checkpoint of the Salyanskiye Barracks.

The day before, Solovyev, another two company commanders and the battalion commander drove out for reconnaissance. They traveled in an ambulance, unarmed and without soldiers, seeking a road free of obstructions which could be used at the needed moment to reinforce the guard on the district's armories. Given the present situation, the existing protection might not be enough, the armories could be overwhelmed, and then....

They were unable to find a clear road—everything was clogged with heavy trucks, buses and bulldozers. And so they returned.

The Deputy Battalion Commander for Political Affairs was the first man Solovyev came across as he rushed out onto the night-shrouded drill field.

"They're firing on the barracks from behind the fence!" he cried, gasping for breath.

Solovyev leapt toward the checkpoint, where he saw someone shooting from beneath the wheels of an Ikarus blocking the road.

Before he could grasp what was going on, he felt a blow in his chest, like someone hitting him with a fist. The 23-year-old Company Commander was not privy then to what it is that a man experiences when he is fired upon—it simply never came into his mind to put on a flack jacket. A bullet whistled by, burying itself into the fence, and Solovyev's bewilderment was replaced by calm, cold rage. He could no longer hear the chatter of the surrounding gunfire, or the cries of the wounded. His sights were fully on the person lying by the wheels of the Ikarus. All of the mistakes of the politicians, all of the unsolved economic problems reduced to a situation where during a warm Baku night, two armed men were lying on the ground 20 meters apart, with but one desire dominating their being: to kill the other.

Solovyev suddenly felt a burning in his leg, and he returned several rounds at the wheels of the Ikarus. He saw the other bring his arms together, as if he was going to dive into water, and fall.

It was all over, it seemed. Zhenya felt his head spinning. Reservists leapt out from the checkpoint and dragged him back into the building. After that, under the cover of four assault riflemen—a sniper was holed up on a rooftop, firing on the drill field—Lieutenant Yevgeniy Solovyev managed to make his way on foot to the medical station, and then to the hospital, to the operating table.

It was there that the night came to an end for him. But for others, it went on.

At approximately this time, 20 kilometers from the Salyanskiye Barracks, Special Forces Lieutenant-Colonel Valeriy Kuposov was walking with a megaphone at the head of a column, telling the people to disperse, and to not block the way of the troops. Someone from the crowd threw a Molotov cocktail at him, which struck his helmet, setting his clothing afire and burning his hands and face. Senior Lieutenant of Medical Service Anatoliy Kurepin began rendering assistance to Kuposov. One could see that he was unarmed, and that he carried a pouch bearing a red cross on his side, but the crowd stoned him anyway.

And at 0140 hours, a soldier died in his arms from gunshot wounds in the vicinity of the Baladzarskiy Downgrade....

Gunshots bring on gunshots, evil brings on evil, and hatred can only bring on hatred. One must be a professional in order to keep a cool head in such a situation. And that was what they were.

The parachute regiment attacked (Lord, what we have come to!) on Baku from the direction of Kyurdamir. The regiment traveled 180 kilometers, expending 263 cartridges. Meeting an obstruction on the way, the parachute company was in a hurry, and with a "Hurrah!", without firing a single shot, it dismantled the obstruction, detaining 70 persons "to get answers to some questions." The rest simply fled. If only all had advanced in this manner.... There were, unfortunately, other examples as well. An "extreme situation" in which the command permitted the troops to open fire, each had to understand to the measure of his military professionalism, and ultimately to the measure of his fear. Reservists in the Salyanskiye Barracks worked on the sniper holed up on the roof of the residential building with automatic fire. They did not hit the sniper: It was later on, in daylight, that he was brought down by a single shot from a warrant officer who had served in Afghanistan, but in the meantime the soldiers shot up a sizable number of windows (this was, after all, a residential building! and at night!). Were they really to blame for this?

The morning promised a sunny day. The nighttime gunfire seemed to have been a dream, and the view from the hotel room was almost idyllic—the sea, a white steamship, the quay.

But then I turned the corner and my gaze fell upon an APC and a swarthy lad beside it in a flack jacket. My first sensation was relief: The last days prior to the entry of the troops were a time of constant tension—the turmoil continually lapped over the edge, threatening to become unchecked. It may be that I was developing a kind of "Afghan syndrome," and I have tried again and again to explain, with a stubbornness worthy of the best imitation, what really happened in that black January in Azerbaijan, but I must repeat stubbornly that this was a civil war, and that each day of delay in making the decisions that had to be made cost the lives of obedient and not-so-obedient taxpayers who maintained the government, people who should have felt assured under all circumstances that the state would protect them. But it did not. Refugees were strung out along the roads, casualties cried out in agony, and the unseeing eyes of the dead stared into the high winter sky in astonishment. Their blood evoked more blood, and so on, and so on, and so on....

The army was not late—it was the politicians who were late. And when the decision was finally made, young people in field dress began carrying it out. It was bitter and painful for them to do so, but they had to literally place their lives on the line between the two union republics.

The name of the lad beside the APC was Volodya. We got to talking, and I learned that we were compatriots from the Moscow region, that he was going home in spring, and that he had also served in Fergana, in Sukhumi, and here in Baku as well, for the second time. Smiling, he turned his back: "Do you see there? A lucky hit," showing me the scorched tatters of his flak jacket, burnt by a Molotov cocktail. "A little higher and I'd have been a goner."

It has been a year and a half that he has been roaming the country together with his subunit, a year and a half of sleeping wherever he put down his head, a year and a half of carrying an assault rifle around on his shoulder, just as habitually as he used to carry his sports bag some time ago (in what life was that?). Is he to blame, are his comrades, sleeping behind armor on this sunny morning, to blame for this? And what fault is there in the airborne troops from Kostroma and Pskov, from Ryazan and Vitebsk? They created a screen between the Azerbaijanis and the Armenians. I saw tanks pulling apart the ruins of Leninakan in that terrible December. There were not enough cranes and dump trucks in the city and there was no light, water, bread or preserved blood in the city. The army—it arrived in just six hours!—baked the first bread in field bakeries, military doctors operated on casualties right within the ruins of the hospital, on the ground, and later when it became dark, they worked in the light of vehicle headlights. All military transport aviation, down to the last IL-76, was committed to carrying cargo to the earthquake site, and the pilots remained in the sky for days on end: I saw their faces, gray with fatigue, as well

as the faces of the military air traffic controllers at Leninakan Airport. Were any words of gratefulness said to them? Begrudgingly....

At that time I sensed in Leninakan that the country was left with but one state institution capable of acting with mobility and efficiency. There were of course examples of another sort in Baku as well, there were the countless inspectors with their quickly mounting paperwork—in quantities impossible to measure!, and there were the VIPs with big stars on their shoulderboards, but there were also the soldiers, the sergeants and the officers. Men of duty, carrying upon their shoulders the burdens and deprivations of service, as it says in the regulations. Let me add: of close to wartime service.

But the assault rifle is not the only weapon in the hands of the soldier in these tragic days. There were the angry lines at the bread shops, the closed fueling stations and newspaper stands, and the continually interrupted communications. The army also had to deal with all of this. It had it bad itself—I saw one APC towing another—there was not enough fuel. In several days the army was able to bring gasoline into the city, military signalmen took their seats at the switchboards, the newspaper resumed publication, and gradually the lines at the bread shops disappeared.

The army went into action when both time and reason were exhausted. When angered heads and savagely beating hearts could respond to only one argument, to only one truth—force.

This is a truth which tanks know.

But the world visible from behind the safety glass of an armored vehicle is too narrow and too black-and-white. Tanks can halt bloodshed. But the hope that they could create a new, just reality is illusory. Gunfire can compel us to think, but assault rifles will not solve the heap of economic, political and international problems.

Two months prior to commitment of the troops he, the Azerbaijani man, sent his Armenian wife and children to a distant village, to relatives. A week prior to commitment of the troops he, an Azerbaijani, could leave the republic, while she, an Armenian, and her children could not—posts manned by people with tricolor armbands carefully checking all vehicles and the passports of passengers stood on the roads. On the day prior to the commitment of the troops he spent the night sitting on the porch of his country house with a hunting rifle in his hands, having distributed his cartridges in two piles—16 with which to fight off the attackers and four for his family. After the twentieth of January he rode to the nearest military unit, where he was given a vehicle, and he then drove his family to a military airfield.

January Georgian Parties' Conference Evaluated
90US0649B Tbilisi MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
No 5, 2 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by E. Kakabadze: "The First Step Has Been Taken"]

[Text] The event which took place at the Tbilisi State University imeni Ivane Dzhavakhishvili in the four days between 22 and 25 January may be rightfully considered extraordinary. For now, let us restrict ourselves to this evaluation being mindful of the fact that "big things are discernible from further away" and that time determines the real value of everything. However, there is every reason to consider the first conference of the political parties, social associations, and organizations of Georgia a certain stage in the development of the national-liberation movement.

While opening the conference, one of its organizers, scientific associate of the TGU [Tbilisi State University] Chair of Nuclear Physics, member of the People's Front of Georgia Andro Torotadze said: "Our goal is to give all political organizations an opportunity to familiarize themselves closer with each other, share their views, compare their positions, and try to develop a joint platform and action program. The convocation of this conference is a requirement of our time and the socio-political situation which has emerged in the republic. As Merab Kostava said, the manifestation of narrow party and organizational patriotism which is akin to erstwhile small-town parochialism is the Achilles' heel of the national movement. The national-liberation movement of Georgia will take a correct position to the degree to which it is able to make the idea of unity supreme to all ideas, so that all of us love the movement itself rather than ourselves in this movement.

It should be noted that the idea of the organizers of the conference was received with appreciation by informal associations and parties. The composition of its participants testifies to this. Representatives of 33 political parties and social organizations took part in the conference. Those already well-known to the public in our republic, such as the People's Front, the Rustaveli Society, the NDP [National Democratic Party], the Democratic Party, the Ilya Chavchavadze Society, the St. Ilya the Righteous Society, the Helsinki Union, and so on, were among them as well as the informal associations and social organizations which are barely taking their first steps in the political arena. They include the Tbilisi Political Club, the Association of Young Economists, the Group for the Freedom of the Nation, the Association of Political Scientists, the Committee of National Accord, the Constitutional-Democratic Party, and so on.

Even this incomplete list makes it possible to judge how broad the spectrum of political forces assembled under the same roof was, and how complicated the actual accomplishment of the task of consolidating these forces

on a joint platform turned out to be during the proceedings of the conference. Still, the goal of the conference was not as utopian as it seemed, and there were grounds for the optimism of Andro Torotadze in his capacity as the organizer of this meeting. Sooner or later, the national-liberation movement will embrace the idea of unity, and the conference is the first step in this direction.

As we see it, the format of the conference proceedings was selected properly: information, statements on political platforms, and sharing opinions on certain issues—and there were several of these; no discussion, because at this point it can accomplish nothing but confrontation.

On the first day, the internal political situation in Georgia was the topic of discussion. On the second day, it was the state structure of Georgia. On the third day, the foreign policy of Georgia. On the fourth day, the outlook for the economic development of Georgia. On top of this, there were speeches on the subject of one's own choosing at the end of every day of work.

There were many speeches. Almost all the parties and associations which desired to participate in the conference had an opportunity to present their points of view on the topics suggested. The Tbilisi Political Club, the People's Front of Georgia, the Rustaveli Society, the Republican-Federative Party, and the Democratic Party of Georgia outlined their interesting but not uncontroversial positions concerning ways to attain the independence of Georgia, its future state system and economic structure. The points of view stated were at times diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive. Due to this, the organizers of the conference had to resort from time to time to harsh measures in order to extinguish emotional arguments flaring up every now and then, and even incidents in a number of cases. So, apart from its primary goal, the conference also accomplished one more task—it showed that it is necessary to learn to be tolerant of each other, listen to alternative opinions, and carry on a political discussion. The conference also showed one other significant aspect of the internal political situation in the republic; namely, the declarative nature of statements by the Communist Party of Georgia on its desire to engage in a constructive dialogue with the informals. Are only extreme situations required for this purpose? We believe that the party and the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] should have taken advantage of this opportunity to participate in the conference if they indeed want to build bridges to the informals.

However, let us go back to the proceedings of the conference. We will refer to several of the main aspects because it is not possible to cover the conference in detail (nor is it necessary because it is planned to publish the materials of the conference in the immediate future).

The issue of securing the independence of Georgia and its future state system was the most interesting one at the conference. All kinds of programs were proposed. Only

the attitude toward elections to the Supreme Soviet of the republic as one of the ways to advance toward real political and economic independence brought out two diametrically opposed points of view—a boycott and participation in the elections of the new parliament. Some parties proposed projects as bold as holding alternative elections and forming an alternative, or, as it was called, provisional transitional government. However, in this instance the following question was immediately asked by way of an argument to the contrary: Is there a political force at present which will be capable of handling this complex endeavor?...

To our mind, the issue of drawing the non-Georgian population into the national-liberation movement and publishing independent Russian-language newspapers, which was raised by the Committee for National Accord, also merits attention. It was noted in their speeches that at present a considerable segment of the Russian-speaking population of the republic is neutral with regard to the struggle of the Georgian people for their independence, or opposes the national-liberation movement for the only reason that it is not informed or is incorrectly informed about the objectives and tasks of the movement. Participants in the conference came to the conclusion that the issue of bringing the Georgian and non-Georgian populace closer together is acute, and that it is necessary to address it in earnest.

Despite the obviously diametrically opposed opinions—we will refrain from commenting on each—we should say for the sake of fairness that many constructive things which merit attention were said at the conference. This was noted both at the final press conference as well as by the conference participants themselves in interviews given to our newspaper. Several statements follow.

Lana Gogoberidze (People's Front):

From the very beginning, the idea of the conference seemed interesting to me. The national-liberation movement should advance to a new stage of its development. I think that the present conference will initiate this. The time has come for analysis. Here, in a quieter situation, an opportunity appeared for everyone to state his opinion on the most pressing issues which concern the Georgian public at present, determine the avenues of further development, and decide what needs to be actually done at this stage in order to attain independence.

It was interesting to listen to all the speeches because previously we had little knowledge of the political platforms of our informal associations and parties. I should say that we happened to hear many interesting positions although we should also note for the sake of fairness that not all of them were well-founded and realistic as far as the ways to achieve the goal are concerned. However, I also got to see the organizations which have a clear idea of how to arrive at independence, which social and political structures we need, and how all of it is justified socially and not just politically. The program presented by the Republican-Federative Party headed by Irakli

Shengelaya seems to be very serious and noteworthy. The Tbilisi Political Club made a very interesting contribution.

The work of the conference showed that a new level of grasping and analyzing reality, of moving forward, has now come. This is exactly what we lacked until recently.

The forthcoming elections to the Supreme Soviet of the republic caused much controversy. The attitude toward them is not unequivocal. Personally I understand why the radically minded parties are against participating in the elections. However, our entire people should undoubtedly participate in them because at present we are at such a turning point that only a Supreme Soviet of the republic elected by the people, in agreement with their will and by truly democratic methods, is capable of making the decisions which Georgia needs. If we let the moment go by and do not form this kind of Supreme Soviet we will miss a real opportunity to make headway right now.

Georgiy Hoshtariya (The Helsinki Union of Georgia):

If we look at this conference as an opportunity to meet each other, as an attempt to engage in a certain dialogue, it was worth it. If its goal were to bring all the informal political parties and associations to a united platform through concessions and compromises, there are parties among them with whom we cannot share the same platform. As of now, the necessary political conditions for this step do not exist. However, for now it is good to even find out who is who, and where and how he is headed. I repeat, however, that in our opinion it is premature to raise the issue of unity of the national-liberation movement at this time. Unity cannot be achieved in an artificial manner. At the stage of its emergence, any national movement is characterized by the splintering we have at present.

Irakliy Shengelaya (Republican-Federative Party):

I believe that such conferences are necessary in order to clarify what kind of Georgia we need in the future. I subscribe wholeheartedly to the idea that theoretical research only will not produce results unless we implement them in actual reality. We should come to a conclusion regarding the way we want to see Georgia in the future, and after that map out ways to achieve this goal.

As I see it, the main point at present is that the non-Georgian population is quite skeptical about the national-liberation movement. This is why it is extremely important to make our goals and tasks known to the broad circles of the public in order to ensure confidence in our liberation movement and find the forms and mechanisms of interaction with the non-Georgian population which will be based on the principles of freedom of individuals and the nation as a whole. We are fighting for freedom rather than for infringing on someone and depriving him of his legitimate rights. The people and the individual may only be free if they

recognize the freedom of others. This is why it is important for us to determine what the social and political structures of the state are going to be in an independent Georgia.

The very name of our party, which has at last become final, indicates the model of a state system in Georgia to which we subscribe. Namely, it does not entail the infringement of the freedom of either individuals or ethnic minorities which reside in its territory. As we see it, they are federal self-governing regions in keeping with the Western model.

In turn, in the course of the conference, we familiarized ourselves with the point of view of other parties on the state system of independent Georgia and its economic arrangements. To our mind, many of them are interesting. Nonetheless, the main result of the conference lies in the fact that it facilitated a certain rapprochement of political forces. I believe that in the future it should extend its framework by drawing into such work representatives of the associations of the non-Georgian population; in the future, it should try to consolidate the political forces of the entire Caucasian region as well.

Zurab Zhvaniya (The Green Movement):

I believe that the goals which were set for the conference were achieved. This was the first attempt at gathering representatives of all informal parties and organizations of Georgia in the same auditorium and giving them an opportunity to hear each other out in a quiet and businesslike environment. This was accomplished. However, stating the position of the Green Movement, I must note that a number of problems which Georgia is now facing in the most acute manner have not been duly appreciated by the public and the political organizations which participated in the conference. I mean primarily the ecological problems and the real complications which will develop in Georgia in the immediate future if literally our entire society and primarily its political vanguard do not grasp how serious the emerging ecological situation is.

I believe the conference also showed that in the future such meetings can continue, and a discussion of individual items is also possible which is what we refrained from doing at the first meeting. A significant process of mutual understanding and cooperation, as well as of the emergence and development of a real multi-party system in Georgia, was definitely initiated.

As far as the idea of convening a congress of the opposition stated by Akakiy Bakradze is concerned, I believe we should refrain from such large-scale undertakings before the elections are over. All our energy and forces should be focused at present on forming a democratic Supreme Soviet of Georgia. However, such a congress should be convened if the new Supreme Soviet does not prove its value.

Georgian Social Democrats Draft Statutes

90US0649A Tbilisi, MOLODEZH GRUZII in Russian
No 5, 2 Feb 90 p 3

["Draft Statute of the Social Democratic Party of Georgia"]

[Text] The Fifth Congress of the Social Democratic Party of Georgia will be held in Tbilisi on 24 and 25 February. The organizational committee has asked our editorial office to publish a draft statute in order to give you, our esteemed readers, an opportunity to state your considerations, remarks, and suggestions. The address of the organizational committee is: Tbilisi, Chitadze Street 6, Room 219, Institute of Management of the National Economy, telephone 93-79-21.

The Social Democratic Party of Georgia is a popular political organization of a parliamentary type which operates within the framework of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution. It favors the restoration of the state independence of Georgia and the creation of a society based on the principles of democratic socialism; it expresses and protects the vital interests of the workers.

The Social Democratic Party of Georgia strives to attract a majority of the electorate through constructive political rivalry with other political parties and to assume responsibility for governing Georgia. It enjoys the rights of a corporate person.

The Social Democratic Party of Georgia is an integral part of the social democracy of the world. It proceeds from general human values in its activities.

1. Any citizen of the Georgian SSR entitled to vote who recognizes the program and statute of the party, supports it financially, and participates in accomplishing the tasks of the party in a manner acceptable to him may belong to the Social Democratic Party of Georgia. The doors of the party are open to atheists and believers alike.

2. Those who recognize the goals and tasks of the party but for some reason cannot join it are party sympathizers. They are entitled to participate in party events with a consultative vote.

3. Admission to the party is handled by the primary party organization. One may leave the party freely. Admission to and departure from the party are based on written requests. A member of the party who besmirches its honor is expelled from the ranks of the party at a meeting of the primary organization in which he is registered.

4. New members of the party pay admission dues. The party accepts donations from its members and sympathizers, from organizations and offices.

5. At the beginning of every year, the members of the party are re-registered. A registration fee has been established.

6. Party members have a right to:

- a) elect or be elected to the leading organs of the party;
- b) submit proposals and critical remarks to any party organ;
- c) nominate or be nominated a candidate people's deputy.

7. Primary party organizations are created on a territorial basis at the place of residence of citizens provided that no fewer than three party members reside there.

8. Primary party organizations belong to rayon and city organizations.

9. Effective participation in the national movement, defense of the interests of workers, propaganda of the principles of democratic socialism and the electoral platform of the party, and nomination and support of candidate people's deputies are the supreme duties of party organizations.

10. Every party organization is autonomous within the framework of the party program and statute. Every organization has a right to publish party literature independently. The decisions of superior echelons of the party which are significant in principle are based on the considerations of the lower echelons of the party submitted by way of a poll.

11. A party meeting which is convened at least once every three months is the supreme organ of a primary party organization. The meeting elects a bureau of the primary party organization, and its chairman and his deputy from among its members, in order to handle current work. If there are fewer than 20 party members, only the chairman and his deputy are elected.

12. A party conference which is convened no later than six months prior to the expiration of the term of office of local soviets of people's deputies is the supreme organ of rayon and city party organizations. An extraordinary conference is convened on the initiative of a regional committee or at the request of one-fourth of the primary party organizations of the region. The conference elects a regional committee of the party organization, and the chairman of the organization, his deputies, and executive secretary from among its members, and endorses the list of candidate people's deputies of the local soviets.

13. The foreign bureau of the party which is confirmed by the Central Committee of the party operates abroad. The bureau coordinates the activities of Georgian social democrats residing abroad. The foreign bureau of the party publishes party literature. It transfers to the Central Committee of the party 10 percent of its financial proceeds.

14. A party congress which is convened no later than five months prior to the expiration of the term of office of the Supreme Soviet of Georgian SSR people's deputies is the supreme organ of the party. An extraordinary congress is

convened on the initiative of the Central Committee or at the request of one-quarter of the primary party organizations. The congress elects the Central Committee and, from among its members, the chairman of the party, his deputies, and the executive secretary of the party, as well as the editor of the central organ and the Audit Commission.

The congress hears reports by the leading organs of the party, revises, amends, and adopts the program and statute of the party, devises the policy and electoral platform of the party, and confirms the list of Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet candidates.

15. Between congresses, the Central Committee of the party is the supreme organ of the party. It manages the entire operation of local party organizations, conducts and steers election campaigns, develops recommendations for the work of the parliamentary group, confirms the members of the editorial board of the central organ presented by the editor, and distributes funds from the party budget.

The Central Committee represents the Social Democratic Party of Georgia in relations with other parties.

16. Between the plenums of the Central Committee, the Council of the Party consisting of the chairman of the party, his deputies, and the executive secretary of the party handle current party work. The Information and Research Center operating at the Council of the Party develops recommendations for increasing the efficiency of party work.

17. The Audit Commission verifies the propriety of recording the monetary funds taken in and of the redistribution and implementation of the party budget.

18. A party meeting, party conference, and party congress have a quorum if no fewer than one-half of party members are represented there. All party organizations and elected party organs resolve issues by a simple majority (secret or open vote); the minority retains the right to defend its position, appeal to the party masses directly, form a faction, or sever itself organizationally from the party.

19. The primary party organizations retain 50 percent of monetary proceeds for their needs and transfer 30 percent to the local party committee and 20 percent to the Central Committee of the party.

20. A party group is formed at the sessions of soviets of people's deputies, congresses, conferences, meetings, and proceedings of public organizations where no fewer than three party members are present. The task of the group is to strengthen the influence of the party and to carry out its policy. The party group structures its work on the basis of recommendations of a relevant party organ.

21. The decision to discontinue the operation of the party is made by a party referendum which should embrace no fewer than two-thirds of party members.

Georgian Social Democratic Party Chairman on Transcaucasian Home

90US0749A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
10 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Georgiy Chanturiya, chairman of the Georgian Social Democratic Party, by ZARYA VOSTOKA correspondent Irina Inoveli: "The Goal—To Create a 'Transcaucasian Home'"; date, place not given]

[Text] As has already been reported, in early March, at the initiative of the Georgian Social Democratic Party, a meeting took place between the leaders of a number of informal associations of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Georgiy Chanturiya, chairman of the Georgian Social Democratic Party, talks about it in greater detail to a ZARYA VOSTOKA correspondent.

[Correspondent] We know that not too long ago, the progressive forces of the Baltic republics expressed readiness to hold a "roundtable" meeting with representatives of the informal movements and associations of Armenia and Azerbaijan in order to help these republics make the transition from confrontation to a search for a common language. Such a meeting took place in Riga; however, it did not have positive results. Tell me, Giya, was it this that moved you to hold an analogous meeting in Tbilisi?

[Chanturiya] No. We had thought about it long before the Balts did. Such a meeting had been scheduled for 30 January, however, then the representatives of the Azerbaijani People's Front were not able to travel to Tbilisi. So we did not follow in the footsteps of the Balts, but quite independently decided to help our neighbors sit down to the negotiating table.

[Correspondent] Why, in your view, was the meeting in Riga unsuccessful?

[Chanturiya] Because the right people did not participate in it. The Balts did not set up a contact with the most popular informal associations in these Transcaucasian republics, to get directly to their leaders, as we did. An one other aspect of no small significance: Representatives of ethnic groups of Armenians and Azerbaijanis residing in Georgia took part in our meeting.

[Correspondent] What did the Georgian National Democratic Party bring to the meeting?

[Chanturiya] We made the proposal to create a coordinating council of informal movements, organizations, and parties of the republics of the Transcaucasus, that is, a single Transcaucasian common home, on the example of the "Common European Home." This proposal found support and approval.

In addition, we announced the draft of a joint communique, which, in part, reflected the positions proposed by us on the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast].

[Correspondent] What is their essence?

[Chanturiya] Their three-in-one formulation. The first thing is that the Azerbaijani side recognize the controversial nature of the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. The second is that the Armenian side refrain from any actions with regard to the NKAO until Armenia achieves independence. And the third—after the achievement of independence by the republics of the Transcaucasus, the given issue will be considered together with representatives of the UN.

[Correspondent] How was your proposal received?

[Chanturiya] Calmly, benevolently, with interest. By our next joint meeting, which we plan to hold in April, the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides have promised to bring the results of the discussion of this proposal with their peoples. Considering that a highly representative delegation of both republics took part in the meeting in Tbilisi, there are all guarantees that they will try to do everything possible to take a step toward one another, to make the transition from confrontation to dialogue. In any case, both the one side and the other have plainly spoken in condemnation of violent means of regulating the complex situation.

[Correspondent] Who represented Armenia and Azerbaijan?

[Chanturiya] On the Azerbaijani side, the republic's People's Front, the committee to aid the NKAO, the Republic Party. On the Armenian side, the organizations "National Self-determination" and "Constitutional Right." I want to emphasize that they were all represented by the leaders.

[Correspondent] But all the same, concretely, how were the first two points of your proposals on the NKAO greeted by the negotiation participants?

[Chanturiya] The Azerbaijani side had a very good attitude toward them; I have in mind the first point concerning Azerbaijan. The Armenian delegation did not express unconditional acceptance of the second point. I think, however, that this will finally take place.

[Correspondent] What is your confidence based upon?

[Chanturiya] Armenia is hoping for the return from abroad of Paruyr Ayrikyan. If this happens, and it seems that it will happen, then by the strength of his very high authority among the people, I think that he will do a great deal for the peaceful, exclusively political means of regulating such a "hot" issue as Karabakh.

[Correspondent] Now a question somewhat "aside." Tell me, is the party you head participating in the pre-election campaign going on in the republic now?

[Chanturiya] No, the national democrats stand behind the position of a boycott of the elections; we do not recognize the current power as lawful, and are doing everything in order to explain this to the population.

[Correspondent] Don't you see a certain contradiction in your position: On the one hand, you have voluntarily taken upon yourself a mission for the consolidation of the republics of the Transcaucasus, and on the other hand, you conduct a confrontational policy with regard to the authorities?

[Chanturiya] There is no contradiction here. We are against interethnic conflicts, but we are for political crisis. We are not against the Russians or any other peoples. We are against the system, against the occupation regime.

Georgian National Liberation Movement Conference Ends

90US0739A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
16 Mar 90 p 3

[Report by Eka Akhalkatsi: "The Path of a Peaceful Struggle is Chosen"]

[Text] The extraordinary conference of the national liberation movement of Georgia completed its work yesterday.

In spite of the irreconcilability of the opinions expressed by various political parties and public organizations, a decision was adopted by majority vote that the national liberation movement of Georgia must chose a path of national disobedience and implacable democratic opposition. Proceeding from this, it was decided to elect a national forum, which will be called upon to become the mouthpiece of the will of the Georgian nation. A proposal was received to introduce into the forum's composition one representative each from those of non-Georgian nationalities residing in the republic. The forum cannot reflect the opinion only of individual people; its reports to the public were recognized as obligatory. For this purpose, it was decided to hold at least two conferences of the national liberation movement of Georgia before the convocation of the national congress. All speakers were unanimous in their opinion on the fact that they bear an enormous responsibility to future generations, and that the main thing today is to consolidate the efforts of the nation and the national liberation movement of Georgia.

"Until recently, 9 April had been assessed as a tragedy, yet at the same time, this was an enormous victory of the Georgian nation, one that laid the foundation for the national democratic revolution, which is continuing today and will culminate in Georgia's independence," Zviad Gamsakhurdia (Helsinki league) said, in part, in his speech. He further noted:

"While recognizing the need to create an opposition national forum, and subsequently, a lawful government, the creation of which does not seem possible today, under the conditions of an annexed Georgia, at the same time we feel that if the Supreme Soviet is to be convened against our will, its logical conclusion must be for it to dissolve itself. We will support the creation of a new Supreme Soviet only in the event that it, based upon the

conceptions expressed in its own resolution, concretely—on the basis of the annexation of Georgia and the recognition of the treaty concluded between Georgia and Soviet Russia—comes to the logical conclusion that the very Supreme Soviet and the Soviet Government are illegal, and eliminate itself. And in this case do we consider permissible the creation of the so-called Supreme Soviet... Of course, even in this case, not one of the opposition parties will take part in its formation... As far as the opposition national forum is concerned, its function is in the control of the government actually existing. For the time being, we cannot reject its de-facto existence. Even though we do not recognize it, we cannot remain indifferent to those actions that this government is implementing in Georgia. That is exactly why we must control all its actions and legislative acts adopted... Our path is the path of a peaceful struggle, not of violence."

In recognizing the services to the republic of Nodar Natadze, chairman of the board of the Georgian People's Front [NFG], at the same time, the conference participants expressed a negative attitude toward the activity implemented by the NFG. Guram Muchaidze, leader of the Georgian Social Democratic Party [SDPG], and the SDPG on the whole received a sharply negative assessment.

During the days of the forum's work, a number of resolutions were adopted, the texts of which will be published in the Georgian press, particularly, on the annexation of Georgia and on the dissolution of the republic Komsomol.

During the course of the conference's work, the names of candidates for deputy who adopted the decision not to participate in the elections were reported.

The elections of the Georgian people's forum were conducted at the final stage of the conference's work.

Georgian Informal Group Leaders Evaluate Conference

90US0743A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
17 Mar 90 p 3

[Interview with Nodar Natadze, professor, chairman of the Georgian People's Front, and Guram Muchaidze, professor, doctor of historical sciences, chairman of the SDPG by Eka Akhalkatsi: "We Have Chosen the Parliamentary Path..."; date, place not given]

[Text] In the opinion of the majority of its participants, the recently-concluded extraordinary conference of the Georgian national liberation movement in Tbilisi served as a powerful stimulus for consolidation, and at the same time, manifested certain contradictions in the views of the representatives of individual formations. Among these are the republic's People's Front, and the Georgian Social Democratic Party [SDPG]. We offer for the readers' attention interviews with their leaders.

Nodar Natadze, professor, chairman of the Georgian People's Front

Disturbing libel was published in KOMUNISTI 2 days ago with regard to the election position of the Georgian People's Front [NFG]. It was stated that supposedly two opinions were in juxtaposition at the forum: 1. The Supreme Soviet of Georgia is illegal, and it is therefore necessary to declare a boycott against it. 2. The Supreme Soviet of Georgia is illegal, and we must therefore take part in the elections. And it was indicated that the NFG advocates the second opinion. This is not true. The People's Front does not recognize the legality of the Supreme Soviet. Georgia is an annexed country; its Supreme Soviet is one of the elements of the unlawfully based structure of statehood, yet the NFG considers participation in the elections to be necessary for the purpose of having the de facto existing Supreme Soviet consist of people who feel for the national interests of Georgia. The Supreme Soviet is the single organ officially empowered today to represent the manifestation of the will of Georgia to the entire world. Non-participation in the pre-election campaign must therefore be assessed as a crime against the nation.

The struggle for victory in the election to the Supreme Soviet does not signify recognition of its legality and does not interfere with holding parallel parliamentary elections expressing the interests of the republic. I do not believe that there exists a person who could not understand this simple logic. I do not believe that there exists an individual to whom it would be impossible to explain that the selection of the parliamentary path of struggle, as one of the means of attaining this goal, does not mean that it is necessary to reject all other means of struggle. Or he must be naive enough to believe that the parliamentary path alone is sufficient in the struggle for Georgia's independence.

It is thus necessary to admit that I do not believe the naivete of those who call today for the majority of the population to boycott the elections. I want to remind the reader that one of the most heroic causes in the national liberation movement in Georgian was in 1924, after that, the demonstration to defend the state status of the Georgian language on 14 April 1978. This was undoubtedly a bold action, and set as its goal the introduction of this point into the Georgian Constitution. This has allowed us until today to guard our people, our national interests from a multitude of insults. If, on that day, we had thrown up our hands and announced that what was written in the USSR Constitution was not our concern, it would have been a good deal worse for us today.

The position of the press staffers covering the course of the conference surprises me. Only a portion of the sociopolitical formations participating in the Georgian national liberation movement took part in the work of the conference. They presented the matter as if, supposedly, only those who participated in the forum represent this movement. I would have been happier if both at the conference and in the press, the talk had been of the

topical problems for Georgia, at least of the problems of the army, rather than of the organizational issues and the interrelations among the various groups and parties.

I was not witness to the entire course of the events of the conference. Of course, everyone is glad about the fact that taking place today is a conference whose open conduct would not not have seemed possible even a year ago. But it will be even more heartening if new forces unite with the national liberation movement. This movement needs a new type of people—ones who can act both in the field and at the tribune. Unfortunately, the field and the hall are not as well mastered as the stadium is today.

Blessed be the cause of Georgia everywhere; we will guard our unity as the apple of our eye, and will be critical of, yet benevolent to one another.

Guram Muchaidze, professor, doctor of historical sciences, chairman of the SDPG

In my view, the negative assessment of the activity of the SDPG can be explained by the fact that those political parties at whose initiative the conference was convened are against the parliamentary path of struggle we have chosen, against our aspiration toward participation in the elections to the GSSR Supreme Soviet for the purpose of creating in it our fraction and waging the struggle for Georgia's independence by just such means; the SDPG Central Committee considers both the communist government and that alternative government which certain political parties are determined to create to be unlawful.

On the second day of the forum's work, we expounded our position on the illegal creation of the opposition government. Until the conduct of free elections on a multiparty basis, according to the norms of international law, the only legal government of Georgia is the emigre government operating in France, the National Council of Georgia. We therefore call upon those leaders who have gathered, and certain of them as before, intend to create an illegal government, to take into consideration the circumstance that this could lead to new repressions and victims, people guilty of nothing.

I was forced to announce to Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgiy Chanturiya, and Irakliy Tsereteli that they are conducting the Georgian national liberation movement in an incorrect vein. Georgian emigres have repeatedly appealed to them to follow the path chosen by the Baltic republics, yet they stubbornly continue to stand by their erroneous positions. Zviad Gamsakhurdia spoke the following day and noted that the creation of a coalition government will lead to a Baku-type tragedy. We agree with the position of his alliance, but alas, other parties do not share it. It was said at the conference that the government of independent Georgia traitorously emigrated to France. Yet this was not flight. The government halted the functioning of its constitution, and was forced to emigrate as the forces were unequal, and to continue the resistance to the troops of Bolshevik Russia would

have led to additional victims. Situated in emigration, the government of Georgia conducted and continues to conduct the struggle for the recognition of Georgia as having been annexed, and for its national independence by means of appeals to the UN and other international organizations. The national council has its own print organ in Paris, *MEBRDZOLI SAKARTVELO*; publications of other emigre parties are being published which have been disseminated and continue to be disseminated in Georgia, promoting the growth of national self-awareness, and mobilizing the progressive forces toward parliamentary means of struggle for the restoration of Georgia's independence. Our party is the only opposition party operating in Georgia that is legally recognized by the Georgian emigration. None of the others has been recognized by them because of the incorrect methods of struggle chosen; they call their leaders national-Bolsheviks, even though I am against pinning labels.

My works have been subjected to sharp criticism, in particular, "Socialism and self-management of the people." This book was written in 1982, and its manuscript was presented to the scholarly council of the Institute of Party History under the Georgian CP Central Committee, where at that time I worked as scientific communism sector head. Based upon the ideas I had developed in my manuscript, the director, trade union committee, and institute party committee secretary submitted a complaint to the KGB and the republic party Central Committee. I was accused of anti-Sovietism because of the ideas on pluralism and a multiparty system, etc. developed in the book. I was saved by perestroika. True, even under its conditions, I did not manage to publish the book for a wide circle of readers. It was published in 1987 with a press run of 500 copies, and the stamp, "for official use." In this work of mine, I developed between the lines the ideas about which we have begun to speak aloud only today.

As far as concerns historian Shot Vadachkoriya's book on anti-Soviet youth organizations, excerpts from which were quoted on the last day of the conference's work, I was only the editor, and it is my firm belief that an editor must be a democrat and stand behind the positions of pluralism. He must maintain the accuracy of the facts, yet he cannot refuse the author his right to his interpretation.

Georgian MID Opens Mission in Moscow

*90US0739B Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
16 Mar 90 p 4*

[Interview with Georgian SSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Aleksey Bakradze by Mikhail Dzhindzhikhashvili: "The Georgian MID Will Have its Own Permanent Missions"; date, place not given]

[Text] **The Georgian MID [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] consular group has begun to function in Moscow. What functions is it executing? Republic Minister of Foreign**

Affairs Aleksey Bakradze responds to this question from a ZARYA VOSTOKA correspondent.

[Bakradze] I will begin by saying that several months ago, having preliminary agreement with the republic government on this issue, we requested that the USSR MID give us the opportunity to resolve independently questions of issuing visas for republic residents' travel abroad. We are speaking only of those who travel on official business.

It seems to make sense to explain how this process used to go. To start with, the passports of those travelling were handed in to us. We issued them foreign passports in our ministry. Then they went to the USSR MID consular administration, which holds the monopoly for getting visas in foreign embassies. Naturally, this process took a long time. Now, our consular group in Moscow takes care of this; it goes directly to the foreign embassies. And not just embassies, but trade missions, and representatives of various firms as well.

[Correspondent] Aleksey Aleksandrovich, as far as I know, the opening of a Georgian MID mission in Moscow is also expected?

[Bakradze] Yes, that issue is in fact at a stage of completion. We have already been allocated premises.

Here, it seems, we must offer a necessary clarification. I have no doubt that many will be puzzled. They say, why yet another mission, when, after all, there is a permanent mission of the Georgian Council of Ministers in Moscow. But that is a sort of linking organ between the governments of the USSR and the Georgian SSR, not concerned with direct international relations.

[Correspondent] And what news is there on the opening of a permanent USSR mission in Batumi...

[Bakradze] On the instruction of our directive organs, the Georgian MID sent to the union ministry the appropriate documents, in which were the grounds for the advisability of the further existence of a permanent USSR MID mission in Batumi, where it was in direct contact with the General Consulate of Turkey. Why have we taken such a step?

You will agree that a paradoxical situation has emerged. After all, there is in the republic our own union-republic ministry of foreign affairs, which, according to its status, is obligated within the territory of the republic, to concern itself with issues associated with foreign states, including those in the competence of the USSR MID. In fact, these functions were being fulfilled by the Batumi permanent mission. It even participated in the resolution of the problem of border and coastal trade. And this, as you understand, is the prerogative of Georgia.

It has been made known to us that the i's will be dotted at the next collegium, and the Georgian MID mission in Batumi will begin to function.

Intellectuals' Caucasus Appeal Faulted

90US0572A Yerevan *KOMMUNIST* in Russian
3 Feb 90 p 4

[“Open Letter to Valentin Rasputin”]

[Text] Dear Valentin!

Of all those who signed the letter published in PRAVDA on 26 January, I know only you intimately and well. Fate would have us get acquainted in the joint fight for the preservation of the drinking water sources of the planet. We were chosen together as co-committee chairmen of the International Ecological Organization, the “Baykal Movement.” I treat with great respect each one of those who placed his signature on the aforementioned letter. I am convinced that they did this out of humane motives, pursuing, as the saying goes, peacemaking objectives. But I am addressing my letter only to you, because, I repeat, I know only you well. And it is from you in these tragic days that I expected other words. I awaited your words.

I do not think that you are the author or the coauthor of the text of the letter. The style is not yours. It is more likely that the text was read to you over the telephone, and that the names of those who signed the letter were mentioned and you gave your concurrence.

One cannot find fault with the text. The words are true. And everything would be fine if it were not for one detail. Those who signed the letter are appealing to the people, to the cultural figures of Azerbaijan and Armenia. You very likely did not ponder over this detail itself. Otherwise you would have asked yourself the question and why, in fact, on such a day, as was stated in the letter, in peacetime, when blood is flowing in the streets of the city, is it necessary suddenly to turn only to the people and also to the cultural figures of Armenia. Because blood is flowing in the streets of the cities of Azerbaijan. And there, Azeris are not killing Azeris, but Armenians and Russians. Armenian and Russian homes are burning. And acts of vandalism and barbarism are being committed only in Azerbaijan. Just as only in Azerbaijan and only Azeris are smashing up the state border.

Does it not seem to you that in this specific situation it was necessary for all of you to address the letter to the people and to the cultural figures of Azerbaijan only. You see, if you place the victim and the executioner on the same level, then, according to the logic of things, the authors of the letter should also have appealed to the Russian people, because among the victims there are Russian soldiers, Russian women, and old men. There are many Russians among the tens of thousands of exhausted mutilated refugees (as you know, by Russian the mass media have in mind Jews and Ukrainians and all so-called Russian speakers).

I agree with you and all of those who signed the letter that “the quality of a nation lies in its moral values, in

ethical principles, and in respect for the freedom and honor of every people first and foremost." And once again, these are the right words. But how about the part "freedom and honor" of my people, when its killed sons and daughters in Baku were not even buried. You did not think it strange that funeral rallies in Baku in memory of those Azeris who perished on 20 January were televised throughout the country, and there was not one scene about the brutally disfigured and barbarously killed Armenians. All of them had names. But not even the names of some of them were left: All members of a family were done away with. In Sumgait, the Melkumyan's perished: father, mother, two sons, and a daughter. There at least the names of our fellow countrymen were preserved. In Baku, it was like in Khatyn.

You know, Valentin, immediately after the Sumgait tragedy the papers wrote, appealing to both peoples, about the fact that reason and the human being will be victorious. And they did not write anything about retribution. About the fact that an 80-year-old Armenian woman was killed, that a 70-year-old woman was raped, and that people were burned alive. The fact was cited in the bill of indictment that when the hand of an Armenian who was burning suddenly straightened and "crawled out" of the fire, a young man, in the presence of a large number of people, approached the man and with a shovel pushed the burning hand, like a log, into the fire. They did not write about this. Today, Sumgait is even forgotten. Today, no one knows anything about the trial of the criminals.

Today, after Baku, as it was after Sumgait, I once more read the familiar words. This time written with your hand also: "Reason and the human being will be victorious." I believe that they will win. But these kinds of words were needed, for example, for those in Khatyn, or, more properly, for those Belorussians remaining alive after their village was turned into a pile of ashes. But, you see, in Baku all Armenian homes without exception were turned into ashes. No Armenians were left there. Out of 300,000, not one person. The exception makes the rule. So that, as you see, by 26 January not even an object of violence remained for the Azeris. But you appeal with the proper and necessary words straight off to both peoples.

I agree that "humanism" today is by no means an abstract category, but it appeals to the love of one's fellow man and to the pacification of life." But humanism does not exist without humanists. And a true humanist, disdaining "arguments," is on the side of the victims. I did not understand from the letter on whose side you and other prominent cultural figures of the country are. Because it is impossible simultaneously to be on the side of those who perished as a result of organized acts of vandalism and barbarity and on the side of the vandals and the barbarians themselves. As you see, I am not talking here of nationality. I am talking about innocent victims and those barbarians who wrecked the state border, who threw people out of windows, who killed people only because of national

origin, and who tortured the women and children of servicemen. There was no mourning and grief for them.

Did you know, Valentin, that the so-called "Azerbaijani factor" (I have in mind here mass violence, pogroms, murders) frightened not only Gorbachev, but also the army, which became intimidated by the diametrically opposed estimates of the "Tbilisi syndrome." But, now, imagine the position of the state, whose army lives, as the saying goes, with fear in its stomach. Here, you see, there can be, to put it mildly, not only transgressions of the state border.

On that day, when your letter was published, a telegram, sent by Soviet officers from Baku and addressed to Gorbachev and Yazov, was published in one of the central newspapers. It did not say anything about the fact that, finally, it is necessary to take decisive measures to save those Armenians who survived miraculously. It said... It is better if I quote it, otherwise you will not believe it if I paraphrase: "We believe that the employment of armed force will lead not just to the isolation of servicemen, but to a full break in relations, and it will threaten the security of their families... and it will provoke an increase in anti-Russian attitudes." In other words, let them finish off the Armenians with impunity, if only to forestall "a break in relations with the people's front." As you see, not only is humanism a specific category, but also cynicism.

Incidentally, on that same day, when the letter came to light, a priest from a Baku Russian Orthodox church appeared on Central Television. He spoke effusively about the fact that he, the Russians, are being treated well, and he spoke of friendship with the Azeris. I understand that at the height of deportation of "his own" parishioners, he had to be diplomatic. But, remembering about God, this slave of God, never mentioned that Christians are being killed and violated before his eyes, and that a Christian Armenian church was destroyed before his eyes. Not a word, Valentin, about this. Literally, as if an old barn had collapsed in a remote hamlet, and not a temple in a city of one and a half million.

You and I talked frequently and for hours about my anguish and your anguish. About Baykal and Sevan, and about the tomorrow of Russia and Armenia, and about the fate of the country. Lately the subject of Karabakh has taken precedence in our dialogues. I talked with you about its tragedy until dawn in a tent on the island of Olkhon. There, on Baykal, I recall, you began to ponder for the first time that besides the sensational Karabakh question, it turns out that there is one other—the Nakhichevan question. I remember a feature from our evening conversation. You asked: "How many Armenians are left in the Nakhichevan autonomy?" I answered: "All told about two and a half to three thousand, or one to one and a half percent. Although during the establishment of autonomy, the Armenians were predominant. But the main thing was afterwards. I said that as soon as they get rid of the last Armenian, they will take after the Russians. You asked about the

number of Russians. I said that it was a question of frontier guards. There are 9 kilometers of border with Turkey and about 700 with Iran. You did not take my words seriously. Although these were not just words, but a warning. And today that border is paralyzed for a distance of 700 kilometers. And in the letter you and our colleagues did not mention a word about Nakhichevan, where not only is blood being spilled, but the foundations of the state are being pulled down. Your letter was written at the time when the Nakhichevan ASSR during its session proclaimed its secession from the USSR structure.

Look at what happens, Valentin. You appeal, as it is stated in the letter, not only to the people and the cultural figures of Azerbaijan and Armenia, but also to friends. You are appealing, as they say, to one and to the other side. Everything is correct and proper. But so that your word and that of our colleagues is not cheapened, very likely, it has to be differentiated somehow. The Armenian autonomous republic of Nakhichevan was made completely Azerbaijani during the years of Soviet authority, and on the territory of the historic Armenia in Nakhichevan Kray up to a hundred Christian temples and churches and thousands and thousands of unique khachkars (stone crosses) and gravestones were destroyed. And finally, just during Soviet time, more than 200 Armenian villages were completely destroyed. However, our native land does not stop being our native land because of this kind of vandalism and genocide. We cried out about this. But does anyone really hear a voice crying in the wilderness?

We warned that according to Article 72 of the USSR Constitution, not only can Azerbaijan secede from the structure of the USSR, but, if it can be expressed this way, it can take a part of historic Armenia with it. We cited Nakhichevan as an example. Again we were not heard. You were unable to take discussions on this subject seriously. And now when the thought, monstrous in its essence and embodied in the decision of the Supreme Soviet of the Nakhichevan ASSR, resounded throughout the world, the country is silent, literally as if nothing has happened.

You often talked to me about the fact that, you said, looking at a map, you are amazed by the lack of soberness of those Armenians who are rooting for independence and even for secession from the union. I, as you know, am not among those who want to divide up a united country like a pie into a large number of pieces. And not only from purely geopolitical considerations, but also historical considerations. And at the very start of the Karabakh movement, the Armenians did not have any such intentions at all. Even toward the Azeri people. Naive Armenians with portraits of Gorbachev in their hands and with the slogans "Nakhichevan has perished—Save Karabakh," "We are demanding self-determination," "Lenin, the party, Gorbachev," came into the square of Stepanakert and Yerevan. Moscow then responded with an unpublished decision whose textual account was transmitted through TASS. There

we were called extremists and nationalists. One more slogan was added to the familiar ones: "We are the people and not extremists." Afterwards there was "Sumgait," which not only did not receive a political assessment, but, as has already been said, retribution. Afterwards, they showed on television, without exception, the chairmen of the presidiums of the Supreme Soviet of the union republics, who blamed the Armenians. This resembled the slaughtering of the innocents. But they did not even touch on the subject of "Sumgait."

The Armenian refugees who appeared for the first time were pharisaically called "resettlers," because, they say, there can be no refugees in our country. Rejecting the term, naturally, they also rejected the struggle against those who administered the forced deportation of aboriginal Christians from Azerbaijan. Later there were provocative speeches in the mass media, where the executioner and the victim were placed on an infamous "equal footing" on the same level.

During these 2 years, we recalled the great Tyutchev a thousand times, and I will permit myself to mention it now as well: "Again the east is steaming with fresh blood. Again there is carnage—there is wailing and crying everywhere. And again the reveling executioner holds sway, and the victims are maligned." This was written 130 years ago, but it is as if the poet were living with us and sees "Sumgait" and "Baku."

The impunity of the executioners has led to an increase in the number of victims. But Moscow persistently and stubbornly awaited a retaliatory reaction on the part of the Armenians. After "Sumgait," refugees appeared in the Gyandzha, Shamkhorskiy, Dashkesanskiy, and Khanlarskiy rayons, and especially in Baku. But the country was silent. It began to speak only when the number of Azeri refugees increased sharply after the earthquake. In short, the center got what it wanted. Parity! Both sides, they said, were good. Consequently, both have to be recompensed equally.

Such was the decision of the arbiters and of the arbitration tribunal. But the people in these circumstances associated everything and everyone with the Russian people who, in the words of Valentin Rasputin, suffered more than anyone from Stalinism, from revolutionary experiments, from the so-called stagnation, and from the so-called center. We admitted to each other more than once that you and I personally, and our fathers, and our people, are responsible for everything that occurred and is occurring in the land. For the frightful drama that turned into a tragedy. But you must agree that there cannot be an identical measure of blame for all people, for all leaders of the country, and for all nations.

You cannot get away from the real fact when people who survived "Sumgait" and "Baku" interpret Primakov's and Girenko's speeches on television as speeches in the name of the Russian people. In your name also, Valentin. You listen to them, and you sense clearly that these people are not troubled by the tragedy of the whole

nation. But if it were only this. The impression is created that they reacted to the pogroms on the State border with absolute calm. What is worse, they are trying to convince the public that if it were not for Karabakh and the residents of Karabakh, that everything would be peaceful, and that there would be no violence in Sumgait, Gyandzha, Baku, and Shusha. That, if it were not for the attempts of the Supreme Soviet of Armenia to take Karabakh and Karabakh inhabitants under its protection in order to prevent a national tragedy, then the Azeris would not destroy the state border. In the process, there is not a word about the fact that if there are such forces that are capable of a "Sumgait" and "Baku" and of a state crime in the border zone, then this means that Karabakh and the Karabakh inhabitants were right in their struggle for survival, for "Sumgait" and "Baku" have been continuing in Karabakh and over the Karabakh inhabitants for 70 years.

You and other prominent cultural figures of the country write in your letter that now that crucial moment has arrived in the destiny of the peoples when not only is history looking at them, but the future also. You are correct. The moment is more than crucial. But it should not be forgotten that the ancient Armenian region of Karabakh also wants to have a place in that same future. Contemporaries, including those who wrote the letter to PRAVDA, remained silent when Armenian Nakhichevan was lost slowly before our eyes. And today the contemporaries, including those who signed the letter to PRAVDA, accuse Karabakh of all mortal sins, only because it did not want the fate of Nakhichevan. Moreover, they equate Karabakh with the shot fired in Sarajevo, not thinking about the fact that Nakhichevan became a Trojan horse for a country nurtured on socialist oats. Today, they are already smashing up our sacred borders, which need a reliable lock. But there is no telling what will happen, Valentin.

In our long conversations, we touched on questions of a differentiated approach to religious questions. I have always been against the syndrome of the "scapegoat," which many consider Zionism to be and, even more so, Jews in general. It is not Christ's fault that the Christian Hitler burned tens of millions of Christians in the ovens of Auschwitz. It is not the fault of Mohammed that the "gray wolves" are spilling all the blood, reflecting on the name of Allah. And today you and those who signed the letter to PRAVDA should know that the executioners of "Sumgait" and "Baku" have nothing in common with Islam as such, and that they are executing the sinister plans of Turkish neofascism.

"We have the chance," the letter states, "to demonstrate the spiritual and moral loftiness of our role, and we must perform it by being concerned for the welfare of the country." Please excuse what is perhaps a persistent refrain, but they are truly proper words. Only it would be even truer if a place could be found in the letter about today's genuinely tragic fate of Armenia, which has endured not only "Sumgait" and "Baku", but also "Spitak." Together with Vasilii Belov, you visited Spitak,

which was flattened by unrestrained elements. You saw the agonizing Sevan, and Armenia which was tormented by an earthquake. And on the surviving plot of land of this republic, 300,000 refugee fellow countrymen have been added to the 700,000 that are destitute and rendered lifeless. The hapless refugees are continuing to arrive right now, as I am writing these lines. They need warmth and bread. But because of the blockade, about which there is not a word in your letter, there is neither warmth nor bread in sunny Armenia today.

Yours truly, Zoriy Balayan

Birlik Elements Accused of Inciting Recent Uzbek Disturbances

90US0757A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
10 Mar 90 p 1

[Unattributed article: "What the Birlik Leaders Want"]

[Text] As we know, an unauthorized rally was held in Parkent on 3 March at the cost of tragic results and human losses. Four people died—three inhabitants of Parkentskiy Rayon and one militia officer. What actually happened there?

There is no question that these events were connected with the events in Bukinskiy Rayon, and not only because it was from there that the Mskhet Turks were brought to Parkentskiy Rayon and housed in the Kumyshkan boarding house, but also because the scenarios of the rallies in Parkent and Buka were amazingly similar.

It is important to know from the start that Parkentskiy and Bukinskiy rayons, despite their external signs of prosperity, are distinguished by the same socioeconomic problems which were decades in the making and which are characteristic of the republic as a whole—the low standard of living of most of the population, the shortage of land, and the lack of consumer conveniences. These seem to have constituted the main "fuse" which touched off the public demonstrations.

In addition, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the administrators of these rayons have not paid enough attention to the timely resolution of urgent social problems, and that, what is more, they did not use the entire rayon aktiv to conduct explanatory work when they heard about the plans for the rally. This was mentioned with regret, incidentally, by one of the community elders when he spoke to the republic leaders who came to Parkent that same day. The elderly people, the war and labor veterans, who have lived in this rayon all their lives, spoke candidly about the passivity of farm managers, the elected aktiv, and the intelligentsia, all of whom chose to ignore the news of the upcoming events.

It is particularly significant that Birlik leaflets announcing the rally were distributed a few days before these events and that the inhabitants of Parkentskiy Rayon were being insulted in bazaars and in some

academic institutions in Tashkent for allowing the Mskhet Turks from Buka to settle in their rayon.

Small groups of people began gathering in different parts of Parkent in the morning and then started moving toward the party raykom building. The explanatory work the party personnel had conducted did not serve its purpose. The groups grew rapidly. Approximately the same pattern of the gradual concentration of groups was seen earlier in Bukinskiy Rayon, where the people first gathered in small groups of 20 or 30 and the figure then rose to 100 and then to 1,000, and where certain people, including the representatives of Birlik, not only raised the issues of socioeconomic problems and violations in the trade sphere and in public health care, but also issued ultimatums, demanding that the Mskhet Turks be expelled from the rayon and that the results of the elections of people's deputies be nullified. In other words, the demands ultimately concerned political issues. Going back to the events in Parkent, we must also say that, in view of the fact that fires had been started (48 buildings) and that there had been threats of violence in Bukinskiy Rayon, additional militia forces and a subunit of internal troops were sent to Parkentskiy Rayon.

When the militia forces ordered the people at the rally to disperse, because, after all, the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium had issued an ukase prohibiting rallies in public squares and other open-air gatherings, and began pushing the crowd away from the ispolkom building, using clubs instead of guns, the people reacted by throwing rocks and injuring some of the militiamen. By that time the number of people at the unauthorized rally had risen to 5,000, and many of them had come to Parkent from other places, especially Bukinskiy Rayon.

Events got out of control. The militia and the internal troops had to use their guns, and the people set fire to the rayon internal affairs department building and to cars and buses.

It is an important point that no government agency gave them permission to use their guns.

An official commission will investigate the events thoroughly to find out whether someone gave the order to fire or whether it was simply a case of someone pulling the trigger because he was frightened by a flying rock. The guilty parties, regardless of their rank, will be subject to the most severe penalties. To this end, the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium passed a special resolution on the creation of a commission made up of people's deputies of the USSR and Uzbek SSR, representatives of law enforcement agencies, and economic managers.

These tragic events, however, also revealed something else: Some people do not want the situation in the republic to be stabilized and do not want people to calm down. This does not fit in with the plans of certain individuals who call themselves the leaders of the informal organization known as "Birlik."

Back in February, as I have already said, the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium responded to the tension and difficulties by prohibiting mass rallies and demonstrations. It is completely possible that many of those who went to the rally in Parkent did not know this, but there is no question that the Birlik leaders, who were actively involved in the rally, did know. And this was not only the case in Parkent, but also in Buka, where the notorious Pulatov openly issued an appeal for mass insubordination and advised the people not to carry out the decisions of state agencies. In addition, this man and his closest associates began distorting and juggling the facts. In their public statements and in the leaflets they distributed, they advised the people not to trust the republic leadership's measures to raise the standard of living, calling all of this a fiction and a fraud.

Here, however, are the facts. Peasants have already received around 160,000 hectares of land, and the cotton production plan for 1990 has been reduced dramatically to only 1.5 million tons of cotton fiber. Of course, it will be a long time before the cotton single-crop system is completely eliminated, but there has been a tendency to allot more land for crops of great importance to our people.

Besides this, the supplementary payment for cotton has been increased.

The state has also allocated funds for free meals for children in schools and pre-school establishments. This will be a big help, especially in rural areas. Pregnant women will receive extra food. There have also been considerable advances in personnel policy and there has been some improvement in the quality of the training of scientific personnel. Just recently, many young scientists were sent to the leading scientific centers in the country. Other important measures have been planned or are being planned for the further enhancement of the welfare of the laboring public, the improvement of the environment, and the normalization of inter-ethnic relations. Only a blind man could fail to see this. Or a man who deliberately chooses not to see it. The leaders of Birlik belong to the latter group. Calling themselves public spokesmen, they try to discredit all positive processes in Uzbekistan, and then they take the credit for any success.

Why are they doing this? The answer is simple. At all of the rallies and in all of their leaflets, they ask the people to nominate the Birlik leaders as candidates for people's deputy, but they conceal their ambitions behind the socioeconomic demands the real people have been justified in making. Their actions could not be described as anything but a power play! Why do they need power? Anyone who believes that the Birlik leaders need power in order to make the life of the people easier is mistaken. Birlik could have done this at the very beginning, as soon as it made contact with party and state organs. The Birlik leaders were given a chance to express their views in the press and on radio and television and they had meetings with Central Committee members. Their charter was published. They, however, chose to speculate on public

unrest and began making loud statements to pass themselves off as fighters for the happiness of the people. The only thing they lacked was a specific cause. On the other hand, this is not quite true because the specific cause of the so-called leaders of Birlik consists in the organization of rallies, and in the most crowded places. These are always occasions to shout about the need to make the people's life easier, and they are also occasions for speculation.

Let us review the events in Buka. The republic leaders who came to the rayon took the most immediate measures to stop the disturbances. The Birlik leaders arrived soon afterward. They also saw the burning buildings and overturned cars, but instead of stopping the vandalism, A. Pulatov told the people not to believe that the republic government would solve socioeconomic problems, demanded that the results of the elections to the Supreme Soviet be nullified, called for the establishment of a branch of Birlik in the rayon, and agitated the crowd while everything burned around him. Although he calls himself an internationalist, he and his accomplices watched indifferently as thousands of people of another nationality were quickly evacuated from the rayon.

It is important to stipulate that the problem is not Birlik itself. It came into being as a genuine popular movement, expressing the wishes and desires of the republic population. The problem is the people who use Birlik slogans as a cover for their intense efforts to fuel inter-ethnic turmoil and to spread dirty provocative rumors. It is understandable that the real supporters of this informal movement who were among its founding members have now renounced Birlik. What they renounced, however, is not Birlik's ideas, but the people who now call themselves its leaders.

Who is completely pleased with their provocative aims today? Above all, it is our foreign "friends" and "well-wishers." It has recently become rather boorish to criticize them. Furthermore, some of our journalists regard the news broadcasts of foreign radio stations as the model of objectivity. The coverage of the recent events in Uzbekistan and the changes occurring in the life of our republic, however, raises questions about the sincerity of the foreign journalists. The overt disinformation regarding the alleged curfew in Samarkand, the misrepresentation of the history of the Basmachi movement, and other such incidents are examples of this. Now the reports on the events in Buka, Parkent, and several other parts of our republic are another example. The main suppliers of this information are the same Birlik leaders. They hope to use the help of foreign radio commentators to shatter the social order in the republic, sow suspicion between different ethnic groups, and undermine the faith in the measures party and soviet organs have taken to stabilize the situation.

Party and soviet personnel have made several attempts to patiently explain the pernicious nature of this policy to these people and have asked them to take an active part in perestroika and in the resolution of all of the

republic's problems. It is already obvious, however, that they do not want this. They have another goal. The problems of the people do not concern them. Personal ambitions and mercenary motives take precedence over everything else.

The republic is experiencing hard times and difficulties. It has to deal with a multitude of unsolved problems, and we inhabitants of the republic are the only ones who can solve them. The main thing—our life in the future—will depend on our labor, on our integrity, and on our commitment.

It is time for each one of us to state this commitment clearly and precisely!

Nationalism, Fanaticism Said To Guide Uzbek Informals' Agendas

90US0758A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
10 Mar 90 p 3

[Unattributed article: "What Has the Agreement Come To? Epilogue to a Rally"]

[Text] Everyone already knows that the inter-regional deputy group and the formal and informal movements of Moscow asked everyone to attend rallies and demonstrations on 25 February. They were to be held in support of progressive candidates for people's deputy and of the demand that the government agree to a "roundtable" discussion with informal movements to seek a way of breaking the political and economic deadlock.

Everyone also knows something else: A crowd is faceless.

There were countless examples of this throughout the country, and our republic also became a hotbed of tragedy. To the shame and sorrow of people of all nationalities in Uzbekistan, the tragic events in the Fergana Valley and in Tashkent Oblast—in spite of their social connotations—erupted in the form of inter-ethnic brawls.

In this context, we can understand the apprehensions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the CPSU Central Committee, the artists unions, the prominent public spokesmen, and the many organizations warning that the rallies of 25 February could have undesirable consequences. It is also understandable that people of all nationalities supported the republic government's measures to restrict unauthorized and unpredictable demonstrations in streets and public squares. The same measures, incidentally, were also taken in other republics. Nevertheless, the rallies did take place, because they, as a speaker in parliament recently said, are evidence of the "society's high temperature."

The national press reported that the rallies of 25 February proceeded normally everywhere, in the sense that they did not end in brawls.

But did the democracy of rallies become more constructive that day if the slogans, time, and emotions of the

gatherings are weighed against the resolution of our problems in the tense atmosphere of the rallies?

The answer is a definite no.

Obscenities, lies, the juggling of facts, the rash unsubstantiated statements, the personal ambitions of the organizers of the rallies, and the invitation of questionable applause are not part of genuine democracy. Emotional outbursts, the personal vilification of specific Communists and soviet personnel, and the rally tactic of drowning out the words of opponents by stamping one's feet and shouting, even though the rally had the relevant and noble purpose of encouraging these opponents to join a "roundtable" discussion, are not the best indicators of democratic pluralism. Finally, the speculation on questionable interpretations of history cannot help in establishing the historical facts.

Unfortunately, all of this did take place at the rally of informal associations in Tashkent on 25 February. Its announced goals were noble: the consolidation of democratic forces in support of perestroika and the drafting of a platform of constructive dialogue with republic government and party leaders.

These issues were to be resolved by the members of Birlik, Intersoyuz, and the Democratic Union who gathered at the rally. None of the speakers at the rally belonged to other movements, including the Youth League, the recently formed Volya ("Erk"), and many others. But this is not our problem, as the saying goes. It does not matter to us if some of the informal associations have no respect for other associations of this kind. It is indicative, however, that many informal movements did not attend the rally expressly because they felt that the disturbances in some parts of Tashkent Oblast should not be compounded at this time by the passions aroused by public rallies. We can respect this point of view.

The rally did take place, however, and we do care how it pursued its goals. After all, every second or third speaker in the House of Knowledge stressed that he was a member of the CPSU.

What actually happened?

Above all, it was a case of dissatisfaction with the elections in the republic. The entire discussion consisted of complaints by informal associations: Too few of their members, in their opinion, were elected.

In the recent elections democracy triumphed with the help of a single pencil, or, more precisely, a ball-point pen—and this was specified in advance, because it is easy for anyone to change a pencil mark to suit his own purposes.

We cannot say that this solved all of the problems connected with the democratization of elections. There were violations, but they were announced to the public and were rectified. The rally probably had the right to criticize these—as long as the criticism and examples were accurate and specific.

This, however, did not take place at the rally. After calling the rally to order and reading the message the informal associations had approved in Moscow, suggesting that all of us turn off the electricity and light candles in our homes, Z. Khaknazarov, co-chairman of Birlik, turned the floor over to his colleague, Co-Chairman Sh. Ismatullayev, for the keynote speech. After thanking Zakhid-aka for explaining the purpose of the rally, Shukhrat-aka devoted his lengthy speech wholly to the elections and to the fraud which, according to him, is still the basis of our politics.

How could this be? After gathering together for the purpose of arranging for a dialogue with the republic government and party, how could they say not one word about the republic party organization's concern about the pitiful state of the people, the shortage of housing, food, hospitals, and schools, the laboring public's lack of a guaranteed minimum wage, unemployment, the environment, and the disastrous state of the Aral Sea and the cis-Aral zone? Was this the reason that healthy forces in our society were to be consolidated?

In the final analysis, people can see that it was not the informal associations, but the leaders of the republic government and Central Committee that brought these problems to the attention of the Soviet Government at the February CPSU Central Committee plenum. The problems are now being solved.

Steps have been taken recently to eliminate the single-crop structure of agriculture and to set new prices on cotton and other agricultural products. Around a million and a half rural families were given additional land for the expansion of their subsidiary plots and the construction of homes. While we were attending rallies, they were already making preparations on their farmsteads for the future harvest. Tens of millions of rubles were allocated for loans to peasants and for free meals for students in elementary schools. The pensions and benefits of veterans and the disabled are being increased. Urban and rural reconstruction programs have been drawn up. The environment and public health services in the republic are being improved. New branches of factories and plants will eliminate unemployment. Finally, more attention is being focused on the national language, which has become the state language of the republic, and the culture, customs, and traditions of all ethnic groups in Uzbekistan.

Many of these problems are trumpeted in the Birlik program, but they are actually being solved by the present leadership of the republic. How could the main speaker at the rally fail to mention this and then blame a long list of problems solely on the fact that not all of the Birlik candidates for people's deputy were elected by a direct and secret ballot?

If we use the same line of reasoning as the speaker, we have to complain that not all of the CPSU candidates won deputy seats either, but the republic Communist Party is not raising questions about the election results

because of this, whereas the Birlik co-chairman carried applause by demanding that these results be nullified. The rally then included these demands in its resolution. What did the democrats at the rally have in mind—the consolidation of healthy forces for democracy or a massive power play?

The rank-and-file members of all of the informal movements probably believe that they are helping perestroika. They do not understand everything, and they sometimes take a shouted phrase as something constructive, but they sincerely believe that there is no other alternative. Certain forces within these movements, however, are openly pursuing their own personal goals, regardless of whether they do or do not belong to the CPSU.

Judging by the speeches at the rally, some members of Intersoyuz also fit this description.

A member of its executive committee, M. Grebenyuk, won a big round of applause by reciting prayers in the name of Allah and God—and in the literal rather than the figurative sense: "In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate, praise to Allah, Lord of the earth" and "Our Father, Who art in Heaven, hallowed be Thy name." After reciting the namaz and the morning prayer, the writer and poet announced that he had spent 50 years in the Komsomol and party and then finally began complaining that he had also been a candidate for the republic Supreme Soviet but had lost the election.

Others who were defeated were also, as he said, "our nominees"—i.e., the candidates of Intersoyuz: Chirkov, Podporenko, and someone else who was not mentioned by name. In one case the members of the candidate's whole work crew were victimized, in another case the "apparatchiks cast a hundred ballots" for the alternative candidate, and the unnamed Intersoyuz nominee received a severe reprimand from the party and lost his job.

We do not know what happened in the case of the "extra ballots." This is a matter to be investigated by election committees and law enforcement agencies rather than at rallies, but we are certain that the attempt to pursue ambitious goals to the accompaniment of the applause and shouts of a crowd is just as similar to the consolidation of democratic forces in the society as the hope of localizing a fire with kerosene.

It is hypocritical to say prayers to God and Allah and then to agitate and incite the crowd at the rally: "Today you and I will retaliate. We must overthrow our enemies and do everything within our power to build a state of truly pious people on the planet Earth."

What is this planetary state of truly pious people? Is it world communism? Probably not. It is simply that ambitious yammering quite naturally leads to utopian appeals. One of these appeals, however, is the furthest thing from utopia: "We must overthrow our enemies."

In view of this, was the rally held to consolidate forces or to seek an "enemy" to be destroyed and thereby trample on our democratic values, which were declared at the very beginning of the rally: "We propose to emerge from the severe crisis by which our country was stricken not through violence and confrontation, but through the peaceful unification of all democratic forces and through constructive dialogue with the authorities"?

Abdurakhim Pulatov, one of the leaders of Birlik who verbally advocated the consolidation of healthy forces for perestroika, did not direct the rally into this channel either. In his "exposure" of the apparatchiks, he could not find anything more convincing to say than the following: "According to some of our comrades, after our rallies and demonstrations, the apparatchiks sit in their offices, drink cocoa laced with brandy, and look over our statements." The accusation was groundless, but it was fully in line with the spirit of the rally. Of course, he never even considered the fact that normal people might be upset by his sarcastic references to the conflagration in Bukhara.

At the time of the well-known events in Bukhara, the republic and oblast leaders went to the rayon center. Ask anyone in Bukhara and he will tell you that this did much to keep things under control, but according to the speaker, "more fire engines should have been sent" to Bukhara instead. The inter-ethnic conflict here, in his opinion, was a coincidence. Something else was no coincidence: "The reason is that the election campaign and results disturbed the people."

Let us assume that the people in Bukhara were the most offended by the elections and, therefore, the most aware people among the 20 million in our country. But how were the "people" annoyed at the elections by the Mskhet Turks, who quickly had to be taken to a neighboring rayon? And what about the subsequent events in Parkent? Was this also a protest against flaws in the election process?

Only Pulatov knows whether he really believes this, and it is not for us to judge how competent he is in this area. After all, he is the one who instantaneously appears in the spots we later refer to as "hot," to say the least. When he asks people there not to pay attention to republic government and party leaders, he seems to be acting against the Birlik program, which appeals for the friendship and development of all nationalities living in Uzbekistan.

Therefore, anyone has the right to judge the honesty of his search for the truth. At the rally, however, he made statements without offering any proof, simply assuring the people there: "I could prove this at any time." This is a familiar and effective tactic.

People's Deputy of the USSR V. Zolotukhin tried to change the rally agenda. He reminded the people who were gathered there that in addition to the elections and their second phase, there was another way of resolving the crisis—"roundtables" with the authorities. This is

the time to seek our common concerns, and not the factors dividing us. It is our duty to unite forces and fight for democracy together.

Did the rally get down to business after this appeal?

I think not. The speakers put all of their oratorical skills to use. One inflamed the crowd with talk about the events in Europe and the dismissal of some party obkom secretaries in Russia, the pitiful state of our peasants, which was already discussed long ago by the party and government, and the tragedy of the Aral Sea, which, regrettably, cannot be rectified at this time by the apparatchiks or the informal movements.

All of the speeches combined implied that the frightening rumors were being spread not by people of a certain frame of mind, but by the "apparatchiks," and that the clashes between people of different nationalities were being fomented not by extremists and instigators, but by the "higher-ups."

Of course, not everyone at a rally can be persuaded to believe lies, but it is possible to confuse many people. And what if someone knows this and then "takes the case to the people," passing off the absurd opinions expressed at the rally as the products of his own thinking? What happens then?

The result is rally-produced "consolidation"....

Some people at the rally broke into thunderous applause at some of the statements and demanded that Birlik be declared a political party, not realizing in the heat of the moment that there are many Communists in this movement and that no political party, including the CPSU, allows its members to belong to two parties at once.

Finally, someone came up with the idea that rallies should be held daily, and he bestowed his revelation on the crowd. He forgot, of course, that rallies cannot feed people, enrich their spiritual values, save the Aral Sea, or dispel the smog over the cities and villages.

Other speakers then read poems about the people who had died in Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan and quoted from reports in Baltic newspapers on the state of affairs in Baku. They suggested that the election campaign be begun all over again. Administration Deputy Chief I. Buriyev from the Ministry of the Petroleum and Gas Industry recited his biography, which was well known to everyone, but with a somewhat new slant. He spent almost his entire speech advising the gathering to be vigilant.

He was interrupted, and then the crowd began to get bored. Things got livelier when Dadakhan Khasanov began to speak. According to him, he was authorized to speak for three oblasts in the Fergana Valley. It turned out that the most important instructions the authorized agent had been given directed him to demand high rostrums and Lenin square for the rallies. Otherwise, as he put it, many useful ukases would be issued, and without the use of the central square in Tashkent, D.

Khasanov would not be able to bring the facts to the attention of his colleagues in the informal movement and to the peasants, who apparently would hear rallies in the square more clearly.

All of this was accompanied by thunderous applause. This is probably the best indication of what kind of rally it was. Was it constructive? Did it unite democratic forces? Was a platform drawn up for a dialogue and for "roundtables"? No, no one remembered any of this! Rhetoric swayed the hearts and minds of the people there. Viscid populism has flourished for a long time on the strength of "measures" of this kind. It did not come into being in Tashkent, but this is where it acquired its license to operate.

Birlik has not been registered? The Central Committee is to blame. Pakhtakor played badly? Independence will make it the world leader.

Is this the right level for a rally of "democrats" concerned about the future of the people and capable of suggesting solutions to the crisis!

The Communist Party was the first to start talking about the economic autonomy of the republic. At a time of economic difficulties in the country, the Government of Uzbekistan is dealing with a multitude of problems requiring colossal expenditures. How did these problems provide occasions for witty remarks at rallies? How could this have happened?

Predictably, even the organizers of the rally became aware that the speaker's platform was being used for excessive "scourging." The leader of the movement interrupted the speaker, but the democratic rostrum was not governed by established procedures: He had only begun, he said, and this is a democracy!

Then he raved on: "I demand the restoration of Turkestan! Let Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, Turkmenia, and Kazakhstan unite, and the result will be Turkestan!"

It appeared that all of the Central Asian republics, and not just three oblasts, had authorized the singer to make these dubious "demands." It is true that he did not mention Tajikistan. Either he was not authorized to speak for that republic or he could not remember how many republics there were in Central Asia. Or perhaps he had some profound views of his own regarding Tajikistan.

The speaker also "solved" several other problems. All of the overseas emigres from Turkestan should return to the land of their ancestors because, as Dadakhin had learned, "they are feeling homesick now." On their way, they should stop to pick up the Hitlerite bootlicker Baymirza Khait, who "is fighting for us there."

The speaker's knowledge covered such a broad range and he was so competent in all areas that he proposed, right there at the rally, the creation of a regular army of Uzbekistan, the replacement of Russian administrators in the republic, the revision of the history of the Emirate

of Bukhara, and much more. Apparently having little faith in the ability of the "democrats" to solve these problems, the singer advised them to ally themselves with God. Singing is the only thing he did not do that day. He promised he would sing, however, when the rallies would be held in Bolshoy Square.

Once again the leader had to remind the gathering that the theme of the rally was democracy, unification, and the search for ways of organizing constructive dialogue. In March, he said, rallies would be held all over the republic, and that would be the time to raise social and political issues.

Then everything reverted to the earlier pattern. There were more complaints that certain people had not been elected to the republic Supreme Soviet, and there were suggestions that it would not be a bad thing to emulate a state as prosperous and open as Turan, which we have all forgotten so disgracefully. But what about consolidation and dialogue?

"We do not need any kind of roundtable discussions with the authorities," said Democratic Union spokesperson Lyudmila Petranovskaya. "We need a change of government. Otherwise, the Central Asian region will always be the site of inter-ethnic strife and will serve as cannon fodder whenever there is a need for the escalation of tension. Whenever conflicts are needed, we will be put to work. You and I are being asked to sit down at a 'round table' with a government whose hands are stained with blood. What purpose could a roundtable serve when there is no unity among democrats and when we cannot dictate our own terms?" This was followed by vague comments about communities, national conciliation, the totalitarian system, and the empire. Then Ibrokhim Zhumanov, who was introduced by the organizers of the rally as "the Kazakh youngster," made some "specific demands" of the Intersoyuz representatives. He asked them to pass a resolution removing one of the Russian republic leaders from office, "so that the need to remove a Russian will not affect the Uzbek people." The wording was awkward, but it was discernible.

The problems of "removal" were addressed by G. Bakhramov. He was categorical, saying that "no one should trust this government at all." Once again, D. Abduraimov said a few words about a united Turkestan. Then the independence of the East was discussed for awhile.

City party personnel made timid statements. They mainly tried to prove that they did not drink brandy and coffee at work. This raised a clamor which did not die down even when Chairman T. Sabitov of the central election committee spoke. After having so much to say about the "unfair elections," the people at the rally did not even try to learn the facts, and they began yelling out questions which were not within the jurisdiction of the head of the committee: Would Birlik be registered when the apparat's privileges had been eliminated?

Amidst all of the "democrats'" noise and uproar, there were numerous assertions that "the people of Tashkent were driven away with clubs" on election day and that "mothers of large families were beaten with clubs when they approached the Central Committee building."

Once again, there was criticism of specific "apparat" personalities, and once again it was connected with the elections. There were modest reminders that order had been restored in Buka by the emissaries from Birlik, and not by the republic leaders who had stayed there for days. Without any excess humility, the organizers remarked that "our rally today went beautifully." It was only at the last minute that two proposals were voiced: Democratic forces must unite, and a dialogue must be organized with the government to settle "some matters, namely the formation of a democratic government."

What kind of impression did the rally produce?

Let us briefly go back to its resolution—to emerge from the political, economic, and inter-ethnic crisis not by means of confrontation, but by means of the unification of democratic forces in the republic and a constructive dialogue with the leadership in the form of a "roundtable," the nullification of the results of the past elections, the registration of all movements within constitutional bounds as soon as possible, and the repeal of articles 3 and 6 of the Constitution of the Uzbek SSR (regarding the leading role of the party and democratic centralism).

In principle, all of this is acceptable. Furthermore, the Tashkent rally did not approve all of the points of its resolution "at first reading." All of this had been discussed in advance, all the way up to the USSR Supreme Soviet and CPSU Central Committee plenums.

The nullification of election results is a different matter, and it is not within the power of a rally.

The main thing is something else. The resolution was drafted in advance, according to the old "apparat" tradition, and did not address the problems the people at the rally were yelling about to the accompaniment of loud applause, including the delirious ravings. Otherwise, the resolution would have had to include the "decisions" on the creation of Turkestan, on the glorification of Baymirza Khait, and on the confrontation with the authorities on the Democratic Union platform.

Even obviously stupid observations, however, did not cool the hot heads at the rally.

What can we learn from the rally?

Our newborn political pluralism is standing on frail legs. The "democrats" are still floating on the wave of denial, propelled only by the force of public discontent. It is not only political experience that they lack. In most cases, they also lack the most elementary political sophistication. The freedom granted to the alternative movements by the party is being used to the detriment of the CPSU,

and the tranquility in our common home is being used to satisfy personal ambition and will ultimately be used in a struggle for power.

There has always been a struggle for power, but in a civilized society this cannot be done by "any means whatsoever," including immoral ones. In any case, the people who have struggled for power have always been tortured by the question of what they might contribute to the government and its people. The populist denial—"This is not how things should be; this is not what I want"—should be balanced in advance with soul-searching—"What can I contribute?" What can I contribute to the government, the people, women and children, Buka and the Aral?

What can the democrats at the Tashkent rally contribute and what are they willing to contribute? They have probably never even considered this matter. Yes, it is true that Fergana, Baku, Dushanbe, and Parkent are the abscesses of a sick society. At this time they are being treated by Communists and by government "apparatchiks"—not always skillfully or under the protection of law, but always with a persistent desire to find a way out of the impasse. They are treating them in the same way that they are treating the ulcerated sores of all the national calamities—from unemployment to the lack of social protection.

Our rally, however, is still "exposing" things that were exposed long ago. And why beat around the bush? A rally cannot alleviate tension with the juggling of facts, categorical remarks, historical blindness, an excess of emotion, and applause at the most inappropriate moments.

Will we draw the proper conclusions from this? Will we learn anything pertinent from the appeals for people to gather en masse in the streets and squares?

So far, it was after this rally that Parkent was set aflame as a result of an unauthorized march....

It was after this rally that the situation in Akkurgan and Alimkent was destabilized.

Finally, it was after this rally that the Birlik leaders began openly sowing anti-Russian propaganda.

Informal movements of all types can certainly continue asserting that they were consolidating their forces at that rally on 25 February.

It is clear, however, to all sensible people, who compare the spirit of this rally to the growing public dissatisfaction with the unpredictable events that might occur at future Birlik-sponsored undertakings, that this rally was an occasion for the underhanded promotion of a nationalist platform and served as a unique review of far from democratic forces and an occasion for the elaboration of their tactics.

They are already being implemented in anonymous leaflets calling for the "gradual expulsion" from the republic of anyone whose ethnic background is unacceptable to the people who have been agitated by the "democrats."

Someone has been intoxicated by the smell of other people's blood.

How much of it will have to be shed before state organs and law enforcement agencies realize that the time has come to disarm all of these fighters and rid the society of extremist groups and their instigators, of the organizers of mass disturbances and pogroms, and of preachers of nationalism, chauvinism, racism, and religious fanaticism?!

At this time their impunity is contributing to instigation at rallies and to outrages that ruin people's lives.

Editor Explains Intent of New Estonian Youth Paper
 90US0559A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
 in Russian 1 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with Margus Mets, editor of PAEVALEHT, by A. Belova: "The First Issue of PAEVALEHT"; date and place not given]

[Text] The first issue of PAEVALEHT was published today. The youth newspaper NOORTE HAAL ceased its existence de-jure. Margus Mets, editor of PAEVALEHT, shares his thoughts on what is connected with the publication of the new daily newspaper.

"In fact, NOORTE HAAL, like MOLODEZHKA published in the Russian language, has not been a youth newspaper in the literal sense of the word for a long time. In recent months within the framework of our youth newspaper we have been working in a new direction, trying to cover as fully as possible the events in and outside of Estonia—in the hot spots of Union republics and abroad. We try to use various information channels. Allan Martinson has now been sent to Moscow as permanent correspondent. Toomas H. Liyv will go to America to study at the International Press Institute for 5 months. Negotiations on sending our correspondent to Washington are being conducted. Incidentally, this year PAEVALEHT correspondents do not stay in one place: In 2 weeks Toomas Sildam and Yullar Born will begin to give reports from Afghanistan. And so, we do not confine ourselves to local problems, but try to look at the whole world with wide open eyes.

"The new newspaper in no way signifies a 180-degree turn to, or revival of, the newspaper with a similar name, which was published in Estonia from 1905 until 1940. However, for a long time society has had an urgent need to have not merely someone's organ and channel for the transmission of all and every kind of views, but a current journalistic publication capable of reflecting the range of problems in totality. Personally, I think that true journalistic democracy lies in the editorial staff having the right to independently decide what materials should be published and at what time. In the last 2 years in our society there has been a situation, in which the press has been under the pressure of all kinds of 'appeals,' 'declarations,' 'open letters,' and so forth. Journalism is not merely a convenient channel for the dissemination of information. I don't like the 'independence' paraded by some newspapers. We are not free from our time, or from ourselves. PAEVALEHT will try to fulfill the outlined program."

RODINA Editor Forced From Post; Journal Publication in Limbo

90US0559B Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
 in Russian No 7, 14 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by L. Grafova: "To Whom Will RODINA Be Given?"]

[Text] "The meeting of the labor collective believes that... methods of secret apparatus decisions, by means of which

the new all-Union journal RODINA is virtually being destroyed..., can be considered a carefully thought-out antiperestroyka act." (From the minutes of the meeting on 1 February of this year.)

The journal is only 1 year old. Born under conditions of tough competition, when many publications lost subscribers, RODINA gained almost half a million. This year, however, readers have not received a single issue. The first and second issues, which have already been printed, but have not been stitched, lie in PRAVDA's printing office and the third and fourth, which have been prepared by the editorial staff on schedule, are not even accepted for production. Workers have been ordered to urgently "vacate the occupied premises" and to hand over equipment and passes.

No complaints against the journal have been lodged officially. Conversely, RODINA is praised. The recent meeting of the ideological commission of the CPSU Central Committee noted the journal's objectivity in the interpretation of our historical facts.

So, what has happened? Simply RODINA (alas, without the subscribers' knowledge and consent) is changing its status. It was the publication of the PRAVDA newspaper and now it is being transferred to the RSFSR Council of Ministers and its Supreme Soviet. Well, Russia really needs its own sociopolitical journal, especially as RODINA has already manifested its independence of "right" and "left" extremism.

What will be? Not long ago the RSFSR Council of Ministers suggested that editor-in-chief Yu. Sovtsov leave his post, or become an assistant. It turns out that the experienced journalist, who has organized an all-Union journal, does not have a good grasp... of "complex Russian problems." Who is considered a specialist here? Who will become the new editor? Uncertainty and rumors...

Yu. Sovtsov was unanimously elected editor at the meeting of the labor collective. The Committee on Glasnost of the USSR Supreme Soviet deals with RODINA's fate. The press and television have already come out in the journal's defense. Why can glasnost not save an organ of glasnost from arbitrary rule? What secret springs operate here?

More on RODINA Journal Publication Difficulties

90US0654B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
 in Russian 7 Mar 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by TASS correspondent V. Saklakov: "What Now, RODINA?"]

[Text] Our newspaper has described to the readers on more than one occasion the difficult fate of the magazine RODINA. Subscribers were supposed to have gotten the third issue, but... The magazine has changed its publisher. Will its previous image remain?

"The first issue did not come out, nor did the second," the RODINA magazine staffers monosyllabically answer their readers' phone calls; they are surprised that this year they have not gotten a single copy of the publication they subscribe to. In the meantime, 420,000 subscribers are simply at a loss about this.

What on earth happened; why has the magazine been "divorced" from its readers?

In answering that question from the TASS correspondent, RSFSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman V.G. Zakharov said:

"The sociopolitical and popular science magazine RODINA was formed as a publication of PRAVDA in February 1988. It quickly gained popularity and found its readership. But a new decision was made at the end of 1989: to give the monthly a new profile, transferring it to a new publisher—the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and republic Council of Ministers.

"And the magazine's perils begun that moment. The PRAVDA publishing house made haste in severing ties with it, practically refusing further cooperation. After the production of the 12th issue of 1989, work with RODINA at the PRAVDA printing plant stopped.

"The PRAVDA publishing house demanded that the republic Council of Ministers confirm the new publisher. The SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA publishing house became the new publisher. Yet it, understandably, did not have the opportunity, and did not immediately take upon itself the printing of RODINA. And we cannot begin to print the magazine in some other location for the time being; there is no printing capacity to spare, and many other things, and the problems of supplying the publication to the subscribers have not been regulated. We are therefore now trying to reach an agreement with the PRAVDA publishing house on continuing to put out the magazine on their base. I feel that we can put out the first 1990 issue of RODINA soon, although, of course, it will now be very complicated to replace the loss of morale inflicted upon its readers."

And what does V.P. Leontyev, director of the PRAVDA publishing house, think about this?

"The transfer of the magazine RODINA to the Russian organs," he explained, "Had as its basis good intentions, to help the country's largest republic acquire its own publication, which would consistently highlight its life, its problems. Yet despite the fact that this idea was considered back in September of last year, nothing was done for any sort of serious preparation for the monthly's re-profiling, for its re-orientation toward new goals and tasks.

"The editorial board began 1990 without have a precise work plan to correspond with the altered program, or the technological opportunities for printing the magazine at Russia's polygraphic enterprises. The impression is created that in the republic, they very much want to take

this publication, yet they re-addressed the concerns about it to just anyone. As a result, to this day, no contract has been drawn up on continuing to produce the magazine at the PRAVDA publishing house base. No one has taken care of how to ensure its distribution.

"The PRAVDA publishing house is prepared to help the magazine that has gotten into such a situation, recognizing that it is not the readers who are to blame for what has happened. We are capable of making up lost time; we can take it upon ourselves to print this publication during 1990. We need just one thing—a contract finally has to be made with us. Until now, we are witnessing astonishing indifference and a lack of desire to work constructively."

And now let us return to what we began with—let us put ourselves in the place of any of the magazine's 420,000 subscribers, that very same subscriber who chose specifically RODINA from among the plethora of the most diverse publications being put out in the country. We do not know what the reader liked about it. Perhaps the adherence declared by the editors to historical conciliation, to national concord, and the humanization of society. Or, was it the principle of pluralism clearly noticeable in the pages of RODINA, the aspiration to conduct a dialogue, even with the collision of polar opposite views, in a benevolent manner, calmly, reasonably, recognizing the reader's right to select from among several points of view?

Today is the time to think about more prosaic things. First and foremost about how it was possible to change the direction of the magazine, to rework it from being an all-union to a republic magazine without informing potential subscribers about this in a timely manner? Now it works out that people have paid money for something that is not at all what they had originally counted on; in fact, they made an advance to, as one reader expressed it, an "incomprehensible enterprise." Will the announcement of a publication now with a Russian orientation be of interest to, let us say, a resident of Central Asia?

Perhaps there will not be any at all if the issue of RODINA does not get to subscribers in a timely manner. Yet, as is apparent from the statements expounded above, time has been lost. It is the third month, and they have practically not begun working on the magazine. It must be that the subscriber has been completely put into the position of sighing: He is without his money, and without the publication he selected. Even if work on the first issue were to begin today, it would not, as the specialists say, appear any time soon.

The position of the new owners of the magazine is particularly incomprehensible. None of them has even met with the members of the editorial collegium. No one has explained the situation to the readership. Many issues of publishing the magazine, expediting it, distributing it, and informing subscribers have, in fact, been left to drift.

Is this how a publication with a new program is supposed to earn authority?

Tomsk People's Deputies Plan Paper to Compete with Obkom Organ

90US0654A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Mar 90
Morning Edition p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA staff correspondent A. Solovyev: "Tomsk 'IZVESTIYA'"]

[Text] Tomsk: The first issue of IZVESTIYA of the Tomsk Oblast soviet of people's deputies has appeared.

The new oblast newspaper got through to the readers with difficulty. There is not yet an official document of the local authorities permitting its publication. But there was no prohibition, either. Not one of the oblast leaders objected.

The preliminary material costs were borne by the oblispolkom Main Planning and Economics Administration; the execution, by an initiative group of journalists from the "old" oblast newspaper, KRASNOYE ZNAMYA, which has thus created a serious competitor for itself.

It is not, of course, simply a matter of entrepreneurship and audacity on the part of individual ispolkom and editorial staffers. The birth of a "purely" soviet newspaper is conditioned by the development of democratic processes in the region.

At the sessions of the oblast soviet, the deputies raised on more than one occasion the demand to have their own publication. Their main argument is that the authority of the soviets is gaining power, but the traditional oblast newspaper is a formal organ of two masters, the party obkom and the oblast soviet.

In an interview in the new newspaper, oblispolkom Chairman R. Popadeykin evaluated its appearance as timely and logical (can this be taken for a "blessing"?). In the opinion of the oblispolkom chairman, in order that there be no dictating on the part of the apparatus, "only the sessions of the soviet of people's deputies must be under control." But if there arise misunderstandings, conflicts in the day-to-day work? It is proposed that their resolution be entrusted to a permanently functioning deputy commission.

The trial issue came out in a 16-page NEDELYA-type format, with a press run of 40,000 copies at the price of 20 kopeks.

Lemeshev Details Personal Environmental Concerns, Plan of Action

90US0657A Moscow LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian No 7, 16 Feb 90 pp 4-5

[Interview With M. Ya. Lemeshev by Yu. Yushkin:
"Ward Off a Deadly Threat"]

[Text] *Candidate for RSFSR people's deputy Mikhail Lemeshev, a doctor of economic sciences and a UN expert on the environment; and Yuriy Yushkin, section editor of LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA, talk about how to assure a future for our children and grandchildren.*

[Yu. Yushkin] Mikhail Yakovlevich! Perestroyka in the public life of our country has been going on for 5 years. This is a considerable length of time, but the results are pathetic. People's welfare is deteriorating. What, in your opinion, is hindering the realization of the goals?

[M. Lemeshev] The departmental-bureaucratic management of social development in the USSR, the neglect of the vital interests of the people, their alienation from the means of production, from natural, material and financial results, from the results of their labor and from decision making have lead the country to an economic, social and ecological crisis. The thoughtless and ruinous growth in the scales of production based upon old technology, industry's working for its own needs and not those of the consumer and the cost approach to the economy have caused the practically universal pollution of the environment and destruction of nature, a general shortage of consumer goods, increases in the rate of illness and death, and reductions in welfare. All these faults of the state, which have accumulated during 70 years of the construction of "barracks socialism", have not only not been eliminated but have deepened during the years of perestroyka. A deadly ecological danger has arisen on the base of economic, social and national disorders. It is my deep conviction that there should be talk about a system of fundamental measures for the survival of the present generation and the future of our children and grandchildren. It is necessary that each and every person recognize that the prevention of the impending ecological catastrophe is the first and decisive condition for the survival of our society.

[Yu. Yushkin] What do you think are the radical measures that must be taken to prevent the impending calamity?

[M. Lemeshev] The protection of people's health should be the first specific step towards survival. The country's economic and scientific-technical potential should be used to solve this key problem. At present this potential is not used in the interest of people, but against it. As a result, the life and health of society are being catastrophically destroyed. Here is a vivid illustration. In the United States the average life expectancy is 75 years, in France it is 76, in Sweden—77, in Japan—78, but in the USSR it is only 69 years. In some regions of our country, in particular in central Russia and the north it is less than

50 years. While in the past 10-15 years life expectancy has been increasing in all the developed countries, in our country it has not only failed to increase, it has declined. As a result, with regard to this indicator the USSR is halfway down the list of the world's countries.

The dynamics of infant mortality are especially tragic in our country when viewed against the background of the developed countries. In the United States 10 infants per 1,000 die before their first year, in France—8, in Sweden—6, in Japan—5 and in the USSR—25. Infant mortality is especially high in cities and settlements with high levels of environmental pollution, above all in the Russian Federation. Here the demographic situation has become critical. In order to convince yourself of this it is sufficient to look closely at the following, chilling data:

Birth Rates, Death Rates and Natural Growth (per 1,000)

	Number of Births	Number of Deaths	Natural growth
USSR	19.8	9.9	9.9
RSFSR	17.1	10.5	6.6
Central Region	14.3	11.9	2.4
Kalinin Oblast	14.1	14.2	-0.1
Tula Oblast	12.8	12.9	-0.1
Pskov Oblast	14.5	14.7	-0.2

As you can see, in central Russia, not only is simple reproduction failing to occur, but, strictly speaking, the Russian nation is dying out. This tragic situation is explained by a complex of reasons ensuing from the general policy of russophobia cultivated in the USSR for several decades and not yet overcome.

[Yu. Yushkin] What, in your opinion, can explain such a tragic situation in the Russian Federation?

[M. Lemeshev] I am convinced that the main reason is the economic and social robbery of Russia. This robbery is conducted by all-union management organs for the benefit of the developed capitalist countries and of union republics, above all the Baltic and Central Asian ones, through the unequal exchange of products of labor. Thus, in world prices imports into the RSFSR from other countries and other union republics total 99 billion rubles, while exports total 140 billion rubles. Thus, every year 41-42 billion rubles are extracted from the budget of Russia. This is the reason for Russia's worsening social and economic problems.

The second reason for the dying out of the Russian people is undoubtedly the destruction of nature and a way of life that has been historically linked to it. A little less than two decades have gone by since the approval of the decree by the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Communist Party: "On Strengthening the Protection of Nature and Improving the Use of Natural Resources." That was in 1972. Similar decrees on the protection of

nature were approved in 1979, 1985 and 1988. However, the ecological situation in the country continues to deteriorate catastrophically. While 20 years ago there were isolated instances of dangerous pollution and destruction of nature, they were primarily of a local character. Today these phenomena have acquired a massive country-wide character. There are widespread zones of ecological calamity, where not only nature is dying, but there is a threat to the health and lives of millions of people. These areas include extensive regions of central Russia, the Lower Volga, the basins of the Caspian Sea, the Aral Sea and the Sea of Azov, Lake Baykal, Lake Ladoga, the southern Urals, Chukotka, the lowlands along the middle stretches of the Ob river, the Yamal Peninsula, the southern Ukraine, regions affected by the Chernobyl accident, resorts in the northern Caucasus, Crimea, the Gulf of Riga and dozens of large and medium sized cities in the country.

There are increasing rates of land destruction, cutting of forests, the pollution of surface and ground waters and the air. All these are causing large economic and social losses. According to experts' estimates, the economic losses from the destruction of nature and public health are 45-50 billion rubles annually. At the same time the state and enterprises fruitlessly spend 10-11 billion rubles to protect nature.

[Yu. Yushkin] It is really possible to improve the environment and save nature from destruction and society from degradation?

[M. Lemeshev] This is a very difficult question. There is a widespread opinion that these environmental protection expenditures are insufficient, and that if they were increased it would be possible to improve the ecological situation in the country. This judgement is deeply mistaken. Under conditions of extensive growth in production based upon resource intensive, nature destroying and polluting technologies, the task of protecting the environment is insolvable in principle, no matter how much is spent upon environmental protection measures. Moreover, without changes in the structure of public production, without its intensification, the stabilization of growth and later, reductions in the production of raw materials and intermediate products (means of production used to produce means of production), without the mastery of resource conserving, ecologically clean technology any growth in labor outlays to protect nature will be nothing other than growth in economic losses to the national economy and public welfare. This is because the creation of all sorts of treatment installations, even the most modern ones, is a struggle with the effects, and not the causes of the destruction of nature and the pollution of the environment. Activities in the protection of nature will lag behind the dynamic activities of nature destroying production, and, consequently, there will be no hope for protecting nature and improving the environment. This is a case where the saying of the ancients can be applied: "The fleet-footed Achilles will never catch the limping tortoise."

[Yu. Yushkin] What do you see as the way out of this critical situation? What should the USSR Supreme Soviet do first?

[M. Lemeshev] There is only one way out—changing the present nature destroying structure of the USSR national economy to a nature conserving one. Specifically, there should be talk about two urgent tasks.

First—Reduce the production and consumption of natural resources, above all, iron ore, oil, gas, timber, fresh water, the area of land being worked, the number of livestock and the gross harvests of several crops (cotton, potatoes, poultry meat, forage crops and others), a large part of which are lost rather than used.

Second—Direct the limited financial and material resources of the state and enterprises away from expanding the scale of production and from economically senseless and ecologically dangerous work such as the construction of nuclear power plants, gigantic reservoirs and canals. Rather, direct them towards the development and mastery of resource conserving, low waste technologies and waste free, ecologically clean industries.

[Yu. Yushkin] Given the specific conditions of our state, is it possible to implement such an ecological and economic strategy for resource use?

[M. Lemeshev] World experience in economic development, especially in such highly developed countries as the United States, the FRG, the Scandinavian countries and Japan, convincingly shows the great efficiency of just this strategy. The aggregate intersectoral calculations I have made show that it should be immediately implemented in the USSR. For example, in the past 15-20 years in the United States the production of oil, gas and steel has declined by one-fourth, that of iron ore, tractors and metal cutting machine tools by half. This decline has not reduced the country's potential. During 1971-1975 the annual growth rate of national income in the United States was 2.8 percent, while during 1986-1988 the annual growth rate increased to 3.3 percent. And, very importantly, this growth was accompanied by marked improvements in the environment.

[Yu. Yushkin] What is the situation in our country?

[M. Lemeshev] It is the direct opposite. With the government's blessings, our ministries and agencies continue the thoughtless and destructive increase in the production of raw materials. The Soviet Union, with 5.7 percent of the world's population, now produces 16 percent of the world's electrical energy, 22 percent of its steel, 27 percent of its petroleum and 42 percent of its natural gas. The lion's share of this production is within the borders of Russia. The RSFSR now accounts for 95 percent of the Soviet Union's oil production, 80 percent of its gas and 63 percent of its electrical energy. In spite of this, kolkhozes and sovkhoses in the republic cannot harvest and haul their crops to the elevators on time because there is not enough fuel.

Tens of millions of families in Russia live without gas. There is not enough electricity for fields and farms. In 103 cities with a total population of about 50 million pollution is higher than the maximum permissible concentrations by factors of 10 and more. There are growing volumes of toxic industrial wastes, a large share of which are hauled to solid waste dumps. Two-thirds of water sources do not meet standards, and there is dangerous pollution of groundwater. There is no high quality treatment of drinking water in 600 cities. Only a small share of output is produced by low waste technologies. Millions of hectares of fertile land are taken out of agricultural use because of mining, erosion, flooding, salination and desertification. Some food products are dangerous because they are saturated with pesticides, nitrates, hormones and radionuclides. The illness rate is increasing.

[Yu. Yushkin] Mikhail Yakovlevich! At present there are bitter disputes about the role of nuclear energy in our society. You are the president of the Soviet Anti-Nuclear Society. What does the "peaceful atom" have to offer us?"

[M. Lemeshev] The development of nuclear energy is the road to ruin. The public, scientists and governments of foreign countries have fully recognized this, and it has been reflected in the sharp reduction or complete halt in the construction of nuclear power plants. In the past 15 years in the United States 108 nuclear power plants have been closed. Since 1976 there has not been a single order for a nuclear power plant in that country. In Sweden in 1980 there was a general referendum in favor of halting the construction of nuclear power plants. The last of the 12 plants now operating are to be shut down by the year 2010. The only nuclear power plant in Austria, which was completed in 1985, has not yet started operating. The governments of Italy, Great Britain, Mexico and Brazil have decided to stop the construction of nuclear power plants. In the 1960's, on the average, every year work began on about 40 power reactors; in the 1970's it was 24; in the beginning of the 1980's, 15 reactors; and in 1988 there were only 2 orders for new nuclear power plants: one each in France and Japan.

The Chernobyl tragedy, costing many human lives, the health of thousands and causing innumerable damage to the country's economy, is the apogee of danger in nuclear power engineering. Initially this damage was officially estimated at 8 billion rubles. However, this estimate was based upon a radiation damage zone with a radius of only 30 kilometers. In reality, the damage covered large areas in Kiev, Zhitomir, Gomel and Bryansk oblasts, where millions of people live. Nobody can accurately predict their future health and the health of their children. In the near future it will be necessary to resettle tens of thousands of citizens living in contaminated regions. Hundreds of thousands of hectares of agricultural and forest land and watershed are out of commission practically forever.

In my estimate, the economic damage inflicted by the Chernobyl accident is at least 40 billion rubles.

According to American specialists, a large catastrophe at a nuclear power plant located in a densely populated region could kill 140,000 people and do about 150 billion dollars in damage. However, this gloomy prospect for the development of nuclear energy does not disturb our pro-nuke people.

Nuclear power plants are now being built at 30 sites in the USSR. These include nuclear heat supply stations located in direct proximity to very large cities; for example, the Gorkiy AST [Nuclear heat supply plant], located 5 kilometers from this city of one and a half million. The high authorities of the future law-governed state decided to sanctify the road our society took to the nuclear netherworld.

Obviously, the draft of the law on the use of nuclear energy was prepared for these purposes. This draft was compiled from a narrowly departmental, technocratic perspective and is a vivid expression of the cost driven approach which still reigns in our economy. The draft completely ignores the opinion of broad circles of Soviet society and world wide tendencies in the development, or more accurately, the curtailment of nuclear power. A vivid example of the lack of objectivity in the situation is shown by the first lines of the draft, which assert that nuclear power is one of the most efficient energy sources for society.

In reality, the cost of electrical energy generated at nuclear power plants is 2-3 times higher than that of thermal power plants and 4-5 times higher than that of hydroelectric power plants. Each nuclear power plant costs from 2 to 6 billion rubles and takes 12-13 years to build, consuming huge amounts of energy in the process. Its service life will not exceed 30 years.

[Yu. Yushkin] Is there an alternative to more nuclear power? After all, the demand for energy is increasing. How can it be met?

[M. Lemeshev] First of all it should be understood that this demand is false. Its increase is due to the increase in unnecessary and extremely energy intensive industry, for example, the construction of gigantic canals destroying our land, plants for poisonous chemicals and artificial feed protein and vitamin concentrates, the extraction and processing of uranium ore, the construction and operation of nuclear power plants and the production of unneeded equipment, such as heavy tractors. A halt to such senseless work will cut energy demand in half.

As far as alternatives are concerned, take a look at the nearest one. In 1988 nuclear power plants generated 216 billion kilowatt hours of electrical energy. Is this too much or not enough? This is equivalent to 65 million tons of standard fuel, or a little more than 2 percent of the USSR fuel and energy balance.

For comparison, it can be pointed out that in 1988 natural gas exports exceeded 88 billion cubic meters, equal to 106 million tons of standard fuel. In the same year the Soviet Union exported 144 billion tons of crude

oil and 61 million tons of light petroleum products, equal to 300 million tons of standard fuel. So, sales of oil and natural gas, the most valuable, ecologically clean and safe energy resources, were more than 6 times greater than the energy output of nuclear power plants. It should be added that these nonrenewable resources were sold literally at throwaway prices, as demand for them has declined sharply due to the transition of Western countries to energy saving technologies.

Obviously, even a partial reduction in the squandering of our unique energy resources could more than compensate for energy from nuclear power plants obtained at the cost of deadly danger to millions of our fellow citizens. There are other alternative sources of energy—the construction of small hydroelectric plants without dams, solar and wind energy facilities, installations working on biomass and wastes from livestock farms, geothermal sources, tidal energy. All these directions in power engineering are rapidly gaining priority in the developed countries, while here they are consciously delayed by the advocates of more nuclear power plants.

[Yu. Yushkin] Mikhail Yakovlevich, you are a candidate for RSFSR people's deputy. Can you say something about your program?

[M. Lemeshev] Russia is threatened with deadly danger. The economic, social and ecological crisis is growing rapidly. The country's government does not have a realistic strategy for improving the economy, saving nature and improving the welfare of working people. Some politicians are giving people the false idea that the country's economy can be improved only by including it in the world economy. However, Russia is too large for the West to swallow whole. Therefore, under the ridiculous pretext of cost accounting, they are attempting to dismember the country into isolated republics and the RSFSR into cities, regions, open rayons and free zones. These fragmented parts of a single Russia are promised a sweet life with the help of foreign capital.

This is a fraud! The replacement of our departmental monopolies and criminal wheeler-dealers with foreign masters will not feed the people but will turn us into slaves! It is naive to think that capitalist bigwigs such as Hammer are really concerned about the welfare of the Soviet people. They are attracted by our natural resources and cheap labor power as a source of superprofits.

The renaissance of Russia as a great power requires the following.

In politics:

Full sovereignty for Soviet Russia as an independent state in the USSR, its political and economic independence from union organs of management;

Full power to the soviets of people's deputies as the political basis for the republic. All social and economic structures to operate according to laws approved by the soviets;

Sovereignty and economic independence for autonomous republics, oblasts, national okrugs in the Russian Federation. The development of national languages, native cultures and their traditional way of life for all peoples in Russia;

Participation of the Russian state in the reconstruction of cathedrals, monasteries and religious relics, and their transfer to churches;

Independent Russian mass media: Television, radio, newspapers, magazines and publishing houses.

In economics:

Transfer all natural resources to the ownership of the soviets of Russia: land, surface and ground water, minerals, the animal and plant kingdoms; stop the criminal sales of natural wealth abroad;

The inter-republic exchange of products based upon world market prices;

Grant land, free of charge, to all citizens of Russia who want to work it;

Halt the budget financing of work and projects destroying Russia's nature and economy;

Free all citizens from taxes on wages. Taxes should be only on additional income, in accordance with the declaration of income.

In ecology:

Develop a republic program for restoring fertile land, saving small and large rivers and lakes, halting the destructive cutting of forests and improving the environment in cities;

Prohibit the construction of nuclear power plants, destructive canals, dams and reservoirs and harmful chemical industries;

Halt the production and agricultural use of pesticides and other poisonous chemicals;

Supply pregnant women, nursing mothers and children with ecologically pure products;

The open public sale of low cost equipment for monitoring radiation and measuring the quality of food, water and air.

In national-territorial electoral district No 11:

Halt the construction of the Northern TETs, threatening the ecology of Moscow and the area north of Moscow;

Prevent the construction of a facility for the mass (165,000 tons annually) incineration and burial of highly toxic wastes near Zagorsk;

Close the Radon enterprise and other ecologically dangerous industries;

Forbid the cutting of forests in the forest park shelter belt north of Moscow;

Set up local committees for ecological self-management in all cities and settlements in the district.

[Yu. Yushkin] A final question. Mikhail Yakovlevich, now, as in the prerevolutionary years, is a time of meetings. For example, on Sunday, 18 February, at noon in Ostankin there will be an approved meeting of the United Workers Front and the public-patriotic movement of Russia. What is your opinion about this?

[M. Lemeshev] I think that such meetings are very important right now. They help consolidate the true patriots of the Fatherland and resist the capture of power by extremist forces, who disguise themselves as leftists, but are really rightist reactionaries. It seems to me that everyone to whom the fate of Russia is dear should participate in the meeting at the television tower.

The participants donated honoraria for this discussion to the Fund for the Restoration of the Cathedral of Christ the Savior.

Public Ecological Coordinating Council Formed in Moscow

90US0709B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 8 Feb 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "New Public Organization Appears in the Capital"]

[Text] The primary task of the Ecological Coordinating Council—"EKOS"—is the application of the scientific and creative potential of scientists, specialists, and cultural leaders to increase the level of ecological culture of Moscow residents, and the formulation of their active civil position. The Council will conduct propaganda on ecological knowledge, provide practical assistance to enterprises and institutions, and aid in establishing business contacts between Soviet and foreign ecology organizations.

Wave of Radioactive Source Mishandling Incidents in Ashkhabad

90US0709A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 27 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA correspondent K. Mirakova: "Around Accidents. Radiation Safety: Is It Really Safe Today?"]

[Text] Last year in Ashkhabad there were 26 radiation-related accidents. However, the chief physician of the city

sanitary-epidemiological station, I. A. Orazov, is calm. He assures us that the radiation situation in the country is all right.

However, for the present day, 14 organizations in Ashkhabad require extraordinary attention, since the loss of radioisotope instruments has been discovered there, and this is included in the notion of a radiation accident.

This topic was acutely and heatedly discussed at the meeting of the republic's Committee for People's Control held on 13 February. Moreover, the question was raised of identifying the organizations who are at fault, who have discarded radioisotope instruments and sources of ionizing radiation beyond the boundaries of their territories. These were discovered by Krasnokholmsk party ecology detachment No 1, which had come from Tashkent in October of last year.

The radiation situations which were discussed were the manifestation of more than just a casual, ignorant and irresponsible attitude toward questions of radiation safety on the part of the enterprise administrations and the Ashkhabad city and republic sanitary-epidemiological stations, as well as the Ashkhabad gorispolkom UVD [Internal Affairs Administration].

Engineer-Physicist V. A. Paramonova of the Ashkhabad city SES [sanitary-epidemiological station], at whose request the meeting was held, believes that the reason for the serious omissions in the work of the radiological services may be found in the approach to radiation-hygienic problems which has been formulated in the republic, the organization of work in radiology groups, and the attitude toward the cadres.

The Committee for People's Control gave a synonymous evaluation of the work of the city and republic SES and their leaders. I. A. Orazov was issued a strict reprimand, and B. Charyyev received a reprimanded.

Will this help matters? Judging by the complacent attitude toward the radiation situation in the republic SES, the city health department, and the departments of the Turkmen SSR Minzdrav [Ministry of Health], there is no reason to hope for any changes soon.

Why? Because even now there is a veil of secrecy over the work of the city's radiological groups. Journalists are presented with facts which depict the state of affairs only in rosy tones. In order to ensure that the "sensational" (read—alarming) information does not leak out, very strict subordination has been established within the group. Literally every step must be coordinated with the management. Any living thought, any desire to fulfill the prerequisites in other than an unthinking manner, to analyze and seek out the reasons for the radiation leaks, is categorically prohibited.

Today, we believe, in the heat of departmental ambitions multiplied by the elements of incompetency, many have forgotten the danger of experiencing a mini-Chernobyl in Ashkhabad.

The problem of radiation safety and effectiveness of application of sources of ionizing radiation (SIR) and radioisotope instruments (RII) has been raised by people's control because it is already apparent, while its resolution in the sanitary-epidemiological stations, the internal affairs administration and the organizations has followed an incorrect path.

Yet the signals that such a problem had arisen in the republic were not isolated incidents.

In 1976 at the airport, children discovered abandoned lead containers in which there were ampules with liquid radionuclides. They had been intended for the Turkmen Scientific-Research Institute of Oncology. The children broke the ampules, but fortunately suffered no ill effects from them.

In 1982 the uncontrolled find of a radiation pack on the territory of the TNII [Turkmen Scientific-Research Institute of Oncology] led to an incident in which one of the institute patients removed a motor from it and some other "warm object", which he threw in the bushes. Then a young man who had come here to visit a relative picked up this same object. However, he did not hold on to it for long—it burned his fingers. This young fellow suffered radiation burns on both hands, which subsequently had to be amputated. An echo of this same accident was the case of the doctor-oncologist who had the fingers of his right hand amputated last summer.

What conclusions were drawn after these extraordinary occurrences? None. Therefore, another radiation incident occurred in February of 1989 at the TNII Oncology. A worker threw into the trash a container with 238 vials containing residue of liquid radionuclides. This led to exceeding the natural background by... 10,000 times. All the vials were discarded without preliminary dosimetric measurement or adherence to the required standing time in the sediment tank to ensure loss of activity. Further investigation of the institute showed 6 more violations, which proved the casual attitude on the part TNII Oncology administration toward the accounting, transport, and transfer of ionizing radiation sources and radioisotope instruments to other organizations.

The need had arisen for conducting sanitary-enlightenment work with the managers of enterprises and militia workers on questions of radiation safety. The most convenient form for this would have been the seminar-conference, which is what V. A. Paramonova proposed. However, it never came to pass.

Yet violations were being uncovered as before. Abandoned radioisotope instruments were found at the city dump, while at an unused storehouse of the Deserts Institute, the loss of 256 radioisotope smoke detectors was discovered.

What is the reason for these accidents? We believe it is the formulation of the question of radiation safety in the organizations and in their controlling organs—the SES

and UVD. The chain of their interconnections has been broken, beginning with the moment of preventative sanitary supervision.

For a number of years, the managers of the Ashgor SES radiological group N. Kurbanov and I. Redzhepov totally ignored the question of keeping an accounting of radioisotope instruments, and therefore in their routine work they did not utilize information on the delivery of these instruments to Ashkhabad enterprises from the departments of the all-union association "Isotop".

A formal approach is observed also in formulating request orders. In 1984, S. M. Karayeva, who was at that time the chief physician of the city SES, submitted a request order to receive 5 gamma-detectors for the PMK-1 "Utkrmengazprom", without evaluating the possibility of placing them in special storage facilities. For its part, the UVD, blindly trusting the signature of the city's chief physician, also signed the document without verifying the true state of affairs at the special storage facilities, their equipment, and the working order of their signalling mechanisms.

As it turned out, there were no free storage tanks available. As a result, two radioisotope instruments were stored at the general warehouse, while the rest were handed over to another organization, and the SES was not informed. This is how the uncontrolled migration of radioisotope instruments is being practiced.

The SES and UVD, already at the stage of preventative supervision, are laying the groundwork for a possible emergency situation. This facilitates and causes a formal approach to the implementation of current sanitary supervision in the future. Once organizations have received radioisotope instruments and sources of ionizing radiation, they do not independently initiate accounting and do not file a report when this equipment is written off.

Judging by the documents approved L. N. Saytakova, the chief of the radiology department at the republic sanitary-epidemiological station, she was aware of the violations which have now been uncovered by people's control in Ashkhabad. However, Lyudmila Nikolayevna believes, since "there is no AES or institutions producing radioactive isotopes under the supervision of the radiation service, the city sanitary-epidemiological station ensures complete control over the facilities". Perhaps this sense of calm is the basis for I. A. Orazova's complacency?

Today we face the problem of tracking down the radioisotope smoke detectors which were lost as a result of lack of accounting. And although this extraordinary occurrence threatens to turn into an emergency with serious consequences, L. N. Saytakova is not worried about the lack of accountability. Otherwise, how can we interpret the fact that the question of mandatory accounting of radioisotope smoke detectors was at her insistence removed from discussion by the people's control?

Who, then, will ensure our radiation safety, and how?

Astrakhan Gas Complex Not Meeting Promised Ecological Standards

90US0705A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 10, 10 Mar 90 p 5

[Article by Valeriy Kiselev: "A Special Zone"]

[Text] It was a sunny day. The clear turquoise sky covered the immense Volga steppes like a dome. One almost did not feel the wind and the trail of white smoke extended from horizon to horizon. When we drove up to the region of this trail, the sharp smell of gas burst into the vehicle. If you had suddenly detected such a smell in the kitchen, you would immediately try to air out the premises—here, it is only possible to fling open a window into space. This is a zone for the special monitoring of the Astrakhan Gas Complex....

The Triumph's Price

Everyone remembers the triumphal television report on the opening of the Astrakhan Gas Complex when it was declared to the entire country that "this is an ecologically clean installation" that the complex's equipment was the most modern from abroad and that the technologies were the most advanced....

N. Toropitsina, the co-chairman of the committee to save the Volga, says:

[Toropitsina] In due course, it caused us to prick up our ears: why was an "ecologically clean installation" suddenly promised us—but, after all, optimism is in our blood.... We allowed ourselves to be lulled by the sweet ministry tales. And this with our sad experience in "great construction projects" and notorious native "maybes"! You see, they delicately passed over in silence such "trifles" as the fact that the complex was put into operation six months ahead of time and that the number of incompleting items, among which were a majority of the items to protect the environment, approached a thousand. Because of the unfinished work, equipment defects and the unreliability of the electric power supply, 137 stoppages of technical assemblies and lines occurred during 1988 alone and the plant was completely shut down 21 times—this is not an impression but was written in the conclusion of the RSFSR State Committee for the Protection of Nature's state commission of experts which submitted a negative verdict for the design of the second phase of the Astrakhan Gas Complex.

On whose account should this sad chronicle be entered?

On 27 February 1987, five cases of child poisoning and 15 cases of poisoning among the adult population were registered. On 1 March 1987, a discharge of gas and condensate into the atmosphere occurred, which led to the death of four people and the poisoning of six. On 19 December 1988, the concentration of hydrogen sulfide in the city of Narimanov exceeded the maximum permissible amount 55-fold during an emergency discharge. On 11 March 1989, it was registered that the maximum allowable concentration was exceeded 97-fold in the

specially monitored zone. On the night of 2-3 December of last year, a gas escape occurred because a valve in a drill broke down; the discharge exceeded the maximum permissible concentration by 162.5-fold.

Faithful to their tactic of silence, Astrakhangazprom representatives reported this accident only 17 hours later when there was a sevenfold increase in the maximum permissible concentration.

However, how did the state commission accept such a dangerous installation?

It has still not accepted it. It is as if the Astrakhan Gas Complex exists illegally. Moreover, the first phase, which has still not reached its design capacity, has been undergoing repairs for more than six months. Meanwhile, the construction of the second phase is being speeded up.

The designers are heaping the blame on the builders and these are blaming the corrosive gas which contains hydrogen sulfide. The complex directors blame... glasnost which has permitted the "hullabaloo to be blown about." According to their logic, they should eliminate it silently but the press is sounding the alarm and meetings are being held....

In June, Yu. Paraskun, the oblast procurator, issued instructions on completely halting the Astrankhanskiy gas refinery. Would you say that the law had prevailed? However, a protest followed from V. Chernomyrdik, the minister of the gas industry, he said that it was impossible to halt the operations of the complex. There were many reasons but the chief one being that the country needed sulfur. Meanwhile, a telegram flew from the RSFSR procurator's office to the oblast procurator's office: "Recall your instructions about halting operations. Report your implementation." No law can withstand departmental logic.

The Astrakhan committee to save the Volga along with the Saratov and Volgograd committees decided to send a request to the USSR Supreme Soviet about officially recognizing the status of the lower Volga as a "zone of ecological distress." Chernobyl's consequences stick like a lump in the throat. People are afraid that "sulphurbyl [Sernobyl] will come next.

... The village of Seytovka was not lucky. It was not lucky because it was in the eight-kilometer special monitoring zone. It was also not lucky because of the wind-rose. The wind most often comes from the combine and then, even the tightly closed windows in the houses cannot save the people from its poisonous breath.

I met a group of inhabitants on the street. To the customary question: "Well, how are you today?"—they replied:

"There was a discharge of gas last night. When we woke up this morning, it was impossible to go outside. The entire brigade had to go to the polyclinic."

"Nausea, coughs, dizziness—in brief, not in condition to work."

"I never had high blood pressure in my life but today it is 200. I walk just like a drunk."

"They are probably lying to us that the combine is only operating at 30 percent. Most likely, it operates at 100 percent during the night! And they then report over the radio that the maximum permissible concentration is normal!"

They told me in the Seytovka polyclinic that 40 people, 16 of them were children, had come to it today. Two children and two adults were in serious condition: an acute aggravation of an asthmatic allergy and a heart problem. They put a pregnant woman into the oblast hospital. The diagnosis for all who came to them was gas poisoning....

Close or Build Up?

From a discussion with V. Shchugorev, the general director of the Astrakhangazprom Production Association, and Ye. Antonov, his deputy for major construction.

[Kiselev] The public demands that the complex be halted or the second phase be frozen. What do you think of this?

[Ye. Antonov] This is unrealistic. To the contrary, it is necessary to accelerate the second phase's construction and to subject the first phase to a radical reconstruction in order to eliminate all the mistakes. Moreover, we have spent almost four billion rubles on the complex and on housing construction. You have only to just mention the closing of the complex and all our personnel will run off....

[V. Shchugorev] The Astrakhan Gas Complex includes more than a thousand production installations: drilling, extraction, transport, production, and refining. According to the draft there are six billion cubic meters of gas, two million tons of sulfur and two million tons of gasoline, diesel fuel and black oil.

The output of the Astrakhan Gas Condensate deposit appears, on the one hand, to be golden and, on the other hand, very dangerous because two acids—sulfuric and carbonic—are present in the gas. The quality of the materials and equipment is important here. But it is not always dependable.

Interruptions in the supply of electricity have inflicted a great deal of harm upon us. According to the French standard, the factory should stop operations for preventive maintenance once every four years but we have had occasions where the stoppages have been three-four times a day.

The design and technical capabilities provide for the discharge of approximately 104,000 tons of various compounds a year into the atmosphere—there does not now exist any more advanced technologies in the world.

However, there have been cases where the maximum permissible concentration has been exceeded fivefold or more for various reasons. I personally think that the vicinity of this complex would be unnatural for people and housing even if it operated perfectly. The difference between the maximum permissible concentration for production and for the population is a thousandfold; we accept only healthy people for work—however, there are old people and children in the combine's area.

The Yuzhniyprogaz Institute recommended the construction of a plant 20 kilometers further into the steppes. However, the oblast directors' point of view won out. You see, this represented for them a chance to reconstruct the entire dilapidated housing fund in Astrakhan at the expense of the Astrakhan Gas Combine. Astrakhan did not suffer but the situation of the 14,000 inhabitants in the special zone was an unenviable one.

[Kiselev] Is it possible to correct matters somehow?

During January of this year, the USSR Council of Ministers Presidium examined the question: "Concerning the Development of the Astrakhan Gas Complex and Measures To Insure the Ecological Safety of Its Operation."

Apart from purely technical measures, the Astrakhan oblast and gas concern was charged with performing work during the first quarter to resettle the nearby villages. We will transfer the villages to a safe place; the inhabitants themselves will select the site.

A Gas Mask Near a Child's Bed

... When I knocked on the door of a small village house, a child in a ... gas mask... came to meet me. I thought to myself: "Are the children here playing some kind of chemical game?" However, everything turned out to be more serious.

In Garif Aynaliyev's family, six-year-old Artur endures the combine's "gas attacks" with much more difficulty than the others. During a night when a discharge has occurred and the child does not feel quite well, his mother puts a gas mask on him and he walks around in it until the wind changes.

Garif says: "When the Astrakhan Gas Combine was built, someone received a bonus, thanks and a promotion. What did we, the local people, receive? What awaits us and what will happen to our descendants? My father died at 49 and my mother at 52. My cousins—at 48 and 49. My relatives and friends did not reach retirement age. They have discovered that my son has a heart problem and my wife is often sick. What will happen to us?..."

From an interview with I. Dyakov, first secretary of the Astrakhan party obkom and member of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

[Kiselev] Ivan Nikolayevich, what is the root of this evil?

[Dyakov] The specialists have accurately defined it—it is the fluctuating power supply. It was decided to give Astrakhan power first and then our “skilled craftsmen” excluded a local power station from the design. You will not find the ends now of who is guilty. The stoppages of the complex are due to the poor supply of electricity and along with them there are additional discharges.

[Kiselev] What do you think of the demands to close the complex?

[Dyakov] We will perish without it. Almost a billion rubles from the complex’s capital investments are going to social needs: gasification and the construction of roads, schools and housing. For decades, Astrakhan has not received such development. One can make our films about Stenka Razin without scenery backdrops. A total of 700,000 square meters of housing has been built thanks to the gas workers.

Yes, the discharges are our scourge. However, it is necessary to determine economic sanctions.... And then, you will see what happens. There is an enormous filtration field around our cellulose combine—even the birds do not alight on these pools. Recently, the dam broke and 200,000 cubic meters of toxic water inundated the nearby land. People worked for several days. If it got into the Volga, everything would die. How did it all turn out? They fined four people... 100 rubles.

[Kiselev] Ivan Nikolayevich, I understand that one can call the entire lower Volga a special monitored zone now.

[Dyakov] The Volga’s lower reaches are now being threatened because 25 percent of the discharges from all enterprises, which are located throughout its basin beginning with Kalinin Oblast, are not cleaned. The entire Mendelev Table gathers here. During the summer, even crayfish crawled out onto the bank to breath—such was the water....

Another problem is how to place the Volga Hydroelectric Power Station under the command of the natural water discharge. During recent years, the power engineers have continuously increased generation during the winter, the discharge of water increases and decreases during the spring. This is a blow against “fishing resources.” It has been calculated that we lose 260 million rubles annually to this.

They are removing the water bit by bit. They closed the Volga-Chogray Canal but they are building the Volgo-Don 2. Is it needed? There are no conclusions. Meanwhile, it will carry away six cubic kilometers of water. Specialists have estimated that we will lose 2,000 tons of sturgeon and 18,000 tons of netted fish. Is this reasonable? We like to receive an extra bag of grain but we are losing a quintal of very valuable fish. Yes, the desert is

catastrophically advancing on our steppes—with a speed of five hectares an hour. Let us think about what our “experiments” will come to.

A decree on ecologically improving the Volga and Caspian Sea basin has been in the USSR Council of Ministers since June of last year. It defines measures for putting into order and constructing new purification works at each enterprise in the Volga-Caspian basin. Hundredfold fines for inflicting ecological damage are being proposed. This is the first fitting decree to save the Volga and the Caspian. It is necessary to adopt it! You see, it has lain for seven months—this delay is inexcusable in such an acute situation.

[Kiselev] ... A gathering, rather more appropriately a meeting, occurred in one of the kolkhoz brigades. The party committee secretary, central dispatch chief and deputy chief engineer of the plant came. Reduced to dire straits, the people showed that it was impossible to live there any more. The representatives from the complex tried to calm them: They said that the maximum permissible concentration was exceeded only 1.5-fold. However, the monitoring laboratory is located on the complex itself and it is impossible to recheck the data.

When I flew from Astrakhan, they broadcast over the local radio that there was another discharge at the complex and that the maximum permissible concentration had been exceeded 5.5-fold in the settlement of Komsomolskiy. This means that the wind had changed and that the young lad, Artur, could remove his gas mask.

However, who would put it on in Komsomolskiy? ...

Goskompriroda Chairman Vorontsov’s Effectiveness Evaluated

*90US0705B Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA
in Russian No 10, 10 Mar 90 p 5*

[Article by B. Yunanov: “A Scientist in the Office of the Ministers”]

[Text] “According to my views, I am a convinced ‘imperialist’”, he declared to all listening. In the hall, they began to smile perplexedly.

“Yes, I really think that the only empire on earth is the biosphere and it should last for centuries. The main question is: In what condition...?”

A foreign colleague, who was sitting next to me, hurled at his neighbor: “A new man.” Nikolay Vorontsov, the new chairman of the USSR State Committee for Protection of the Environment, was holding a press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center. The foreigners were filled with curiosity. The Soviet ones, you can imagine, were also. For example, I could not understand for a long time why this individual, despite the traditional dark suit, white shirt and tie in severe tones and with a retinue to the left

and right that is indispensable during public presentations, nevertheless did not in any way personify the typical model of an apparatchik who is gradually and purposefully rising to the head chair. Suddenly, it dawned on me: It was his Russian language. Fluent, picturesque, and absolutely grammatically correct. Second, there was his mastery of the ability to "reveal himself to the people" instead of limiting himself to the stereotype cannons of nomenclature etiquette.

Nikolay Vorontsov is a scientist and he has a different biography. In science, there is a particular speciality. He is a zoologist and a geneticist—do you understand? When you begin a life in science with the struggle for your right to work, you do not worry about official etiquette. The independence of scientific thinking was logically transformed into independence in his public position.

A WASHINGTON POST correspondent asked the first non-party union minister in the history of the Soviet state: "Are you not lonely in the government? Do you plan on joining the Communist Party?" Evidently, not having thought about whether "you sympathize with the ideals expressed in the 'Manifesto of the Communist Party' by the classic Marxist writers and whether you share them"—the question is an unprincipled one. It is "one of principles" if you are chairman of the Supreme Court or General Procurator: Then, it is necessary to leave any party in the name of 100-percent impartiality. Being a people's deputy, Vorontsov did not conceal his position from others.

There is another "Vorontsov effect"—he, you can check it, is well oriented on the problems connected with his new position. And this is not at all a euphemism. As P. Shelest recalled about himself, one can demand a "minimum of three years" to "delve into the affair" but during this "minimum" the affair radically changes....

Nikolay Vorontsov left his academic office quietly in order to engage in general compulsory ecological education:

"It will not disturb my minister colleagues, I am convinced of this."

The "polluting" branches will not surrender. What will he reply to them—slogans? Did you see how many of them there were on ecology during the 7 November demonstration? TIME magazine, for example, noted it.

Other ministers tried to find out from Vorontsov: "Your work?" He replied "My!" as a joke and seriously.... You see, it is necessary to begin with something.

Commission Official on Implementing Ecological Urgent Measures Legislation

90US0707B Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY
VESTNIK in Russian No 10, Mar 90 p 3

[Article by A. Tsygankov, deputy chairman, USSR Council of Ministers' State Commission on Extraordinary Situations: "What Will We Leave to Our Grandchildren and Great-Grandchildren?"]

[Text] The government has embarked upon the realization of the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution, "On Immediate Measures for Ecological Revitalization of the Country". A. TSYGANKOV, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission on Extraordinary Situations, tells about the first steps taken in this direction.

The USSR Supreme Soviet proposes that in a year or two we achieve a significant breakthrough in environmental protection, not only by curbing the growth of negative phenomena, but also by stopping this process and turning it around. The most serious tasks in this resolution are directly addressed to the USSR Council of Ministers which, in turn, has worked out a set of measures or, if you will, a plan-timetable for the realization of specific measures in the entire system of state management. Finally, after sharp discussions, this was included in the appropriate resolution. We might add that much of what is embodied in it had already begun to be implemented much earlier.

The draft of a long-term state program on environmental protection and rational application of the country's natural resources for the 13th Five-Year Plan and for the period to the year 2005, prepared by the union Goskompriroda [State Committee for the Protection of Nature], GKNT [USSR Council of Ministers State Committee on Science and Technology], Gosplan, Goskomgidromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology] and the Academy of Sciences, has already been submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers. This draft must be developed as soon as possible, bringing it up to the level of a principle state document draft, and introduced to the "people's court", so that the opinion of the population may be taken into consideration during debates in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The program is a strategic document, while the tactics of achieving the goals must be determined by the regional, republic, oblast, kray, city and rayon programs. The governments of the union republics and the ispolkoms of the renewed local Soviets of People's Deputies must take the management of these tactics into their own hands.

And so, let us assume, the program is adopted. How can we make it effective? How can we achieve a real breakthrough? We often have occasion to hear—increase the allocations sharply, say, to 25 billion rubles a year, and we may consider the matter resolved. Today we have exceeded the limits of 11 billion rubles a year. However, the experience of the USA, for example, shows that money even in the cherished convertible currency and in huge amounts is far from everything. Often in the course

of business meetings American specialists have warned in a friendly manner: We should not strive toward allocation of gigantic sums. Rather, we should deal more thoroughly with the ecological aspects of development of the industrial, communal and agricultural complexes. Expenditures may be significantly reduced if, for example, at the enterprise level we engage not only in the elimination of pollution at the final stage, when the mixture of substances is already difficult to purify and render harmless, but rather if we proceed along the entire chain—from the raw material to the end product, even to products which have become outdated, if we implement all measures to process waste or, in general, if we opt for a principally different, waste-free, type of production.

The resolution takes into consideration the sad fact that there are two regions in our country—Chernobyl and the Aral region, which we can assuredly call ecological disaster zones, although there is as yet no such legal definition of such territories, while [the definition] proposed by the draft of the USSR Law on Environmental Protection is incomplete.

A governmental commission under the chairmanship of USSR Council of Ministers Deputy Chairman V. Doguzhiyev has been formed to develop measures on restoring the ecological balance in the Aral Sea region and to control their implementation.

In essence, for the first time a special organ has been created for managing the unique process of restoring the disrupted ecological balance, an organ which has no analogs either in this country or abroad. It must find as quickly as possible the means of preventing one of the greatest ecological catastrophes on the planet—the disappearance of the Aral Sea. An analysis of the fulfillment of decisions on this region which were previously adopted showed that far from all the managers of mid-level and highest rank fully realize the consequences which this crisis entails. In Central Asia, many believe that the drying up of the Aral Sea will not affect them. This is a deep misconception. A common misfortune has come (or more precisely, we ourselves have created it), and the water for this sea must be found. Otherwise, great expanses where life goes on fervently today will turn into a barren desert.

The 4 years which have passed since the tragic days of April 1986, when a powerful explosion destroyed the roof of the Chernobyl reactor, showed that the consequences of the accident continue to affect the population of various regions of the RSFSR, the Ukraine and Belorussia. Based on the accumulated experience, a project for a unified union program is being created, which will make it possible to most prudently and correctly utilize all the available means. Specific measures will be announced at the spring session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

At the same time, this year we will conduct an ecological expert investigation of the projects of atomic and

thermal power stations and transport installations currently under construction, including military ones. The task of this expert investigation is to identify and eliminate any, even the slightest, "crack", through which the terrible nuclear genie may break free. At operating AES [atomic power stations], a set of measures is already being implemented to increase the safety of the reactors. We must formulate the state energy program in an entirely different manner, placing energy conservation at the cornerstone of the problem.

However, discontinuing the manufacture of certain types of products may lead to unexpected social upheavals. An acute discussion continues to this day regarding the production of protein vitamin concentrates (BVK) from petroleum paraffins. Meetings have been held in cities where the manufacturing plants are located, as for example in Kirishy. Public influence has born fruit—at all 8 of the plants, the emissions into the atmosphere have been reduced to a minimum with which the sanitary services cannot find fault. However, there are demands to reject BVK's in livestock raising altogether. Yet the closure of the plants will lead not only to economic losses. We must think also about the fate of the 15,000 workers of these enterprises, for whom we will have to find jobs. Therefore, the decision was made to conduct an additional state ecological expert investigation of BVK production prior to August 1990, and to prepare proposals concerning the development of ecologically clean types of production based on traditional types of raw materials and re-profiling the plants on the basis of these new types.

This year, the first State Program on Forest Restoration in the history of our country will be developed. Much will depend on its realization—specifically, what kind of land our grandchildren and great-grandchildren will inherit.

Those peoples whose traditional lifestyle has for many generations been associated with the forest value this resource most of all. The RSFSR Council of Ministers (and on the republic's territory is where such peoples live primarily—the Orochi, Udegey, Evenki, and Nanay) has received a recommendation to establish the boundaries of forest plantings this year, so that thoughtless management intervention does not lead to new conflicts.

Next will be a series of drafts of USSR Laws on environmental protection (already submitted to the USSR Council of Ministers), on the protection and rational application of the plant world, on specially protected natural territories, and on the application of atomic energy and nuclear safety, as well as statutes on resorts. There is also a proposal to create a draft law on utilization of waste.

In the first half of this year, proposals will be prepared on increasing responsibility for violation of environmental protection legislation, as well as for the intentional concealment and distortion of information on accidents having ecological consequences.

Work is planned on creating a new economic mechanism of nature utilization, and in almost 50 regions an experiment has begun on working out a method of extracting payment for environmental emissions. PRAVITEL-STVENNIYY VESTNIK has already reported briefly on this (No 8, 1990).

In this same year, if the union Goskompriroda, Goskompechat, Gossnab, Mosgorispolkom and other departments exhibit proper activity, the readers will for the first time be able to hold in their hands a weekly ecological report. I believe there is no need to explain the role and significance of this.

Higher courses in ecology will be created to prepare highly trained specialists. In all probability, these will operate in the capital and have branches in other regions of the country.

The Soviet Union is actively participating in international cooperation on environmental protection. Recently, agreements have been signed with Australia and Switzerland, there are plans to join the International Convention for the Control of Transport of Toxic Wastes, and measures are being prepared within the framework of the 10th anniversary of combatting natural disasters announced by the UN. The authority of our state largely depends on order in our own house, and on a precise fulfillment of all the points of these measures.

Local Authorities Oppose Moscow's Amur River Dam Project

90US0707A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 15 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by N. Belyy, *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent: "The Amur's Tears"]

[Text] Why is the fate of our great Asian river being decided quietly, without a broad public investigation?

They have been unable to turn the northern rivers. It doesn't matter. There is still the possibility of drowning billions in the east. The father-Amur has found itself the target of the next project of the century.

Let me explain from the beginning. The idea of blocking the Amur with a high dam was not born today. This joint Sino-Soviet project was proposed back in the mid-50's. It is still unclear what specific benefits it promised. Yet according to the notions of its authors, the gigantic dam project would certainly strengthen the fraternal ties between the two great peoples. It was only because of the circumstances known to all that the project was put off until more favorable times. Now they have come, and evidently this has provided a reason to shake the 30-year old dust off of the old schemes.

Hailing Tsian—the "Black Dragon". That is what they call the Amur in China. The "taming of the Black Dragon"—that is what the project was called by mutual agreement. At that time, it was customary to tame

nature, and not to live in peace and harmony with it. Yet in 1957 the discussion centered around a single dam. Today, when we have supposedly begun to think seriously about ecology, a cascade of 7 hydroelectric stations is being planned. In other words, the appetites have increased to a geological project of which there is no equal in world practice. Then again, few people know anything about it. The scope of the forthcoming construction is clearly not commensurate with the level of publicity about it. Perhaps this is because it is the former Minvodkhoz which will bring the planned project to life? Its tactics are well-known: To quietly excavate a foundation pit, and then try to convince everyone that it would be a shame to lose the millions which have already been spent.

Ministry people have been visiting China for several years now and happily working in joint Soviet-Chinese commissions. A meeting of one of the latter was held last year under the chairmanship of the not unknown P. Polad-zade. An agreement has already been reached on the first priority objects—the Amazar hydroelectrical station and the Dzhalin Din counterregulator. After these, the head institute "Soyuzgiprovdokhoz" proposes to start work on the hydroelectrical stations on the Central Amur—Tolbuzinskiy, Kuznetsovskiy, and Novovoskresenovskiy...

The Amur was once a rich river. The well-known Russian researcher of the last century, Mikhail Ivanovich Venyukov, for example, described how Cossack settlers fished for food there. "They set out", he testified, "fishing tackle made of simple poles with hooks tied to them, on which they had no bait. Nevertheless, they caught fish. That is how much of it there was!" Today this is just a myth. Enterprises have poisoned and continue to poison the waters, dumping 35,000 tons of harmful substances each year. We must save the river. By some strange logic, it seems there is never enough money for purification structures or for modernization of technology. Yet they find the funds right away for all kinds of hydroelectrical stations.

Today the free Amur is already an ecological disaster zone. If dammed up, it will perish altogether. The fate of the Mother Volga awaits the Father Amur. The expansive seas, the so-called water reservoirs, will flood over the forests and pasturelands. Why, the Khingansk hydroelectrical station alone is capable of causing a catastrophe. Next to the planned site are the lands of the largest state preserve in the Far East, where unique natural ecosystems, the only one's on earth, have been preserved. Here one may still find the Amur lotus and the Japanese crane, which have been entered into the USSR Red Book [endangered species list] and the Red Book of the International Council of Environmental Protection. If a dam were to appear here, it would cover over the migration routes of the miraculously surviving Far Eastern salmon and other commercially valuable fish.

It is quite understandable that the prospect of being left on the banks of a gigantic drainage ditch, devoid of fish and deprived of the advantages of through navigation, does not suit the population of either side. In the course of my newswriting assignments, I often had occasion to visit the province of Heilungkiang which neighbors the Amur region, and I have a first-hand knowledge of the viewpoint of the local residents, as well as that of competent specialists, regarding the future of the Amur.

"The planned cascade means the destruction of the entire Amur basin," states USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member V. Moisiyenko, expressing the opinion of Soviet scientists. "We cannot allow this! Alas, neither the specialists from our AmurKNII [Amur Comprehensive Scientific-Research Institute] nor our colleagues from Khabarovsk were invited to participate in preparing the project. Moscow thinks it knows best.

The Amur oblsipolkom opposes the plan. One of the first official appeals of its new oblsipolkom chairman, A. Velonogov, was to the USSR Council of Ministers. In it, he expressed regret that the plan developments on the Amur are being conducted without the participation of local Soviets, without apprising the community of the project, and without consideration for the full complement of ecological factors. Prior to completion of the plan development and approval of the scheme for the comprehensive utilization of boundary sections of the Amur and Agrun rivers, the letter stressed, the oblsipolkom believes that any negotiations with the contiguous side on specific questions of a joint project and construction of hydro-electrical stations would be premature.

For some reason it was the USSR Minenergo [Ministry of Power and Electrification] which responded to the letter. I saw this glib text, compiled according to the well-polished principle of "running with the hare and hunting with the hounds", and I understood that there is absolutely nothing standing in the way of the proposed hydraulic project. The developments have been given the "green light". It is true that the Ministry made a verbal step toward compromise. It promised that in the future the negotiations with the Chinese side on specific questions of construction would be conducted only after coordinating the agreed-upon points with all interested organs, and that the population would be fully apprised of the course of the scheme's realization. Yet the main question, alas, remained without attention. Who really needs the project—the USSR Minvostroy or the region?

Nevertheless, it would be naive to place all the blame now on the waterway departments. In the situation with the Amur there are enough "commanders"—beginning with the highest institutions. People have often hinted to me about this circumstance, significantly raising their index finger. Once they even showed me the documents. They bore the seals of the USSR and RSFSR Councils of Ministers. I also saw their orders to the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, the RSFSR Gosplan, and the former RSFSR Ministry of Land Reclamation and

Water Resources. I saw the list of jobs performed in recent years on the Upper and Central Amur within the framework of the outlined scheme. In short, the matter has received its blessing and is moving along. Quietly, without too much noise, the ruin of the "Black Dragon" has been prepared. And it is very close now. Whether or not society will be able to save the Amur is unknown.

We admit that the problem is an extraordinary one. It goes beyond the framework of our country. There is an agreement between the USSR and CPR governments dating back to 1986 regarding the prospects of joint utilization of the water resources of the Amur and Arguka. Yet this does not mean that this agreement should be fulfilled by any means, including controversial ones capable of bringing irreparable harm instead of the promised benefit. We are speaking here about the future of a great number of people inhabiting both sides of the Amur, about a river of world renown, whose success largely determines the ecological-economic status of the Transbaykal and the entire Pacific region.

And one more thing. It is quite probable that the people who are today giving orders to the ministries and making decisions on the project voted for the draft of the CPSU Central Committee Platform. Yet it states: "The party considers it necessary to legislatively secure the order of strictest scientific expert investigation and consideration of public opinion in resolving questions associated with the location of new industries". Good words must be not only pronounced. They must be followed.

Moscow Air Pollution Statistics Broken Down by Rayon

90US0714A Moscow *VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA*
in Russian 17 Feb 90 p 2

[Article from the press service of the Moscow Committee for Environmental Protection: "What Are We Breathing?"]

[Text] On 3 February, *VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA* published on the first page material under the title "The Capital: The View From Space." It was illustrated with a photograph taken at an altitude of 660 kilometers from a satellite. Moscow was imprinted as a unique "breathing map," where the dark sections designated areas where man has had an active influence on the environment.

The space photograph made it possible to see the ecological situation in the capital as it is, in all the complicated interlacing of the problems, be they slight or simply unsolvable. The publication caused a response from the readers. The specialists from Moskomprirody [the Moscow Committee for Environmental Protection] responded as well. They prepared data which testify eloquently about the situation in Moscow's rayons. Just what is it?

The main thing which disturbs the residents of Moscow, to judge by their letters and phone calls, is the air

pollution. The total volume of discharges into the atmosphere of harmful substances, according to Moskomprody's data, amounts to around 1.2 million tons per year. Which rayons here are "in the lead?" Here is a small table which shows the pollution percentages as part of the overall volume for Moscow.

Lyublinskiy—19.1 percent, Timiryazevskiy—14.6 percent, Kuybyshevskiy—12.0 percent, Gagarinskiy—7.9 percent, Sovetskiy—7.4 percent, Proletarskiy—6.3 percent, Taganskiy—3.8 percent.

The comfort level of the condition of the surrounding environment encompasses 28 residential microrayons with an area of 4,100 hectares. These are the northern part of Khimki—Khovrino, Tushino, Strogino, Krylatskoye, Troparevo, Teply Stan, Yasenevo and some others. Around 700,000 Muscovites live here.

There are more than 8,600 hectares of residential areas in the vast area of uncomfortable living conditions, where millions of Muscovites live. This area occupies the central, eastern, southeastern and northeastern sections of the city. Within the area, on an area of 2,700 hectares, residential districts with a maximum state of environmental discomfort are clearly marked out. They are located within the limits of the Sadovyy Ring Road and within the central planning zone.

Increased atmospheric pollution manifests itself first and foremost in the increase of lung illnesses. Thus, the extent of bronchial asthma, acute bronchitis, conjunctivitis, pharyngitis, tonsillitis, and chronic otitis is 40-60 percent higher in rayons with increased air pollution. Children living in houses along the Sadovyy Ring Road (from Smolenskiy Plotschad [Smolensk Square] to Plotschad Vosstaniya [Insurrection Square]) have six times as many incidences of ear, throat and nose infections and three times as many incidences of bronchitis as children living, for example, around Filevskiy Park.

Now, with adequate certainty, it is possible to state that one-fifth of all the illnesses of Moscow's population is associated with the unsatisfactory state of the ecology.

The editorial staff has passed these data on to the Space Monitoring Department of Goskomgidromet [the State Committee for Hydrometeorology] with a request that detailed photographs be made from space of Moscow's rayons, primarily of the most unsatisfactory ones. We will publish these photographs in order, again and again, to attract the attention of all interested parties and, first and foremost, of the residents themselves. We will give space to specialists who want to express their own well-qualified opinions regarding how to improve the ecological situation in the city's rayons.

Ecological Rating of Moscow's Rayons (According to the discharges of harmful substances into the atmosphere)

Relatively Satisfactory Rayons:

1. Babushkinskiy: The portion of pollution of the city by it is 0.8 percent. The source here is the petroleum lubricants refinery, about which there have been many complaints.
2. Voroshilovskiy—2.4 percent. The maximum allowable concentrations (PDK) for nitric oxides and dust are being exceeded.
3. Dzerzhinskiy—0.5 percent.
4. Zheleznodorozhnyy—0.2 percent.
5. The city of Zelenograd—0.5 percent.
6. Kiyevskiy—1.8 percent. The PDK's for carbon monoxide and nitric oxides from the operation of enterprises and motor vehicle transportation are being exceeded.
7. Krasnopresnenskiy—1.9 percent. There is an excess of nitric oxides from motor vehicle transportation.
8. Kuntsevskiy—0.8 percent.
9. Leningradskiy—1.1 percent. There is an excess of nitric oxides from motor vehicle transportation.
10. Leninskiy—0.4 percent.
11. Moskvoretskiy—1.5 percent.
12. Oktyabrskiy—0.2 percent. The PDK's for nitric oxides are being exceeded on the primary motor vehicle highways.
13. Pervomayskiy—0.9 percent.
14. Sverdlovskiy—0.6 percent.
15. Solntsevskiy—0.3 percent.
16. Sokolnicheskiy—0.5 percent.
17. Sevastopolskiy—1.5 percent.
18. Tushinskiy—1.4 percent.
19. Frunzenskiy—0.2 percent.

Unsatisfactory Rayons:

1. Baumanskiy: The portion of pollution of the city by it is 0.3 percent. Nevertheless, the PDK's for carbon monoxide and nitric oxides are being exceeded because of motor vehicle transportation.
2. Volgogradskiy—1.1 percent. The PDK's for carbon monoxide and nitric oxides are being exceeded because of motor vehicle transportation.
3. Gagarinskiy—7.9 percent. The PDK's for nitric oxides and dust are being exceeded.

4. Kalininskiy—0.9 percent. The PDK's for carbon monoxide, nitric oxides and dust from the operation of enterprises and motor vehicle transportation are being exceeded.

5. Kirovskiy—1.6 percent. There have been a lot of complaints about the Stankolit plant [machine tool foundry], the aluminum alloys plant and Chemical Plant No 1. The PDK's for carbon monoxide, nitric oxides and dust are being exceeded.

6. Krasnogvardeyskiy—0.9 percent. There have been a lot of complaints about the oil refinery, the gas coking plant and TETs-22, which are located outside the boundaries of the rayon. The PDK's for ammonia, nitric oxides and other substances are being exceeded.

7. Kuybyshevskiy—12.0 percent. There have been a lot of complaints about the enterprises operating here. The PDK's for nitric oxides, carbon monoxide and hydrocarbons are being exceeded.

8. Lyublinskiy—19.1 percent. One of the most unsatisfactory rayons. The PDK's for nitric oxides, ammonia and dust are being sharply exceeded.

9. Perovskiy—3.2 percent. There are also a lot of complaints from this rayon.

10. Proletarskiy—6.3 percent. The PDK's for carbon monoxide, nitric oxides, hydrocarbons and dust are being exceeded.

11. Sovetskiy—7.4 percent. The PDK's for carbon monoxide and nitric oxides are being exceeded.

12. Taganskiy—3.8 percent. The PDK's for carbon monoxide, nitric oxides and dust are being exceeded.

13. Timiryazevskiy—14.8 percent. Also one of the most unsatisfactory rayons. The PDK's for carbon monoxide, nitric oxides and dust are being sharply exceeded.

14. Cheremushkinskiy—3.9 percent.

During the evaluation of the state of the ecology of one or another of the rayons, the wind rose is also taken into consideration. For example, even with a relatively small amount of discharges, one or another rayon is listed among the unsatisfactory ones because of the harmful substances transported by the wind from adjacent areas.

Environmental Pressures Cited in Pharmaceutical Shortage

90US0714B Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 10,
5-11 Mar 90 p 7

[Article by Vladislav Starchevskiy: "The Ecological Pill"]

[Text] You will hardly find anyone who likes to hurt. This pursuit is not very pleasant. And sometimes it is very difficult for us. More accurately, it is difficult to treat. Well, sometimes there is simply nothing which can cope

with a serious illness, or even a trivial headache: the shortage virus is spreading throughout our drugstores, like a flu virus at the height of an epidemic. By far, not every prescription gets filled the first time. The lines for simple mustard plasters or a potion are threatening to reach the scale of the lines for cooked meats...

The situation, there is no denying, is an emergency. Therefore, there is nothing surprising in the fact that, at the end of January, it was examined by the USSR Council of Ministers' State Commission for Emergency Situations. As is well known, this commission has jurisdiction over acute ecological matters as well. And, in the opinion of the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry, the situation was aggravated precisely by the fact that, locally, in the course of the struggle for environmental cleanliness, they actively began to close enterprises and shops which produce raw materials for the pharmaceutical industry.

As was mentioned at the meeting, the closure since 1 January, 1990, of 13 such enterprises and production lines is depriving the country's health care system of many of the most important medicinal remedies. At the same time, it is true, it was noted that the majority of these enterprises and shops have inflicted serious damage for a long time on the environment (and, consequently, on the health of the people, which their products are supposed to restore). The commission decided to adopt urgent measures for setting into motion once again the halted capacities while simultaneously implementing the necessary environmental protection measures.

In the USSR Goskomprirody [State Committee for Environmental Protection], I was shown letters sent after the commission's meeting by the first deputy minister of the medical industry, L.P. Telegin, to a number of departments, including the State Committee for Environmental Protection: "I ask that you, without delay... determine the additional measures and time frames which will ensure the immediate placement into operation..." and it continues on with a list of enterprises.

But, as it turned out, by far not all of those have been closed by the local authorities out of ecological considerations. Others are operating quite well, for example, the Khimprom [chemical industry] Production Association in the city of Krasnoperekopsk. Not put out of operation were the capacities of the Baku Iodine Plant, the Neftechala Iodo-Bromine Plant and the Sumgait Orgsintez [organic synthesis] Association, about which an official report was presented in USSR Goskomprirody by the first deputy chairman of the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers. And then there is the Kemerovo Azot [nitrogen] Association, which was supposed to be put out of operation by the USSR Council of Ministers' resolution on improving the ecological situation in the regions, which was adopted a few years ago. But it is operating even now.

The most serious conflict is associated, perhaps, with the closing of the chlorosulfonic acid production line at the

Kirovgrad Copper Smelting Combine (Sverdlovsk Oblast). More than 20,000 tons of this acid were produced here annually—a third of the union-wide production. Yet it is necessary for the production of analgin, amidopyrine, norsulfazole, sulfalene and many other mass-produced drugs. Losses of such volumes, there is no denying, are keenly felt. Why, then, did the oblast leadership and the environmental protection services stop the production line? "Local egoism," they believe in the Ministry of the Medical Industry. And the chief of the ministry's Main Production Administration, M.I. Grigoryev, declared on the pages of PRAVITEL-STVENNYY VESTNIK: "I am not convinced that this decision has removed the ecological stress, since chlorosulfonic acid amounts to only 0.25 percent of the total in the harmful discharges from the copper smelting combine."

We will not argue about the humaneness of the percentage approach to such things. Especially since it is not a matter of this quarter of a percent: the stopping of acid production in Kirovgrad is the result of a long story.

The shop we are talking about was built at the combine in 1941. Its technology, structures and equipment have become hopelessly outdated, and this is why the sensible decision was adopted at the union level: in 1988, the production of the referenced acid here was to cease. And by this time, the former USSR Ministry of Mineral Fertilizer Production was supposed to expand its production at its own chemical hydrology plant in the city of Uvarovo. Naturally, based on modern technology. And just as naturally, alas, nothing was done. The retired shop in Kirovgrad continued to operate.

The situation at the enterprise became ever more tense. The oblast authorities decided all the same to close the acid production line as of July, 1989. "It is not necessary," declared the then active USSR Ministry of Non-ferrous Metallurgy, the combine's owner. "We are carrying out renovation." And, in fact, capital repairs were made. After which, because of gross manufacturing process violations, in July of last year, there occurred here an enormous discharge of poisonous substances into the atmosphere. Acid burned more than 500 vegetable and garden plots in the district. There followed a routine decision by the oblkomprirody [oblast environmental protection committee] to stop the harmful production. Then—routine repairs. In August, there was a routine accident which discharged acid into the atmosphere. It became necessary to evacuate the workers from adjacent shops and two people were injured. And even the metallurgists flatly demanded that they be saved from such a nearby "bomb."

Further on—it was like a detective novel. The oblast committee for environmental protection put a seal on the dangerous shop and the plant management broke it. It was sealed again—it was broken again. The oblkomprirody turned to the oblast procuracy. USSR Goskomprirody turned to the union procuracy. The actions of

the local bodies of power were acknowledged as legal. As of 1 January, 1990, the production of acid was stopped.

This is how the Kirovgrad story was described to me in USSR Goskomprirody. Well, but what about the Ministry of the Medical Industry? Of course, they knew about the accidents there. But, with the active support of V.K. Gusev, a deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, they insisted on continuing production. Not taken into consideration was the actual situation, which was in danger of becoming an emergency, but rather, the written assertions of S.V. Kolpakov, the country's minister of metallurgy, that a "program of measures" had been worked out. It, supposedly, would make it possible, even in 1989, to improve the working conditions of the workers in the chlorosulfonic acid division, to restore the equipment and to reduce the discharges of harmful substances into the atmosphere to the standard level. The minister sent such a letter to the USSR Council of Ministers in September of last year. But already in this year, when the Ministry of the Medical Industry decided all the same to clarify the situation, it turned out that neither money nor metal nor equipment were given to the combine by the USSR Ministry of Metallurgy. So much for the "program of measures." And, finally, the latest news from Kirovgrad. At the end of February, on the very same day when, at a meeting in V.K. Gusev's office, as usual, disputes were going on around the Ural production, the roof collapsed in the ill-fated shop. Fortunately, there was already no one there.

So who, then, one may ask, is responsible for the fact that the medical industry was left without the needed raw materials? Those who decided not to risk people's lives any more? Or, likewise, those who did not carry out at the proper time the sensible decisions, those who gave promises backed up by nothing or those who believed these promises?

"In any case, we have found ourselves in a complicated situation," said V.A. Kirsh, chief of the USSR Ministry of the Medical Industry's Material and Technical Resources Department. "Compensating for the shortage of chlorosulfonic acid by purchasing it abroad is very difficult. And there it costs twice as much as the domestic version. For this year, we managed to conclude a contract with a Swedish firm and the Poles promised to deliver the acid. But, first, this will not make up for all the losses and, second, what is to be done for next year? In my opinion, we will not be able to expand production at the enterprise in Uvarovo sooner than in two years time... Huge problems have been created for us also by the closure in Yerevan of the USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry's Nairit [chloroprene rubber] Association, where, in particular, they produced carboxylic acids. Without them, it is impossible to manufacture analgesic drugs, vitamins and other preparations. It is true, according to the latest reports from Yerevan, they have decided there to resume the "medicinal" part of the production. We will hope..."

The struggle surrounding the closed production lines has shed light on one of the main ills of our pharmacology—the monopoly of the raw materials suppliers. In the words of V.A. Kirsh, up to 70-80 percent of the materials received by the sector are in the hands of monopolistic producers. But, with the transition to direct wholesale ties, the matter has been aggravated to the limit. Thus, while a state order is given for the production of medicines, the raw materials for them are not there.

USSR Gosplan and USSR Gossnab are occupying a strange, to put it mildly, position. The former persistently continues to plan the tasks of the medical industry in rubles, which enables the industry splendidly to deal with them and even to overfulfill—against the background of the increasing medicine shortage and the poor satisfaction of the Ministry of Health's demands for many preparations.

And with regards to Gossnab, here are two examples of its activities.

The readers, of course, will recall how much of an uproar was caused by the shutdown of the Sloka TsBK [Paper and Pulp Combine] in Yurmala. It also struck a blow to the Ministry of the Medical Industry: Sloka supplied the bundling paper from which they make the wrapping for medicines. But here the passions have abated, the TsBK has partially resumed operation and is promising to begin supplying the bundling paper. Although, instead of the former 12,500 tons, it will produce around 9,500 tons. How, then, did the country's Gossnab deal with these volumes? It allocated to the medical industry 1,000 tons, less than two-sevenths of what was needed. While the lion's share, 6,000 tons, was given... to the tobacco industry!

There is nothing to be said, it is necessary to watch over the interests of the smokers, for we have so many of them. But really, do the interests of sick people count for less? Perhaps the Ministry of Health will remind Gossnab that, not only is smoking dangerous to health, but so is the lack of medicines as well?

Again, Gossnab decided to economize in the medical industry in the distribution of orders for the delivery of soda ash, without which it is impossible to make the glass for bottles and ampoules: it included the sector's needs among the "non-priorities." I saw the desperate letter written by the directors of the various glass works to P.I. Mostovoy, the chairman of USSR Gossnab. And I am talking about, in all, a missing 5,000 tons of soda: a drop in the bucket of the national economy, but, for these plants—a substantial figure...

It is possible to go on and on, listing the ills of our pharmacology. There are also the miserly assets allotted to the sector for many years. And the backwardness of the production base, which has not been renovated for about 10 years. And, naturally, there are the problems with the raw materials. That is the way it is. However, references to the difficulty have still not put a single sick person back on his feet. We are unable to get by without a widespread state program for the "resuscitation" of the medical industry.

But why, then, of all the sector's problems, have the collisions between the ecological and the health services come to the forefront? And is it just accidental that, shortly after the revelation of these collisions, the USSR Council of Ministers included in the decree "On Urgent Measures for Normalization of the Consumer Market, Money Circulation and On Strengthening State Control Over Prices" a paragraph about the fact that the suspension or stopping of the activities of enterprises of union subordination is permissible in exceptional instances and only with the permission of the national government?

This paragraph, in fact, is removing from the environmental protection service the only effective means for influencing the heads of enterprises and departments. Indeed, more and more often, only the actual threat of closing has compelled them at least to do something to protect the environment and the people. The curtailed rights of Goskomprirody (which, by the way, is itself flatly against hasty closings) have not been currently reinforced either by adequately effective environmental protection legislation or by colossal fines for ecological crimes such as are generally accepted throughout the world. What is more, the decision adopted by the government is a direct violation straight out of two laws: the USSR Law "On the Protection of the Atmosphere" (Article 10) and the USSR Law "On the Protection and Use of Animals" (Article 34).

Of course, our economic system has turned out to be caught in an ecological vice. It is not possible to get out of it easily, in a year, in 5 years. And each production stoppage is an extreme step which should not be the result of emotions. But is it worthwhile to return to the position "either the economy—or the ecology"? If there are doubts about the objectivity of the local authorities, let independent interdepartmental commissions of experts decide the fate of the disputed enterprises.

Honestly, I, just like any one of us, want us to be delivered from the disgraceful medicine shortage and for the Ministry of the Medical Industry to have those resources and in those quantities which it needs. But the shortage of medicines tells not only about the level of the medical industry, but also about the level of the people's health. And both of them should not be in emergency situations.

Resettlement of Contaminated Belorussian Villages Delayed

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in Russian 26 Jan 90 p 2

[Article by A. Kryzhanovskiy, BELTA correspondent: "Joyless Housewarming: A Zone of Particular Attention"]

[Text] For the inhabitants of the villages of Chudyany and Malinovka, Cherikovskiy Rayon, their long-awaited "housewarming" has not been a joyful matter. Their resettlement was supposed to take place much earlier—but the level of radioactive contamination here exceeds 100 Curie units per square kilometer. However, the settlement of Mayskiy, to which they are moving, is not ready to receive people....

This story, although brief, is nonetheless dramatic. The fate of the settlement depended upon a great many persons and circumstances. Its construction sometimes slackened or even came to a standstill, and at other times began again with new force. Thus, in the spring of last year, this republic's Council of Ministers, relying on the conclusions drawn by the Belorussian SSR Ministry of Health, abrogated the decision of the Mogilev Oblispolkom concerning the resettlement of the inhabitants of Chudyany and Manilovka to the settlement of Mayskiy. The medical authorities considered it unfeasible to resettle people in places where the radiation background averages 8 Curie units per square kilometer. But...construction work continued. It was decided to carry out the resettlement of these two much-suffering villages under the banner of voluntarism, i.e., according to the inhabitants' own wishes.

Just before the New Year the representatives of Belselstroy attempted to turn the settlement over for use and occupancy, but the members of the state commission refused to sign the appropriate certificate.

"This will be a joyless housewarming," Ivan Maksimenko, director of the Znamya Sovkhoz, acknowledged to this BELTA correspondent. "The recent decision taken by the Belorussian Communist Party and this republic's Council of Ministers regarding the urgent resettlement of persons and whereby our villages were scheduled to be resettled during the first quarter of 1990 cannot be completely carried out in time. The work here will continue at the very least until June. The Belselstroy representatives are constantly pressuring the members of the reception commission and myself personally as the sovkhoz director to "sign the necessary papers." It's as if they don't see under what conditions the people would have to live. In December virtually half the sovkhoz was operational in Mayskiy—we handled the unfinished items. But we did not manage to fully correct the defects. During times of thaw the basements of the houses have to have the water pumped out of them; they are flooded, and the barns are in danger of being washed away. It's tragicomic—goats and pigs which people succeeded in bringing here have been rescued, like Uncle Mazay's

hares, by letting them climb into sleighs and carts. The wind howls in the apartments—the cracks have not been sealed, the heating lines are continually getting out of order, and the water pipeline is constantly bursting. There can be no talk here of any 'well-laid-out' housing facilities, not to mention social and cultural life, etc. The chief perpetrators of bad workmanship are Polesevodstroy and the Vitebskiy Oblselstroy."

What he said requires no commentary.

At a recent press conference dealing with the results of the Belorussian CP Central Committee's December Plenum, A.S. Kamay, secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee, remarked as follows in touching upon the post-Chernobyl problems: "We are frequently and justifiably made indignant by shortcomings. But, you know, every dereliction, figuratively speaking, has a name. Such names must be called out at the tops of our voices." Let's carry out this expressed desire. The task of monitoring the implementation of the decree passed by the Belorussian CP Central Committee and the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers with regard to eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES was assigned to the Commission which was headed up by A. Kichkaylo, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. Construction of the Mayskiy settlement is currently under the direction of V. Vetrov, deputy chairman of Belselstroy; Polesevodstroy is directed by I. Titov; and the Vitebskiy Oblselstroy is under the direction of V. Gul.

Could it be that this "zone of particular attention" has ceased to be such for them?

Chernobyl Related Problems Examined

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in Russian 6 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondents Kirill Belyaninov and Petr Polozhevets, reporting from Chernobyl, Pripyat and Slavutich: "And the Moment Will Last More Than a Century: On 26 April, 1986, the Reckoning of a New Time Began not only for Chernobyl"]

[Text] From Decree No 206 of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers of 10 June, 1986:

"3. ...for the resettlement of the rural populace evacuated from the exclusion area of the Chernobyl AES, to be implemented in 1986... the planning and construction of apartment houses... according to the appended document."

From Appended Document No 1:

"The task... on the construction and placement into service from June through September, 1986, of apartment houses... Narodichskiy Rayon, Zhitomir Oblast: the settlement of Narodichi—50 apartment houses,

Malye Kleshchi—10, Zvezdal—10, Velikiye Kleshchi—10, Golubiyevichi—10, Lyubarka—10..."

From Order No 530-r of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers of 10 September, 1986:

"I b. ...to increase up to 25 percent the wage rates (the official wage rates) for workers in rayons and at jobs with increased radioactivity."

From the appended document to Order No 530-r:

"The list of populated areas with increased radioactivity... Zhitomir Oblast, Narodichskiy Rayon, the settlement of Narodichi, Malye Kleshchi, Zvezdal, Velikiye Kleshchi, Golubiyevichi, Lyubarka..."

From Decree No 333 of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers of 30 December, 1989:

"1. To adopt the proposal... regarding the resettlement of the inhabitants..., located in the area of increased pollution..."

From Appended Document No 1 to Decree No 333:

"The task of the resettlement of the inhabitants from the populated areas...: Malye Kleshchi—168 families, Zvezdal—134 families, Velikiye Kleshchi—250."

...Around 1 million people, and 250,000 children besides, live under the influence of increased radiation in the Ukraine. In 1986, 5,800 children and 7,000 adults received thyroid radiation.

The Threshold

"I was a normal, healthy person. This is confirmed by my district doctor and the rayzdrav [rayon health department]. From 5 May through 23 July, 1987, I 'was a partisan' in Chernobyl. First Platoon, 5th Company, Military Unit... We made it to top of the heap with the assistance of the procurator. It took me a year and a half to obtain the certificate that I was there. A year and a half is what I spent to get into the expert commission where they are establishing the connection between current illnesses and the stay in the area.

"1987: August—I was in the Tashkent hospital, October—still there and December—in a sanitarium. I changed climate on the doctors' recommendation. I began living in Salekhard. 1988: May—in the hospital, June—again in the hospital, July—in the Tyumen hospital, October—in the hospital in the settlement of Kharp, in December—in a Moscow clinic. 1989: June—the Vorkuta hospital, July—again in Salekhard, September—the Tashkent hospital. I have received 1,500 injections. No one needs me. Is it worthwhile to go on living?

Vladimir Lutsenko, Tashkent.

"I do not understand the agitation," indignantly says the deputy director of the USSR Ministry of Health's Biophysics Institute, Academy of Medical Sciences Academician L. Buldakov. "Nothing terrible has happened. Without radiation in general, nothing grows and can not

grow. So I believe that the fears have been exaggerated. We did what was necessary and, perhaps, more than we could. But the fact that we kept quiet about the true dimensions of the Chernobyl accident is something not everyone needs to know about..."

Today, in the various departments and higher authorities, they are making the excuse that, immediately after the accident, so they say, they did not have all the information. But what about those reports which came to the ispolkoms? They are trying not to mention them—they have been stamped "Secret." And just what is the use of recalling that time when, even at the end of last year, Gidromet [the State Committee for Hydrometeorology] raised the cry when the staff of the central committee of the Ukrainian Komsomol printed maps of the pollution of all the rayons in its own MOLO-DEZHKA: Why are you agitating the people?

There is a secret which still needs to be unraveled: who drew a circle around the nuclear power plant with a radius of 30 kilometers and said that it is precisely here that the problem is, while, beyond this circumference, everything is peaceful. The area itself is like the leopard's hide: radioactive deposits fell like spots. The actual trail stretched for hundreds of kilometers. Zhitomir's Narodichi almost immediately went on the list of victims (another matter is the fact that no one did anything to save it). While the accidental contamination of Polesskoye was made known a year ago, Korosten learned the truth about itself just recently. And then it was quite by accident: potatoes were not accepted by the purchasing office—discovered in them were radionuclides higher than all permissible standards.

Stanislav Ivanovich Gurenko, second secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, was asked at a campaign meeting in Slavutich: what were you doing in '86 in the government commission when it committed such errors? He replied in a fit of temper: "You, indeed, were not there and do not know what was decided and how, but I know," and he suddenly added unexpectedly, "I am in favor of an inquiry being conducted into who made these erroneous decisions. All the more so since all these people are alive." Gurenko went to the Ukraine's parliament. Perhaps, in fact, he will be brave enough to head up such an inquiry?..

Yuriy Shcherbak, a writer and USSR People's Deputy, in speaking at the last session of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet, said that the 35-rem concept is criminal. Prior to the Chernobyl accident, many scientists had asserted that radiation is terrible and deadly. But, after the explosion, they began to assure everyone that, for a long time and in earnest, they have studied the effect of small doses on a person and, in general, they are all harmless. Perhaps they began to persuade us so ardently because, for the last 20 years, almost all radiation medicine, having become departmental, serving the Ministry of Medium Machine Building and defense, lost its own independence.

Forty curies—it is possible to live. Forty one—it is not. Who determined this boundary—a single unit? Does it not become Bradbury's butterfly? A man was sent into the past—to hunt a dinosaur, by accident, he strayed from the laid-out path and inadvertently crushed a butterfly. He returned to his own time and found... a completely different political system. The scientists have calculated that, in the territories where the doses amount to 40 rems, it is very likely that, from the last accident, 134 people will die, where there are 15-40 rems—740 people, where there are 5-15 rems—780 people, and where there are 3 rems—327. But they are preparing to move out, where there is a probability, only 134 people...

Who knows, perhaps, even 35 rems is quite harmless. Here is the trouble, it is hard to believe in something different: that there, where the people are being assured that they will never collect so many, it will come to pass. Ideal ones are needed for this condition really badly. And the stoves are not to be fueled with firewood and food from one's own garden is not to be eaten and water from the well is not to be drunk and only paved roads are to be traveled. But the main thing is pure produce. But there is none. Instead of produce, they are often paid money. All last winter, Zhitomir's Rudnya-Ososhnya (60 curies per square kilometer) sat on its own potatoes. The staff of the Komsomol Central Committee sent to the contaminated rayons, for New Year's, a "clean train"—160 tons of provisions. This is thus a holiday meal, but what will be put on the table on the weekdays?

'Self-Settlers'

A little old lady hurried over to our vehicle, desperately stamping oversized boots on the highway's broken asphalt, firmly pressing bulging bags to the soiled padded jacket side and not paying any attention to the KPP [traffic control station] barrier. And the emaciated senior lieutenant, who had just now fastidiously checked our pass for entry into the area, down to the last period, did not attach any special significance to such a procedural violation.

And the old woman had already settled in the back seat of the Niva, fussily pushed her numerous bags to the sides, not forgetting, however, to repeat over and over:

"We have about 7 kilometers on foot to the village and there is no transportation whatsoever..."

...They were moved out in the summer of '86. Two dozen army trucks blocked the village streets, the soldiers went from house to house, helping gather things and a major in the lead vehicle barked authoritatively through a white gauze mask: "Do not take a lot with you, only the most necessary things. All the same, in 3 days, you will return home." They did not believe this and left in the cow sheds and pigsties feed not for 3 days, but for a week, poured out piles of bones in front of the doghouses and hung stout, warehouse-type locks on the doors of the homes they left.

"For about 2 months, we drove from village to village, but we could not stop anywhere," said Ekaterina Kirillovna Kucherenko, who had already made herself at home in the vehicle. "But what is to be done? We are people without rights: without work, without money and without homes. Only toward autumn, did we stop, sort of. We were settled in Yagotin, at the Put Zhovtnya Kolkhoz. They constructed 75 little houses. On a marsh. So that even the walls were damp all the time and all the whitewash fell off in a week. And there were three families in each such little house. This is how we survived the winter, but, by spring, the houses began to crumble. When our roof fell in and the walls cracked wide open, I went to the chairman, to Vasilii Prokopyevich Moyse. I wanted to request construction materials. And he told me in response 'you will have to prop up your roofs any way you can, even if it is with your own hands.'"

So they returned. They returned to their own village, tightly closed off by barbed wire, having covered hundreds of kilometers in passing trucks and bypassed the military and militia cordons at the boundary of the 30-kilometer zone. Three hundred old women and a dozen old men from the village of Yelitsa, 70 from neighboring Lubyanka, 30-40 people from nearby villages. They knocked the rusted locks from the doors and swept out the dust which had piled up over a year's time.

"And then they still wanted to move us out. In December of '88, they drove into the village with bulldozers and power shovels, leave, they said, your houses are going to be demolished. But why should we leave, when we had just gotten our gardens in order, and our huts! We stood below the walls of the huts, demolish them, we said, and us with them... And so they went away. And then everybody and his mother arrived!"

On the whole, they are not complaining. They have gotten used to the nickname of "self-settlers," especially since they can rely only on themselves. In addition, there is no water and gas, while it is light for only an hour and a half a day.

"And if someone gets sick, then we immediately run to the KPP, to the militia. They have both telephones and portable radios. They always call the doctors. And we are frequently visited by commissions, every four months. The entire village has already been thoroughly tested..."

They do not believe the discussions about radiation. And, as proof, they pull out from the cupboards and from behind numerous village photographs official reports about the fact that the gamma radiation background in their houses does not exceed one-one hundredth millirem per hour.

"Tell me, why are they giving a wage supplement in both the Poleskiy and Ivankovskiy rayons, 15 rubles for radiation, and milk to boot, while they give us nothing. And why, up till now, have they not fenced off the 'clean' plots and not said where it is permissible to sow and where it is not?"

We did not know what to answer. Then again, what can you say to the people living in the village of Yelitsa, 20 kilometers from Chernobyl, 7 from the zone boundary and 130 from Kiev?

The Zone

Sasha Burakov, the first secretary of the Slavutich Komsomol Gorkom, brought us to the traffic control station in his own Zhigulinka [little Zhiguli car]. Of course, he himself could have dropped us off in Pripjat and not taken the risk. The reason for this would not have been cowardice or being busy, but rather, that the city (and a not completely clean one at that) does not particularly need the excess radionuclides which would most certainly wind up on wheels which have driven around the zone.

The vehicle for us soon arrived. After 10 minutes, we reached the place. A helicopter was waiting on the concrete pad. Below, the city of Pripjat went by quickly, then the rye turned the view green. No one will ever taste bread from these fields. The meadows and cut-down forest were sown with rye so they would not become dust bowls. The bushy roots hold the soil well. The winter did not indulge the zone with either snow or rain. All the ground had dried up and the slightest breeze was enough to set dust devils whirling. It is evident from above that the forest is alive, although, here and there, there are spots of dead trees...

After the accident, they hurried with the start-up of the plant. They wanted to receive a medal. This is something about which, 3 years later, many people are having doubts: was it really worthwhile to hurry so? The sarcophagus over the fourth unit has also been made larger in order to protect the plant workers from excess radiation. And they cleaned everything in the district in the beginning for the same purpose. It is now known what kind of radiation fields there are. It is said somewhat jokingly: 450 types of radionuclides flew out during the explosion and, in addition, completely new combinations were formed. They buried all this "filth." They asserted that this is safe. They called the ordinary holes sepulchers. Today, there are 800 of them in the zone. There is in the sand a "red" forest, cut down on 150 hectares, 100,000 tons of ferrous metals, 10,000 tons of alloyed steel, "straw"—small tubes, protective outer garments, and cement structures—in all, 3.5 million cubic meters.

The sepulchers have become dangerous. Little by little, the radionuclides are seeping into the ground waters. It is difficult to predict what may happen then. In many of the republic's rayons, after the accident, they have been drinking water from wells. The Ukraine's entire water basin turns out to be threatened.

The Kompleks Enterprise, which is part of the Pripjat Scientific Production Association, is occupied right now with the sepulchers. In '86, they built a wall in the soil around the plant in order to contain the contaminated water and not let it get into the Pripjat River and from

there into the Dnepr River. The water did not go anywhere, but, over four years, it has come to the very surface. Tiny geysers are suddenly beginning to break through, first here, then there, and they are, for the time being, stopping them up with asphalt plugs. The water can be drained—into a cooling pond, but there is so much "filth" there that this water turns out to be just a drop in the bucket. Yet, all the same, it is necessary to clean it, just like the many mill ponds along the river banks.

"Mines"—globes of fuel—are also present throughout the entire zone. Kompleks' "minesweepers" are producing quite different results from those supplied to everyone for 4 years by the hydrometeorology workers. They are removing the "filth" in the zone with shovels. It is a good thing that, for the time being, there are enough of them in the country. "Robots" are helping carry out the decontamination—those same shovels, but on wheels. But there is no place whatsoever to process the wastes...

The "filth" is being spread from the zone in all directions. Things are being pilfered from the abandoned apartments and houses. Private automobiles are being burned: spare parts have repeatedly cropped up in the black market. And recently, quite a downright scandal occurred. In Kiev, in the Dnepr River inlet—10 meters from apartment houses and a kindergarten—they stumbled across a pontoon with radioactive wastes. The tracks led to the Kiev Ship-Building and Ship-Repairs Yard. A ship, which had returned from the zone, had brought the containers to here. For a long time, they moved it from one place to another, until the workers insisted: get it out of our sight. Then they sent it to the other bank. It turned out that there were dirty protective outer garments in the containers, ones worn by the ship's repair workers in the zone. The "boxes" were immediately returned to Chernobyl and buried there. Where is the guarantee that the zone has sent its last gift and has sent to us the last remnant of the "roadside picnic"?..

The Chernobyl AES

The Ukraine's new Supreme Soviet was elected in March. But, back in February, the old membership gathered for a last session. They discussed the ecological situation. For the first time in 4 years. What they decided, they can not be held accountable for, because the new soviet is to carry out their decisions and, in return, they recorded in the historical record: they said, while we were in power, we did something, or more accurately, we just discussed it. After people had lived for 4 years in radioactive "filth," where it was higher than all the most "increased" standards; when it had become clear that a third resettlement is drawing near—from already resettled areas; precisely when our scientists—the only ones in the world—have invented the concept of safe living in contaminated areas. But, on the other hand, what is there to be surprised at when, even up till now, 4 years after Chernobyl, the republic's minister of health care does not know what is going on on the grounds of nuclear power plants. There is still just

one master there—the Third Main Administration of the USSR Ministry of Health, that same so-called departmental medicine and that means classified and classifying everything...

So the deputies finally thought suddenly that it was necessary to atone for the guilt and, first of all, they decided: to close the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. It is true, not tomorrow—by 1995...

Stopping the plant—what could be simpler: press a button and it is done. It will stop producing power and, in return, it itself will become a consumer for decades. Stopping and closing are by no means one and the same thing. Ye.I. Ignatenko, the chief of the Scientific and Technical Main Administration of the Ministry of the Nuclear Power Industry, is certain that everything will turn out like so: "The personnel of the reactor section will be retained for about 3 years. Meanwhile, the fuel will be unloaded. (To where? The storehouses around the plant are packed to the brim.—the authors) Then it will be shipped from the plant in stages. This is about another two years. So, for about 5 years, the reactor section's personnel will be near the reactors. After this, it will be possible to lock up the station and not worry further... And after approximately 12 years, it will be possible to set about removing the highly radioactive equipment." Clear and simple. But here is the problem: a special process is needed to unload the fuel. It does not exist. Equipment for such unloading also does not exist. No one has taken up the matter of the special transportation for shipments of radioactive wastes (and their amount will be three times greater than for all the years of operation of the AES). And there are also no plants for processing the unloaded fuel. They will appear no sooner than in 5-7 years.

They have blown 80 million [rubles] on repairs for the sarcophagus and its beauty treatment, someone grumbles. They should tear it down and that would be the end of it. The sarcophagus has remained an enigma for three years: they were not able to get to its core and thus find out: is a nuclear explosion possible or not? They have drilled 70 holes through the walls. They have constructed a specially protected passageway. (Now this really cost a lot). Only then did they explain: the fourth reactor, in essence, does not exist. The graphite has burned up. There are no regular assemblies. No process canals either. The fuel has fused completely with the building structures. And part of it has even been turned to dust. And it, especially the plutonium, is not something to trifle with. In general, they received an unambiguous answer: a chain reaction will not occur. But the building structures may collapse. This answer, very likely, also cost 80 million.

The informals do not like the sarcophagus. They are proposing that a lawn be laid out on its site. And excursions be brought to there. The grass will rustle, the flowers will fill the air with fragrance and the bees will buzz—an idyllic scene. But who will tear down the

sarcophagus? The opponents of nuclear power production? They will not do it. There is neither the technology nor robots. "And what ones there are will not likely go into such radiation fields, they will refuse," joke the specialists and they are not recalling an anecdote, but rather, the truth: in '86, a robot—not ours, a foreign model—would not accept the command to move to the mess and committed suicide: it jumped into a deep ditch with water in it.

Does this mean, people again? To that place where there are 800 rems per hour?

At the session of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet, they cleanly smashed nuclear power production: unreliable, ecologically dangerous and uneconomical. And they further acknowledged that the sun and wind will not save power production and there is no coal or oil. It is possible to count on gas, but there is only enough for about 20-25 years. They say, recently, a nuclear power plant was getting ready to be built 30 miles from New York. The residents protested. The authorities were not about to go against the wishes of the people, but they offered a choice: either the plant be built or prices for electric power be raised. The people deliberated and agreed to pay a bit more.

The Chernobyl plant will stop operating and the Ukraine will lose 10 percent of its electric power. The nuclear power plant workers earned a pure profit of 70 million [rubles] a year. Twelve percent goes into the local budget. They are useful funds. Indeed, just one program for elimination of the accident's consequences requires 15 billion rubles. By the way, the public movement, *Perspektiva*, which originated in Slavutich, is proposing that the ministry give back up to half of the profits for the development of the 30-kilometer zone and Slavutich.

M.P. Umanets, director of the Chernobyl AES, believes: we need to be concerned not about whether it is necessary to operate nuclear plants, but rather, about whether it is possible to increase their safety. The specialists maintain: if everything which occurred on 26 April, 1986, were to occur today, the accident would not occur. This is guaranteed not only by the calculations, but also by the experimental corroborations. The vapor void coefficient, which played a fatal role then, has been reduced by a factor of 5-6. The safety system operates twice as fast: 12.5 seconds instead of 24 seconds. They have installed a completely new, independent, quick-reponse emergency safety system. Its speed is 2.5 seconds in all. The operators are now responsible not for the production of electric power, but only for the plant's safety.

"And if, knowing the whole truth, the public says: we are closing the plant, I will obey," Umanets said to us as we parted.

...It is 10 minutes to the electric railway to Slavutich. We slipped through the radiation monitoring devices and ran to Semikhody—a platform five steps from the station. After removing work clothing, it is necessary to

jump under a shower, then receive new clothing, but what were we supposed to do—we came in our own. A dear woman says sympathetically: Oh, they will not let you in. Then she gives us size 56 quilted jackets and pants. We cram our own jackets into a bag.

At the exit to the railway, they touch us suspiciously with instruments and then threaten the chief that they will not take us with them. Yet, all the same, we manage to jump onto the departing electric train. Halfway there—a transfer, onto a clean train. But, in Slavutich, they located us all the same. We removed the protective outer garments, put on our own and went to the control point.

Slavutich

In the city, our troubles are the usual ones, socialist. Products slip away illegally. Ispolkom chiefs buy vehicles through phony relatives. Machinations with the passport. People sleeping on the floor—there is no furniture. So-called increased demand goods (and what today is not in increased demand?) do not reach the collectives, to which they are supposed to be distributed. In return, certain chiefs store their own reserves in three refrigerators. There is no limit to improvement, especially at state expense. One administrator parquetered the ceiling in his own cottage...

But one time, everything appeared in the stores: stewing meat and condensed milk, Finnish footwear and Italian raincoats. The candidates for Ukrainian People's Deputies came to town. The voters were keenly interested: is such abundance only for today?

The plant director, M.P. Umanets, although he had withdrawn his own candidacy, firmly promised the people that things would be put in order. For a start, the chief of the workers' supply department would be replaced. Medicine would be tightened up. The medical unit was on everyone's tongue: children without care and certain former Prip'yat residents have been generally forgotten. On the other hand, there was really nothing to investigate seriously. It is just now that the plant has received a million in cash for medicine. They have already managed to acquire some abroad. It is true that one of two SICH [human radiation counter] devices settled somewhere in Moscow.

An alarm in Slavutich: they discovered a "spot." S.I. Gurenko, second secretary of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee, said at a meeting with the voters: "I was against the site in the environs of Slavutich, but it was selected by union departments and we were assured that everything was normal." Prip'yat Party Secretary V.I. Kholosha was more precise: "Ilin and Izrael—the main safety specialists—said that the site was clean and it was not necessary to perform any kind of decontamination. Construction was begun. But the former 'Combine' investigated the area all the same and immediately suggested that a battalion of soldier be brought in to decontaminate it. The order came down: do not send any soldiers. So as not to upset the builders and the residents.

In the fall of 1988, all the same, they broke the opposition and decontaminated the area, but the city had already been built between two 'spots.'"

What will become of the city if they close the plant? Without the plant, the city has no future. Now the problem is to settle the latter members of the families, but where are 5,000 people supposed to find work right away? There is no kind of infrastructure. However, there is this version of the future: "Here there is the city of Slavutich and there is a collective, so it would make sense to build somewhere nearby a new AES, so that the people discharged from the first unit would transfer to the new, modern unit." It belongs to Ye.I. Ignatenko, the chief of the Ministry of the Nuclear Power Industry's Scientific and Technical Main Administration.

Instead of the Results

We understand that the government commission on Chernobyl has its hands full. All the programs and the sins of others are hanging on it. Today's problems are pressing, and frequently they can not get to tomorrow's. But about 20 years will pass and will we not need to dig into the Chernobyl archives to get to the truth all the same? The Chernobyl tragedy will not lessen in severity from the most generous investments, routine portions of migration and the best foreign diagnostics, if we do not receive an answer to the simplest questions.

Who is accountable to the people for those documents which we cited at the very beginning? (There are hundreds of them, in fact).

Who gave the order to the USSR Ministry of Health's Third Main Administration to suppress all the radiation information—the radiation doses and the diagnoses? (Many of the victims could have been helped earlier. Today it is too late).

Who made the decision to send tens of thousands of soldiers and trainees across the zone and across the reactor?

And the most important one: who is really, in fact, at fault in the accident?

The official version (presented in the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]) reads: "The initial cause of the accident was the extremely unlikely combination of violations of procedure and operating conditions committed by the personnel of the power unit." The report was prepared by the Atomic Energy Institute. It was approved by the institute's deputy director, Ye.P. Ryazantsev, in October of 1986. In the IAEA, the report was cut down. "Unimportant details" were concealed under the stamp "For Official Use Only." In the official version of the causes for the accident, it was abridged like so: "...during which there appeared shortcomings in the design of the reactor and key areas of the SUZ" (the control and safety system). This is precisely the heart of the matter. Many specialists (the participants in the

elimination of the consequences of the accident conducted an independent investigation) believe they are the initial cause of the accident. Engineer and Nuclear Safety Inspector A.A. Yadrikhinskiy is certain: "The nuclear accident—the explosion of the reactor of the Chernobyl AES' fourth unit—occurred because of violations in the design of the RBMK reactor [High-Power Channel Reactor], by the scientific adviser and the chief designer, of the PBYa-04-74" (nuclear safety rules). He analyzed the design and found that 7 points of these rules had been violated, while, in all, 32 violations were uncovered, 9 of which—noted the former minister of the Ministry of Atomic Power, N.F. Lukonin—are technically irremovable. (A complete analysis of the violations is available in the editorial office). By the way, the legal and technical experts, in response to the question of a court as to whether or not the RBMK reactor met the requirements of the PBYa, answered that it met the requirements of the PBYa and the OPB.

...One of us has an old green notebook. Glued and re-glued. It was started on 5 May, 1986. In it are all the Chernobyl facts, names and telephones. It was at the third unit and right next to the sarcophagus, in Prip'yat and Slavutich. And we never thought about testing it. In Slavutich, in the yard of the medical check point, the radiation monitor operators were testing the soil. We put the notebook underneath. On the panel, it flashed: 22...

They say that Einstein wrote fiction stories. On earth, there was only nuclear power production. And suddenly, some crazy fellow came up with the idea that it would be possible to obtain power from oil, gas and wood. The brightest minds gathered together, discussed this for a long time and decided: no, that will not work—a very dirty technology...

Perhaps, this is the future?..

Uzbek Veterans Score Separatism, Extremism in Letter to Gorbachev

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30 Jan 90 p 2

[Commentary by R. Gulamov, chairman of the Uzbek republic council of veterans of war and labor, USSR people's deputy: "We Support Perestroika With Our Deeds"]

[Text] To comrade M.S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Dear Mikhail Sergeyevich!

The important, stormy, ambiguous events of recent times compel the attention of all Soviet people. They especially trouble veterans—we feel a special responsibility for everything that we have created with our labor or fought for and defended with our blood. As a result we have been intently pondering again and again the materials of the 2d USSR Congress of People's Deputies of

December (1989), the CPSU Central Committee plenums, and the All-Union Conference of Representatives of the Working Class, Peasantry, and Engineering and Technical Workers that took place a few days ago. Again and again we read your speeches and discussions in Lithuania, and we discuss with pain the alarming reports on the dramatic events occurring in the Transcaucasus.

Permit us to share our thoughts. Indeed, we are speaking of the fate of our multinational state, our Leninist party, and the historic fate of socialism.

The Uzbek veterans of the party, war, and labor unanimously believe that perestroika, proclaimed by our party, is a revolution within a revolution because it has been called upon to radically change and renew the appearance of socialism and to return a genuinely Leninist content both to socialist economics and to the political and spiritual life of society.

Its early results already reveal something about it.

Radical changes in production relations have been taking place on the basis of economic reforms that are in essence revolutionary. We have noted major structural changes in the national economy and its reorientation toward the solution of social problems. The system for the provision of pensions is being restructured, which calls forth the special gratitude of the veterans. We are overcoming the remnants of the command administrative system, which inflicted serious damage upon the welfare of our socialist society, our science and culture, and the spiritual development of the Soviet people.

Glasnost and genuine democracy are gathering force, the political and spiritual life of our Soviet people have become richer and more varied, and the process of giving the working masses access to the administration of state and social matters is underway.

As a result of perestroika and the victory of the new political thinking under contemporary conditions and thanks to the foreign policy initiatives of the Soviet Union, international tension has decreased palpably and real prospects for lasting peace and security of peoples have appeared. All this is an object of our common pride and it strengthens the inexhaustible faith of the veterans of the party, war, and labor in the ideals of socialism.

At the same time, we, the veterans, are not misled by the results of the initial stage of perestroika and we are aware that we still have many unresolved problems, among them the supply of foodstuffs and other consumer goods to the population. There are instances of sabotage and irresponsibility, and crime is on the rise.

We understand how great, multifaceted, and difficult the problems are that face the party and the country at this upcoming stage. There will be a need for a great effort by all the party, soviet, trade union, and social organizations for the final victory of perestroika in all the spheres of the national economic and sociopolitical life and for

the triumph over all the consequences of negative phenomena from the era of stagnation and the difficult crisis state of our country. And the republic's veterans assure the CPSU Central Committee that they consider it their primary duty to help the party in every possible way in its great and multifaceted effort to renovate all aspects of the life of our socialist society and especially in the education of the youth in the spirit of communist ideology, Soviet patriotism and internationalism, high ethics and morality, love for work, and belief in the ideals of the Communist Party and the Socialist manner of life.

Wholly supporting glasnost, openness and a truthful evaluation of the path our country has traveled, the veterans nonetheless cannot reconcile themselves to instances of a nihilistic attitude toward the history of our country after the October revolution. They call for an honest, objective demonstration of the historic achievements of our peoples as well as the mistakes, misfortunes, and tragic events. We believe that it is our duty to bring our youth the truth about the steadfast faith of socialism's pioneers in the pure ideals of a new world and about the heroic labor, huge enthusiasm, and unselfishness of the older generation, to transmit to the Soviet youth our experience of life and labor, to further their education in the spirit of boundless love for the Homeland, of readiness to defend it, and of loyalty to socialist ideals, and to protect it from pernicious influences of bourgeois and so-called "mass" culture.

Deeply aware of the burdensome, destructive consequences of Stalinism, which deformed socialism and led to mass repressions, the Uzbek veterans of the party, war, and labor understand that criticism of everything tragic that happened to us in the past cleanses us morally and ensures that nothing similar will ever happen again. But, as you have repeatedly stressed, it must be done with clean hands and with pure intentions.

Therefore the veterans strongly protest attempts by some historians and publicists to slander the past as a chain of continuous mistakes. We consider the statements of some latter-day "theoreticians" that our country has "gone nowhere" for 70 years to be antiscientific and immoral, and we repudiate these ill-intentioned statements.

One need not emphasize in the history of our Homeland the labor exploits of the people, who created a mighty power under the leadership of the Leninist party in the shortest possible time, the heroic feats of the Soviet people, who defeated fascism in the years of the Great Patriotic War, or the achievements of science and technology in the postwar years.

Perestroika is a continuation of the cause of the October Revolution and the cause of Lenin, and we the veterans express our boundless gratitude to the Leninist party of the communists which has acted as sponsor and chief motivating force for a fundamental renovation of Soviet society, and we reject the direct attacks on the party that

have appeared in some mass media, at the meetings of individual informal organizations, and in attempts to split the party from the people and set them against one another.

If these bawlers at the meetings had pure intentions, they would have long ago directed their efforts at a constructive resolution of the tasks of perestroika and, by participating to the fullest extent, hastened the processes of perestroika.

We are very troubled by the appearance of separatist sentiments and of actions with the goal of dividing our multinational Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and undermining the organizational and ideological unity of the party. We consider absolutely intolerable the criminal actions of armed extremists who stir up interethnic discord, bring blood and suffering to the people of other nationalities, undermine the foundations of law and order, act openly against the legitimate organs of power, or desecrate the inviolability of what is most sacred—the border of the USSR. That can never be justified by anything. It has nothing in common with either democracy or national consciousness. The banditry which leads to chaos and victims must be decisively stopped.

The facts prove irrefutably that such extremist elements pursue only their own selfish and base goals, and they negate perestroika in every possible fashion with their unworthy actions. They are, according to V.I. Lenin, the worst enemies of the working class, able to doom the masses to the most bitter ordeals.

We declare firmly that in our society the party is the integrating, uniting force of all social organizations and of the whole people. And no one will take away from it the role of the political vanguard. As a result, the veterans of the party, war and labor wish to inform you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, that they protest the unscrupulous attacks on the party, the attempts to publicly defame it, and the discrediting of communists and party committees in the presence of the labor collectives, and we demand that an end be put to it.

A great task is before the party and each communist, including the veterans. The preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress are before us. And the party has no more important work than to expand revolutionary perestroika persistently and tenaciously and to fulfill its historic mission of renewing socialism.

Here in Uzbekistan the republic's party organization is already conducting a great organizational and political effort, directing the energy of the republic's workers to the tasks of perestroika.

And the first positive achievements are already available. The republic has fulfilled the plan for laying in cotton, silk cocoons, grain, and melons.

Housing and social and cultural facilities are being built intensively, and work has been placed on a broad footing to allot and expand the plots of land of workers at the

collective and state farms, which will contribute substantially to a solution of food and housing problems and to an improvement in the social position of women and mothers with many children. A program has been approved for a fundamental reconstruction of the republic's capital, Tashkent, for the improvement of living conditions for its population of two million, and for a renovation of the historic portion of our ancient city and its remarkable monuments.

At the October session of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet, a Law on the State Language was adopted guaranteeing free and equal development of the languages and cultures of all the peoples inhabiting our republic.

The Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet also adopted a decree directed at stabilizing the republic's social and political situation, which received the support of the entire republic.

The party and soviet organs are working to satisfy the urgent consumer demands of the veterans of the party, war, and labor.

The republic's party organization is taking measures to further rally the party's ranks around the CPSU Central Committee, to strengthen the Leninist friendship of the peoples, and to give an international education to communists, members of the Komsomol, and all the republic's workers.

At the same time we understand that this is only the beginning of the positive achievements. Uzbekistan still has many unresolved problems and difficulties which will be met on the road of perestroika and which will require great efforts, organization, persistence, and extraordinary responsibility to overcome.

We still have to make major structural reforms in the republic's national economy and we have to end its orientation toward raw materials. Special, large-scale measures are needed to overcome social backwardness and improve living conditions for people. Our industrious people by right connect the economic independence of Uzbekistan with a change in the prices for cotton, that unique gift of nature and an important source of prosperity for all our society. We count on the participation of the entire country in the liquidation of the gigantic ecological catastrophe in the Aral region.

The Uzbek veterans of the party, war, and labor have been and will be loyal assistants to the republic's party organization in the resolution of all these tasks of perestroika.

In the name of the republic's veterans aktiv and of all the veterans of Uzbekistan, we convey to you, Mikhail Sergeyevich, our sincere support and warm approval of your activities. We wish you strength, confidence, and resolution in the victory of perestroika for the good of our multinational Homeland—The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

On behalf of the Uzbek veterans of the party, war, and labor, with deep respect.

Rasul Gulamov.

Resolution on Status of Women, Children

90US0801A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 90
Second Edition pp 1-2

[Text of USSR Supreme Soviet resolution, signed by A. Lukyanov, USSR Supreme Soviet chairman: "Resolution of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Immediate Measures for the Improvement of the Status of Women, Maternity and Children, and the Strengthening of the Family"; Kremlin, Moscow, 10 Apr 90]

[Text] In assigning great meaning to the resolution of urgent problems of the family, maternity and children, and for the execution of the decisions of the First Congress of USSR People's Deputies resolves:

1. For the purpose of improving the material status of families with children:

1) to increase: the amount of allowances for child care until age 18 months to the level of the minimum wage (for the birth of two or more children, the allowance is paid for each child). For persons residing in areas and localities for which regional coefficients are added to wages, the size of the allowance is determined with the application of these coefficients. If in the given region there are various coefficients for wages, then the coefficient established for the wage workers and employees of non-production branches of the national economy are applied;

—the amount of the state allowance for a child under care (guardianship)—up to the level of the minimum wage;

—the amount of the state allowance paid for the upbringing and maintenance of children of single mothers (widows, widowers), former inmates of children's homes (boarding schools)—up to the level of the minimum wage;

2) to pay working women who have not yet reached age 18 an allowance for child care until age 18 months independent of the length of labor service;

3) to establish for working women without one year's labor service and for non-employed women allowances for child care until age 18 months at the rate of 50 percent of the minimum wage;

4) to extend to widowers with children who do not receive for them a pension for loss of a breadwinner the right to the state allowance paid to widows in accordance with legislation currently in effect.

2. By 1 January 1991, the USSR Council of Ministers in conjunction with the All Union Central Council Trade Union [VTsSPS] is to:

—develop a single system of state allowances to families with children, taking into consideration the type of family, its income, and the cost of living index;

—to determine the procedure for providing allowances for persons temporarily unable to work who are occupied with early child care (up to age 3) or care for handicapped children in the event of a mother's illness, when she cannot care for a child.

3. To grant the union republic and autonomous republic Councils of Ministers, kray, oblast, okrug, rayon, and city soviets of people's deputies the right to establish, within the limits of the resources they have, additions to all types of allowances and privileges for families with children specified by currently effective legislation of the Union of SSRs, to introduce supplemental forms of allowances and privileges geared toward a more complete satisfaction of the requirements of families with children, first and foremost, large, incomplete, and young families, families bringing up handicapped children, and children remaining without the guardianship of parents.

4. To extend the privileges established by currently effective legislation for the given category of children located in children's homes or boarding schools to all orphans and children remaining without the guardianship of parents being educated or brought up in educational-upbringing institutions, regardless of type or departmental subordination.

5. To establish that the resources exacted from parents for the maintenance of children located in state children's institutions, as well as the state pensions and allowances designated for them, are transferred to the personal accounts of the inmates in a savings bank.

6. For the purpose of increasing the efficacy of preventive health maintenance for pregnant women, for preserving their health and that of newborn infants, to establish pregnancy and maternity leave of a duration of 56 calendar days before delivery (starting 1 December 1990, 70 calendar days), and 56 calendar days thereafter (in the event of delivery complications or the birth of two or more infants, 70 days), to be counted totally and granted to a woman fully, regardless of the number of days actually used before delivery.

7. In order to create favorable conditions for newborn infant and toddler care:

1) to establish that leave for care of children until age 3 is granted completely or partially to the child's mother or, at the family's discretion, to the father, grandmother, grandfather or other relative who actually cares for the child;

2) to grant working men whose wives are on pregnancy and maternity leave annual leave at their desire during the period of the wife's leave.

8. For the purpose of creating favorable conditions for parents which allow them to combine labor in social production with bringing up children:

1) to establish at the request of women with children up to age 14 (including those under their guardianship) a part-time work day or a part-time work week;

2) to preserve women's uninterrupted labor service for calculating allowances for temporary inability to work in the event of the dissolution of a labor contract in connection with caring for a child up to age 14 (including those under their guardianship) of for a handicapped child up to age 16 under the condition of coming to work before the child attains the indicated age;

3) to extend the privileges granted women in connection with maternity (limits upon night and overtime labor, being called in on days off and sent on work-related travel; grants of supplemental leave; the establishment of special labor regimes and other privileges established by the legislation currently in effect) to fathers bringing up children without a mother (in the event of her death, deprivation of parental rights, an extended stay in a treatment facility and in other cases of the absence of maternal guardianship of children), as well as to guardians (trustees) of minors;

4) to establish for one of the parents (trustee or guardian) caring for a handicapped child:

—the issuance of medical certification of temporary inability to work for the entire period of the sanatorium treatment (including travel time) of a handicapped child under age 16 if individual care of the child is indicated as medically necessary;

—one supplemental day off per month, with the day's wages covered by funds from social insurance.

9. For the purpose of the further improvement of labor conditions for women and persons under age 18:

1) to recognize the need to create realistic conditions for the application of their labor primarily in jobs corresponding to their psycho-physiological and age traits, as well as for the improvement of their professional mastery, their work advancement, and their active participation in all spheres of society's life activity;

2) for the USSR Council of Ministers in conjunction with the VTsSPS to provide in 1990-1991:

—the development of measures to increase the interest of associations, enterprises, and organizations in the rational utilization of the labor of women, persons under age 18, and persons having limited labor capabilities;

—the development of new norms of the maximum permissible loads for women and minors in the manual lifting and carrying of loads in accordance with scientifically based norms;

—the review of the list of production lines, professions, and jobs with burdensome and harmful labor conditions at which the application of the labor of women and teenagers is prohibited; to add to their forms jobs in which women of childbearing age must not be involved;

- the determination of branches of the national economy, production lines, and jobs at which the night labor of women is not caused by particular necessity, and the according establishment of concrete terms and procedures for releasing women from night shifts, having specified the priority release from night labor of women with children under age 14 or handicapped children under age 16;
 - the development of criteria for the classification of workplaces with consideration for the psychophysiological, age, and other traits of the workers and an approximate list of the jobs and professions subject to priority substitution by women, minor, and persons having limited labor capability;
 - the introduction of a form of statistical bookkeeping for labor set up with a separate paragraph for women and persons under age 18 in the occupation indexes and categories of workers, the forms of labor organization and conditions, illness, trauma, and their causes.
10. For the purpose of preventing hazardous effects upon the health of women and children from work in tobacco and cotton cultivation, to consider it necessary to charge the union republic Councils of Ministers with ensuring the development and inculcation of safe technologies for harvest and primary processing of tobacco and cotton, and the corresponding forms of labor organization and conditions.
11. To ensure the timely transfer of pregnant women to different, lighter work which excludes the effects of unfavorable production factors:
- 1) association, enterprise, and organization managers, in conjunction with trade union committees and organs of sanitary supervision, with the participation of women's public organizations in accordance with medical requirements are to establish the work places and determine types of jobs to which pregnant women may be transferred, or which they may fulfill at home, as well to create special shops (sectors) for the application of their labor, or create for these purposes production lines on a share basis;
 - 2) to establish that until the resolution of the issue of a rational labor situation for the pregnant woman, in accordance with medical certification, she is entitled to release from work while maintaining the average wage

for all work days subsequently missed, to be covered by enterprise, institution, or organization resources.

12. In the interests of maintaining and strengthening the health of women and children:

1) USSR Gosplan and the USSR Ministry of Finance are to stipulate the allocation in 1991-1992 of supplemental hard currency funds for the construction and equipping of new types of pediatric and obstetric treatment and prevention facilities; the purchase of imported technological equipment for the expansion of the production of biological preparations, vaccines, infant food products, and forms of medicines for children; the purchase of infant food products, including treatment and contraceptive means to fully meet the population's requirements, with consideration for the output of domestic production;

2) the USSR Council of Ministers and the Councils of Ministers of union republics to provide special conditions for the creation of joint enterprises with foreign firms and organizations for the production of treatment and diagnostic apparatus and instrumentation for obstetric and pediatric facilities, and rehabilitation and prosthetic resources for handicapped children;

3) the USSR Council of Ministers State Commission for foodstuffs and purchasing to develop by the beginning of the 13th 5-year-plan a mechanism for intensifying agricultural enterprises' interest in cultivating ecologically safe production, first and foremost for young children and pregnant women.

13. To charge the USSR Council of Ministers with presenting to the USSR Supreme Soviet in a 6-month period the proposals stemming from this resolution on introducing amendments into the legislation currently in effect.

14. Articles 1, 4, 5, and Article 8 point 4 of this resolution are to enter into force on 1 January 1991.

15. Control over the implementation of this resolution is incumbent upon the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the affairs of women, the protection of the family, maternity, and children, and the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for science, public education, culture, and upbringing, and the USSR Supreme Soviet committee for the people's health maintenance.

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